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This thesis is a comparative study of outcomes of the criminal process in
customary and magistrate courts in Botswana with specific reference to
sentencing outcomes. The main objective of the study was to determine
whether differences in the structure of the sentencing discretion of judges of
customary and magistrate courts as regards the types and combinations of
punishments they may impose in respect of any offence triable in either
type of court resulted in the imposition of unjustifiably dissimilar
punishments for similar offences. Accordingly, the study examined and
compared disposals and sentencing patterns of the customary and magistrate
courts more generally, and more specifically the use and severity of multiple
punishment(s) awarded by the two courts in respect of similar offences in the
period 1991-2001. The primary hypothesis was substantially, if only
partially supported, in so far as it assumed that differences in the use and
severity of multiple punishments could be explained primarily in terms of
differences in the discretion of the judges as regards combinations of
punishments they may employ against any particular triable-either-way
offence. The study found that, though some of the differences in types and
combinations of multiple punishments deployed by the two courts could be
attributed to differences in the structure of the discretion as to combination
of punishments as postulated, some could not be explained in those terms
despite the apparent exclusive use by one type of court as against the other of
particular combinations of multiple punishments. Nevertheless, the study
found that when customary courts employed multiple punishments, they
tended to punish more severely than magistrate courts did similar offences.
This was evident from the following general patterns: (a) the variety of
punishment combinations deployed by customary courts exceeded those
employed by magistrate courts, sometimes by a very wide margin (b) it was
not unusual for the average number of multiple punishments used to
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punish a single offence in customary courts to exceed three whereas those
deployed by magistrate courts rarely exceeded two (c)customary courts
registered the highest severity scores across all offence groups considered
(d) the severity score differentials ranged from large to very large. Taken
together, these differences amounted to unjustifiable disparities between the
sentencing outcomes of the two courts.
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Glossary of Terms
NORMATIVE: means any practices, conventions, rules, standards, principles
or norms that govern operations in or are followed by a court in relation to a
particular process or processes whether these are adhered to as a matter of
tradition, formal legal requirement or both. This definition relies on the
notion of norms expounded by Gulliver (1963:9) who defined norms to
'include principles, norms, values, rules, laws and the like'
JUDGE: refers to a presiding officer of a court. It is not used in the same
fashion as it is employed in the Interpretations Act.
FORMAL JUSTICE: The term 'formal justice' as used here refers to the
ability or inclination of a court to adhere to commonly agreed standards as
set out in procedural and other sections of statutes governing the trial
process as a whole(see Lyons 1973). The question whether the rules that must
be followed are consistent with or contradict the court's own notions of
justice is not a relevant consideration.
LEGAL FORMALISM: a belief or requirement that the way the legal system
conducts business must be based on binding rules and principles, or more
narrowly, the injunction that the courts are bound to follow or conduct
business according to or within parameters set by rules.
ORDINARY COURTS: refers to received or western style courts also known
as general courts.
INDIGENOUS COURTS: means customary courts.
EXTRA-ORDINARY JURISDICTION: in the context of this thesis it means a
situation where extra jurisdictional powers have been conferred on
customary courts to enable them to try offences that would otherwise be
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considered to be outside their competence because of deficits in their
substantive powers or some other factor.
UNIFICATION/INTEGRATION OF LAW: the terms are used as loosely as
they are in the general literature (especially the writings of A.N Allott) and
are not intended to have broader or narrower meaning that in the literature,
in this thesis. According to Allott (1984:65) '...unification imposes a uniform
law; integration creates a law which brings together, without totally
obliterating, laws of different origins....'
ORIENTATION: means a constellation of values, general philosophies, and
aims that inform, drive, underlie or associated with a system or subsystem.
FOCAL CONCERN: any problem or issue that is of particular concern to a
social/interest group, institution, agency or organ of the state, and which
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1.1 Background to the Research
It has been over thirty years since the government of Botswana made the
most significant legislative intervention yet to minimise the gap between
criminal trials in customary and ordinary courts. In 1972, the government
passed the Customary Courts (Amendment) Act (1972), which effectively
marked the end of customary criminal law, and, heralded the coming into
operation of a common offence framework for all the courts, as well as the
adoption by customary courts of procedural rules broadly similar to those
found in the ordinary courts. These reforms, underlined the importance of
the principle on comparability of standards of justice in criminal trials in
plural legal systems as established at a series of all-Africa conferences on
modernisation of African law, where it was agreed, amongst other things, to
resolve the conflict between customary criminal law and received criminal
law through the 'unification/integration' of substantive law, and,
standardisation of procedural rules (Allot 1984).
As independence approached, the long term aim of narrowing the
differences in standards in plural legal systems continent-wide in respect of
criminal trials was given new impetus by a desire to de-racialize criminal
justice. The pattern in Botswana was not any different:
"One of the factors reinforcing the goal of creating a completely
unified legal system is the objective of maintaining a non-racial
ideology. Moving towards the goal encourages dismantling of those
aspects of the dual legal system which imply the appropriateness
of separate judicial apparatuses for blacks and for others, even
though duality is rationalized in terms of culture or life-style
instead of race"( Barton et al 1983:99).
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The adoption of a rights-based constitution probably also changed the
dynamic in the criminal justice system. The new Constitution as described in
official literature was meant to guide customary courts personnel following
the 1972 reforms as 'the basic principles according to which Botswana is
governed', which were put in place to 'secure the protection of law for every
person' (Republic of Botswana 1971 (a):2). This general trend has been
underscored over the years by the adoption of international standards for
fair trial under various United Nations conventions (see Tshosa 2001).
Yet more than three decades after the momentous reforms of 1972 were
introduced, the perception that the criminal justice system in Botswana is
characterised by wildly different standards of justice is widespread and
persistent (WLSA 1999, Boko 2000, Tshosa 2001, US State Department 2006).
Concerns have been raised, locally and internationally regarding the
question whether those coming before these courts are subject to broadly
similar treatment as was presumably envisaged when reforms to 'unify'
criminal law and standardise procedures were undertaken. Inequities and
disparities in the criminal justice system supposedly emanating from
differences in rules, values, standards and practices of the two legal systems
have become one of the most widely discussed topics in the popular press
and in the legal community, in recent years.
Much of the criticism in the popular press and in scholarly articles (Kirby
1985, Boko 2000) concerning perceived failures of justice has been directed at
customary courts. The independent press has been particularly critical of
customary court justice. One newspaper described customary courts as 'a
joke' and '... a government sponsored court of injustice that is putting
innocent men behind bars' (sic) (Midweek Sun 07/01/2004). Scholars have
found customary court justice wanting in a number of ways. They have
criticised customary courts for being too quick to convict accused persons
3
even though the judges that preside over them often lack the necessary skills
to take onerous decisions affecting the liberty of ordinary citizens (WLSA
1999: 83, Kirby 1985, Boko 2000). The belief that customary courts convict too
readily is not confined to critics of the system but it is something that caused
the government some anxiety before and after the changes that were
introduced in 1972. The terms of the Baillie survey (1969) on customary
courts and the repeated cautions to court presidents in a guidebook prepared
for customary court staff in preparation for the 1972 reforms attest to this.
For example the guidebook cautioned that: "There are court presidents who
feel that they have failed if they do not secure a conviction in a criminal trial"
(Republic of Botswana 1971(a):4).
Critics have also suggested that customary court procedures are generally
flawed and exclude important elements of a fair trial such as legal
representation (Kirby 1985). One of the earliest post-independence studies to
be done on the customary system raised concerns about procedure in
customary courts (Bailie 1969). The survey, which was commissioned by the
government, was tasked, inter alia, with providing a factual account of the
practice and procedure in customary courts and to try to assess the standing
of these courts in the eyes of a cross section of the public (term of reference
(a) and (e) respectively). It found the procedures to be unsatisfactory.
Almost a decade and a half later another commentator observed that the
police channelled weak cases or cases where the evidence would be
inadmissible in magistrate courts, to customary courts (Kirby 1985:32) thus
suggesting that procedures in the latter were relatively weak.
Similarly, punishments handed down by customary courts often attract a lot
of criticism from the liberal sections of the community for their
inappropriateness or harshness. It appears that in some cases it is the
underlying attitudes thought to be behind punishments imposed by
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customary courts rather than the punishments as such that are the subject of
criticism. Customary courts are generally believed to espouse a philosophy
of punishment that is fundamentally different from that of the western-style
courts (Tagart 1931, Schapera 1938, Leslie 1969, Baillie 1969). These perceived
differences have from time to time prompted governments, before and after
independence, to pass laws to regulate the use of punishment.
Ordinary courts have not escaped criticism either. The most common
complaints against ordinary courts in the media have been in connection
with apparent delays in the disposal of cases (e.g. Daily News 29/10/2001).
Rural communities and traditional leaders have generally been critical of
ordinary courts for being somewhat detached from community values and
affording offenders too many protections at the expense of victims of crime.
There is evidently no consensus regarding how far apart the two systems are
in terms of standards or regarding whether or not the differences between
them are of an acceptable magnitude given the presumption of comparability
that underpins the system post-1972. The most widely accepted view
amongst scholars and the legal community at large is that they are too far
apart and that radical reform of the customary system, in particular, is
required to bridge the gap (Boko 2000, Tshosa 2001). Among the most widely
cited demands in the legal community is that accused persons appearing
before customary courts should be allowed legal representation, which is
currently not the case.
On the other hand, traditional leaders believe that the role of customary
courts should be preserved, if not expanded (House of Chiefs debates on the
Stock Theft Bill 1997). Chiefs and other traditional leaders believe that any
differences that there are between customary and general courts are
necessary and acceptable. Perhaps government has to a certain extent found
this argument persuasive in that it has granted customary courts
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extraordinary jurisdiction in respect of two major offences (stock-theft and
habit-forming drugs) that carry sentences that far exceed the normal
sentencing powers of customary court judges. Another argument advanced
in support of the role played by customary courts in criminal trials is that
they enjoy far greater legitimacy among the general population than the
general courts (Otlhogile 1993).
Protections provided for customary law in the Constitution seem to
encourage the view that government never intended to go all the way with
convergence (see Otlhogile 1993) though some commentators suggested in
the period immediately after independence that government was slowly
abolishing customary law (Brewer 1974 ). It is difficult to determine what
exactly the position of the government is on the current debate about
disparities in the criminal justice system save to note that so far the
government has not instituted any further reforms since 1972 to bring the
two legal systems even closer in terms of rules and procedures governing
the trial process. Large areas pertaining to procedure and evidence in
criminal trials in customary courts were left outside the reach of common
law rules when the reforms were instituted so that in these areas the trial
process is still governed by customary law. The government may have been
encouraged in this attitude by various government commissions tasked to
look into the law and the workings of the courts such as the Presidential
Commission Report of 1979 which observed that despite their shortcomings,
customary courts '...dispense a reasonable standard of justice....' to
contemplate any further radical changes (Republic of Botswana 1979: 32).
Perhaps the government has more pragmatic reasons for maintaining the
status quo. Some have suggested that the role of customary courts in the
criminal justice has been retained for reasons of administrative convenience
rather than justice because the system is so heavily reliant on these courts
6
that it can not function without them (Bouman 1984). There is much to
suggest that this may be a valid argument. The minister responsible for local
government under whose ministry customary courts falls recently
observed that customary court play a vital role in dispensing justice (Daily
News 18/07/2000). Furthermore, statistics indicate that the majority of
criminal cases are processed by customary courts. Figures show that
customary courts tried 66% of persons sent to prison in 1985 (Otlhogile
1993:530). Another study showed that in 1992 customary courts dealt with
70% of criminal trials that year (Love and Love 1996:41).
General uneasiness about the system as it is currently arranged amongst
sections of the public, the legal community, scholars and international
agencies may be an indication that the balance that was struck in 1972 is no
longer appropriate for contemporary Botswana society. The country has
undergone tremendous structural transformation over the past 40 years or
so: whereas she was regarded as one of the poorest countries in the world at
independence in 1966, it is today categorised as a middle income country (see
Pearce et al 1990, Hope 1996, UNDP 1990). More of its citizens than before
are educated, and therefore more aware of their rights. The increasing
professionalization of the lower courts in the general system is probably also
increasing pressure on the customary legal system to modernize more
rapidly and in a sense further converge with the former. These factors may
explain current heightened concerns about disparities in the legal system.
But given the changes outlined above, the entire national legal system finds
that it has to strive hard to find the right balance between the changing
lifestyles, social conventions and justice.
Some early writers expressed fears that the nature of duality of the legal
system in post-independence Botswana might be creating different classes of
citizens with different sets of rights (Barton et al 1983:99). Some have been
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more explicit, arguing that in criminal matters, magistrate courts are
forums of justice for rich, educated or enlightened defendants whereas
customary courts are regarded as forums for poor, illiterate or unenlightened
ones (see Kirby 1985:31, Boko 2000:458, Molatlhegi 1997). Some practices,
such as the way the transfer of cases from customary to magistrate courts is
handled lends credence to this view. For instance, if a defendant wants to
get his or her case transferred from a customary to a magistrate court
he/she must produce a letter from a lawyer to that effect and that
essentially means matters turn on whether he/she can afford a lawyer in
the first place as the state does not provide any in non-capital cases, even
for the indigent.
In sum, many of the concerns regarding divergences in the normative
standards of the two legal systems revolve around trial processes, most
notably procedure, and outcomes of these processes, but typically about both
of these (Baillie 1969, Kirby 1985, WLSA 1999, Boko 2000). It appears that
while the incorporation of what are essentially common law courts
procedures into the law governing the trial process in customary courts has
narrowed considerably the previously existing gulf between common law
courts and customary courts, a significant gap still remains because the latter
are exempted from certain rules or are allowed to follow customary
procedures in certain areas. Rules that apply in respect of different aspects of
the trial process in customary courts were deliberately designed to be similar
to or different from those applicable in the general courts to varying degrees.
The law also leaves some gaps in some areas regarding certain aspects of the
trial process or in relation to structural arrangements presumably to
encourage customary courts to follow the traditional pattern of conducting
trials. Thus while on the one hand convergence of processes and rules was
intended to make justice in indigenous and received courts roughly
comparable, on the other hand flexibility clauses/exemption clauses preserve
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and perpetuate differences between the two. It is these differences that are
the major source of controversy.
This review suggests that critics of the current arrangement tend to feel that
variation in the rules relating to different aspects of the trial process affect
outcomes of cases. But not all of these differences in rules or process or their
impact are measurable or quantifiable. In some cases it may be difficult to
separate the impact of a particular rule from that of others. In certain areas
such as evidence it may be difficult to determine conclusively whether a
lower court has misdirected itself in applying a particular rule (as customary
courts are often accused of doing) until the matter goes to higher courts on
appeal. It then becomes a technical matter whether in arriving at a particular
decision the lower court achieved or failed to achieve the correct balance or
the correct result having regard to all the circumstances. In that case the
complaint ceases to be about the process but rather becomes one about the
rule itself. However, all of these circumstances would not stop members of
the public complaining about disparities resulting from differences in the
rules or how they are applied by the courts if they intuitively feel that the
situation is not consistent with their idea of justice.
This thesis attempts a comparative analysis of the impact of differences in
the rules relating to the last stage of the trial process, namely sentencing.
Unlike with other stages of the trial process disparities relating to sentencing
outcomes are measurable and norms or rules relating to imposition of
punishment tend to be very specific in nature.
1.2 Aims of the Thesis
The aim of this thesis is to provide an empirical basis for the national
conversation on comparative justice in customary and ordinary courts. It is
evident that there is dearth of information on many aspects of the trial
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process. Even though comparative justice is a recurrent theme in public and
scholarly discourse, remarkably little has been done by way of empirical
research on the comparative aspects of the criminal process in ordinary and
customary courts. Virtually no research of any significance has been done in
the area save for a study conducted by Bouman (1984) more than twenty
years ago. This neglect is surprising given the amount of interest that the
public has shown in the issue over many years, if the amounts of column
inches in newspapers that have been devoted to the subject indirectly or
directly and amount of attention issues of comparative justice receive at
government-sponsored workshops on the criminal justice machinery are
anything to go by. This lacuna is even more surprising considering the fact
that not only was criminal law and allied branches of law such as criminal
procedure identified very early by modernizers as an area that needed the
most urgent attention but it has to date been the subject of the most radical
reforms ever seen in Botswana. These reforms have fundamentally altered
the dynamics of how the customary and received systems operate and relate
to one another and it would be natural to assume that this would pique
interest of researchers. The recurrent debate on the comparative merits and
demerits of the customary and general courts in this area has been all the
poorer for lack of research on the subject.
The present study therefore provides a much needed empirical dimension to
the on-going public and scholarly debate on the nature and comparability of
justice dispensed by customary and ordinary courts. It helps to close the
existing knowledge gap on the subject of comparative justice by focussing on
sentencing in customary and magistrate courts. More specifically, it examines
the impact of differences in the rules that govern the options exercisable by
magistrate and customary court judges in respect of the use of punishments
and combinations of punishments (discretion) in relation to a variety
offences. More generally, the project provides a starting point as well as a
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framework for a policy debate concerning the impact and implications of
variations in rules governing sentencing in customary and magistrate courts.
Crucially, it links this debate to historical justifications for the integration of
criminal law and also locates the discussion within the broader context of
principles of modern criminal justice systems in the common law world
hence the focus discretion. Sentencing is a particularly topical issue in
Botswana at the present time because of changes to the punishment regime
brought about by a change in the law in 2004. Lastly, the study proposes new
policy and research directions and it is hoped that it provides stimulus as
well as the opportunity for reflection on the nature and dynamics of
pluralism in the field of criminal law.
1.3 Scope of Study
It may be asked why this project is limited to sentencing. The simple answer
is that it would have been impractical to attempt a comparative analysis of
all stages of the criminal process in the two types of courts, much less, gather
enough data on all of them, in the time available to be able to do justice to
each one. Thus while a comprehensive analysis of all the stages of the trial
process would have gone a long way towards closing the existing
information and knowledge gap more fully, it was simply beyond the scope
of the present project. It is for these reasons, and for reasons of limitation of
space, that this study focuses on only one stage in the criminal process, in
this case, sentencing.
1.4 An Overview of Methods
The present study employed the Mixed Method research strategy which
combines quantitative and qualitative methods in a way that is similar yet
qualitatively different from traditional triangulation to obtain information on
aspects of the criminal process in customary and magistrate courts. In brief,
the study gathered data on the following aspects of the criminal process:
sentencing outcomes, court staff and courtroom processes. It was
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hypothesized that differences in the structure of discretion of judges of
customary and magistrate courts as regards punishments or combinations
of punishments they may impose for similar offences would result in
comparatively dissimilar punishments for those offences. As a first step the
study sought to establish whether there were any general patterns as regards
the distribution of offences by type of court since it was assumed that apart
from differences in substantive jurisdiction, other factors, such as the focal
concerns of each system played some role in the distribution. Second, we
wanted to find out whether there were any variations in the sentencing
patterns of these courts for offences triable-either-way generally. Finally,
using an assortment of quantitative techniques the study compared and
measured the effects of an identified variation in the discretionary powers of
magistrates and customary court judges on sentencing disparities in cases
involving offences and offenders with similar characteristics.
A census survey involving a total of 10 024 criminal cases tried before
magistrate and customary courts at Kanye and Mochudi over a period a ten
years (1991-2001) was the primary method of data extraction. This was
followed by a more detailed supplementary survey, which was conducted at
Mochudi, focusing on offence and offender characteristics. The
supplementary study covered the period 1996-2000.
Court observations and interviews were used to obtain qualitative data
which were used to gain further insight into court processes and to gather
information on the views and background of agents who drive the trial
process, especially judges. The rationale behind court observations was two
fold. First, to gather material on court processes, generally, including,
sentencing. Second, to gather general background material on court
dynamics, not normally available in, or discernable from, court records (e.g.
pre-trial and post-trial attempts by presiding officers to reconcile
complainants and defendants). In terms of the research design of the study it
12
was intended to supplement quantitative data gathered using the census
survey by providing, in a general sort of way, useful information on the
orientation of magistrate and customary courts. In my assessment, such
material provides a useful backcloth for the analysis of the main questions of
the study.
1.5 Statement of Thesis
This study postulated that differences between the two types of courts in
respect of discretion as to choice of punishment would have a significant
distorting effect on sentencing such that in any given instance, the
probability of an offender suffering or not suffering a particular form or
combinations of punishment for an offence that is triable-either-way would
be likely to vary with type of forum. As corollary to that and given
assumptions that the thesis makes about the value differences between the
customary and general courts (see Chapters Three, Four and Five), the
severity of punishments that defendants would be likely to suffer would
most likely vary by type of court as well. It was hypothesized that these
differences would manifest (a) in the form of general patterns and (b) also in
more specific patterns in relation to specific offences and offender
characteristics.
Because the offences in the penal code, the primary offence-creating
instrument in Botswana, are organised, like those of most other countries
according to some rough scale of gravity, if the punishment patterns vary
significantly distortions are likely to occur in the distribution of
severe/lenient sentences within the system as a whole. Thus, the principle
common to modern legal systems that the severity of the penalty suggests




The primary hypothesis of the study set out below, summarizes the expected
effects of differences in the structure of discretion on sentencing patterns and
outcomes. It is followed by a series of minor hypotheses. The first set of
hypotheses (1-2A), all of which are non-directional, are concerned with broad
patterns and how these may be linked to the orientation, basic values and
focal concerns of the two types of court, amongst other factors. Hypotheses
1-2A are described as non-directional because they predict that there will be
differences in the patterns of the two types of court without indicating the
likely direction of these divergences as in terms of which of the two will have
a lower or higher value in respect of any of the items described or
enumerated under those hypotheses.
These hypotheses provide a context for understanding the effects on
sentencing outcomes of the differences in discretionary powers of the judges
of these courts. These effects are summarised under directional hypotheses 3-
4. The second set of hypotheses (3-4) may be described as directional in so far
as they attempt to make predictions regarding the directional patterns of the
expected trends.
The primary hypothesis of this study was that: Differences in the structure
of the sentencing discretion of judges of customary and magistrate courts as
regards the types and combinations of punishments they may impose in
respect of any offence triable in either type of court is likely to result in the
imposition of unjustifiably dissimilar punishments for similar offences.
Hypothesis 1\ There should generally be an uneven distribution of criminal
cases between the courts.
Hypothesis 2: There should generally be variations in the outcome of triable-
either-way offences registered for trial in customary courts ihz-a-viz those
registered for trial in Magistrate courts.
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Hypothesis 2A: There should generally be variations in both sentencing
patterns of customary and magistrate courts in terms of sentencing outcomes
for triable- either-way offences and regarding the most frequently deployed
punishment(s) by each type of court, overall.
Hypothesis 3: Customary courts are more likely than magistrate courts to use
multiple punishments to punish a single offence.
Hypothesis 3A: Where customary courts use multiple punishments to punish
a single offence, the punishments are generally likely to differ in severity
when weighted and compared with those imposed for the same offence by
magistrate courts.
Hypothesis 4: Where the punishments imposed for the same offence is of
the same type, the severity of punishments is likely to vary according to
type of court regardless of whether or not the offender and offence
characteristics are similar.
As is probably evident from most of the hypotheses, the study focused
primarily on sentencing outcomes, but more generally on outcomes of cases
entering customary and magistrate courts. Justification for this approach was
that since the two legal systems are, despite convergence in a number of
critical areas, anchored in social and legal cultures with potentially
divergent value systems, the sentencing outcomes can only be properly
understood and appreciated if the fate of the average case that enters the two
court systems is known because outcomes of cases are products of case-
processing decisions of the courts which may, for whatever reason, be
peculiar to that type of court. Case processing decisions were in turn,
assumed to a lesser or greater extent, to be indicative of the
orientation/values of the court in question. Subject to rules governing the
use or importation of principles associated with them, these values would
presumably run like a thread through all stages of the criminal process
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including, sentencing. To that extent, punishment like other stages must be
seen as being, fundamentally, about values.
What, exactly, was assumed to be the relationship between discretion and
variations in outcomes or fate of cases, generally? The short answer is that it
was assumed that those differences in outcomes of cases that did not reach
sentencing stage would have very little to do with sentencing discretion as
conceptualised in this study (see Chapter Four) They, were, however,
assumed to have a lot to do with other case-processing aspects such as
evidence and procedure which might in turn be influenced by variations in
discretion between the courts in relation to these processes at that point or
stage in the trial as well as the general orientation of the courts. In other
words, it was assumed that such outcomes were probably influenced by let
out and flexibility clauses specific to that stage of the criminal process.
1.7 Theoretical Considerations
The interdisciplinary nature of the study and its general methodological
approach (see Chapter Two) means that the emphasis of the study was more
on gaining insights into problem of disparities rather than on providing
opportunities for theoretical reflection on justice in plural legal contexts. To
that extent the study did not rely on any overarching theoretical framework
or a heavy theoretical background to inform or guide analysis and research.
However, the study does borrow and use insights from writers who have
been associated to varying degrees with theoretical models that are well
known in some sub-disciplines that this study draws upon such as legal
anthropology. A good example would include those writers in the area of
legal anthropology whose works refer to or have been categorised as falling
under or utilizing processual and rule-centred approaches to law (see
Comaroff and Roberts 1981). Furthermore, where it is considered it would
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facilitate discussion to do so, we employ the broader notion of legal
pluralism, not as theoretical framework but as a concept.
Legal pluralism is unquestionably the dominant theoretical framework for
understanding and analysing law in colonial and postcolonial societies at
present time (Woodman 1998, Merry 1988). While it provides a welcome
corrective to the epistemic bias in law (see Griffiths.J1986, Merryl988), it does
not resolve conceptual problems presented by the hybrid nature of African
legal systems (Kuper and Kuper 1965). Furthermore it is open to doubt
whether legal pluralism in both the official and theoretical sense is still the
appropriate framework for analysing difference given that its cohesiveness
and therefore, analytic value, is being increasingly undermined by the
emergence of new pluralisms( see Tamanaha 1993;2000, Woodman 1998) and
lack of a theoretic closure. It has been suggested that the concept has been
extended too far so undermining the comparative project which has always
been at the heart of anthropology (Woodman 1998).
It appears to me that legal pluralism in its various forms is useful as a way of
illuminating the dynamics of a plural legal environment albeit at a fairly high
level of abstraction. It does not, however, provide an adequate theoretical
context for the analysis processes and micro-processes within and between
delineated and/or self-described (legal) systems, especially in sentencing
(see Henham 2000). Notions like 'deep pluralism', 'weak/strong pluralism',
'state law pluralism'(see Woodman 1996; Griffiths.J 1986), whilst useful for
analytical purposes at a relatively high level of abstraction, are not much use
as a guide for understanding a range of permutations that occur within or
might be conceivably be thought to fall under these different labels.
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1.8 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is divided eight chapters. Chapter One outlines and discusses the
context, thesis, scope, assumptions and structure of the study. It also briefly
touches on methodological issues. Some of the issues enumerated are given
fuller treatment in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter Two discusses the research strategy, the assumptions behind it, as
well as the methods and techniques employed in the study to gather and
process data. It describes project-specific factors which led to the choice of
mixed method research strategy as the methodological approach of the
study. It also outlines and discusses procedures used to analyze data.
Chapter Three examines legal developments in Botswana from the colonial
period to the present in the context of a dual legal system with a specific
focus changing normative emphasis of the legal system.
Chapter Four discusses and describes the framework for the exercise of
sentencing discretion in Botswana, before going on to consider the
discretionary powers of magistrates and customary court judges in relation
to discretion as to combination of punishments.
Chapter Five presents and analyzes results from the quantitative part of the
inquiry drawn from the census survey, supplementary survey and derivative
data.
Chapter Six presents and discusses results of the study based on observational
data.
Chapter Seven presents and discusses results from interviews with key court
personnel.
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Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter of the study. It summarizes the
critical and salient findings of the study in light of the primary hypothesis
and other supporting hypotheses. More importantly, it explains the general
and specific factors behind variations in the sentencing patterns of customary
and magistrate courts. Furthermore, it considers the implications of the study
for a number of dimensions of punishment generally, and in the specific
context of Botswana, not the least of which include dealing with the
complexities of the meaning of punishment in rapidly changing post-colonial
societies. It then briefly considers the significance of the methodology
employed in the study and identifies areas for further research and possible
policy changes.
1.9 Conclusion
This chapter introduced and outlined the thesis and basic structure of the
study. It provided the background to the research problem and outlined the
hypotheses that form the focus of the thesis. It also briefly considered the
scope, justification and the methodology of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.0 METHODOLOGY AND RATIONALE
A brief overview of the methodology of the study was provided Chapter
One, Chapter Two discusses methodological aspects of the study in greater
detail. This chapter is divided into three broad sections. The first section of
the chapter discusses the research strategy of the study, its justification and
relevance to the present project as well as its philosophical basis. The second
part focuses on the methods and techniques used in the process of data
collection in both the pilot and the main study. It also discusses the revision
of and adjustments to the data collection techniques and strategies that were
made following the pilot study. The third and last section provides a
synopsis of data analysis techniques employed in the study and their
possible limitations. However, for immediacy and ease of reference more
detailed description and discussion of data analysis techniques is provided in
the relevant sections of the Chapter Five, Six and Seven which present results
on different aspects of the study.
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine and compare sentencing practices
of two different systems to discover how general or system-specific factors
may be influencing sentencing outcomes in customary and magistrate courts.
In this study I employed a mixed method research (MMR hereafter) strategy
that involved the simultaneous use of quantitative and qualitative techniques
but with the former as the primary method guiding the study. The choice of
mixed method research design was motivated by, amongst other factors,
apparent divergences in the methods that have traditionally been employed
in sentencing research into normative aspects of legal systems, especially
African legal systems. There appears to be a strong commitment to
quantitative and qualitative methods among researchers working in the
areas of sentencing and African legal systems and more specifically cross-
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systems research in Botswana. As this study straddles the two areas I
considered that the mixed method design was the most appropriate design
for this research. Incidentally, interest in a MMR is growing across social
sciences and behavioural disciplines (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). As an
approach to research, MMR is descended from traditional triangulation even
though it is considered to be qualitatively different from the latter in that
it is founded or claims to be founded on a firmer and more coherent
philosophy than triangulation (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003; Cresswell
2003). On another level MMR is also seen as an emergent movement that is
motivated by an emphasis on a pragmatic approach to methodological
issues. One of its defining features is that it tries to rise above the
paradigmatic differences and disagreements between quantitative and
qualitative approaches, that have, traditionally, occupied and sometimes
even paralysed researchers in the social sciences and related fields. This shift
in thinking about research has been characterised by leading advocates of
MMR as the Third Methodological Movement (TMM) in contradistinction to
the historical evolution and self-referential nature of the two dominant
paradigms (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2003). What persuaded me to adopt
MMR was the pragmatic nature of its guiding philosophy which dictates that
the choice and mix of methods must depend on the question to be answered.
MMR has a number of distinct advantages over traditional approaches to
research (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). First it can answer research
questions that other methods can not answer. Second, MMR by its very
nature makes for stronger inferences. Third, it provides the researcher with
the opportunity for presenting a greater diversity of views. It has even been
suggested that MMR portends a wider methodological movement (TMM)
that is in the process of establishing itself (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003:4).
As indicated earlier, interest in MMR is growing across social sciences as well
as in behavioural disciplines. It is growing most rapidly in the health sciences
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such as nursing (Forthfer 2003). Its value is also being increasingly
recognised and underscored in psychological research, education, sociology
and in the field of evaluation (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003:x). The
publication of the handbook on MMR cited above as well as a number of
other books on MMR also suggests an increasing interest in the approach (eg
Cresswell 2003). Even more important, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie
(2003), a number of journals have begun to feature articles on mixed methods
may well suggest the emergence of an important trend (Tashakkori and
Teddlie 2003: 698).
2.2 Methodological Issues in Sentencing and Cross-systems Research
But before I discuss the specific mixed methods research strategy used in this
study, the philosophical basis of mixed methods, and project-specific factors
that motivated me to adopt a mixed methods research strategy for the study,
it is necessary to discuss what research methods predominate in sentencing
and cross-systems research generally, and in Botswana in particular, so as to
provide a context for the choice of methods for the study.
Research in the fields of sentencing and cross-systems studies involving
western style legal systems and non-western legal systems have traditionally
been dominated by quantitative and qualitative methods respectively.
Examples of the anthropological genre abound (Schapera 1938; Bohannan
1957; Gulliver 1963). Most studies comparing sentencing patterns of different
courts, most of which, in the common law world, have been in advanced
industrial societies, are within-system or intra-system studies focusing on
such themes as racial and gender disparities in sentencing (Hood 1992,
Spohn 2002) sentencing patterns of lower courts versus sentencing patterns
of higher courts or geographical variations in sentencing patterns such as
urban versus rural (Spohn 2002). Although there are notable exceptions (e.g.
Carlen: 1976), it seems that the preferred methods in sentencing research are
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in the main quantitative (see Spohn 2002; Tonry 1988). With the possible
exception of comparative analysis that superficially examines such
phenomena as incarceration rates and victimisation (e.g. Zvekic and Frate
1995) in different countries, cross-systems research that focuses on value-
based differences and similarities has traditionally, been dominated by
qualitative approaches (Nader 1992, Mundy 2002, Moore 1978;1997).
Because it is mostly concerned with the influence of certain variables relating
to various aspects of sentencing, sentencing research tends generally to
emphasise quantitative methods. The introduction of software such as
Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) direction (see e.g Field 2005)
has probably pushed sentencing research even more in the quantitative. New
and increasingly sophisticated software with enormous capacity to handle
and analyse large amounts of data has increased the possibilities and scope
for statistical manipulation tremendously. This has enabled researchers to,
amongst other things, explore, re-analyse and re-interpret old research data
on sentencing from past studies. Economists, whose interest in sentencing
seems to be growing, have imported mathematical models into the area and
this can only increase the perception that quantitative techniques are the
natural methods to use in sentencing research. It is therefore not surprising
that some have decried the 'blackbox' approach to sentencing research that
simply identifies factors that are prima facie determinants of decisions of a
particular kind and then abstract them from the sentencing context. The few
works that there have been that have focused on interpretive procedures of
actors and how they account for their practices have been both insightful and
enduring (e.g. Carlen: 1976). Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that there will be
a major shift soon in the area of sentencing research in the direction of
qualitative methods.
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On the other hand, the predominant methods in cross-systems study of
western style and non-western legal systems, especially African legal
systems, have been of the qualitative variety, the most important of which is
ethnography. Researchers have been using ethnographic methods to study
legal systems in Africa with great success since the colonial period (Schapera
1938, Radcliffe-Brown 1952, Gluckman 1955, Bohannan 1957).
Ethnographers working among the Tswana are among researchers whose
works have had a significant impact on the international scene (Schapera
1938; Comaroff and Roberts 1981; Griffiths. A. 1997). But most early
researchers, with the exception of Gluckman (1955) did not make a direct
comparison between western legal systems and African legal systems.
However, that did not stop the debate moving in that direction, particularly
in scholarly journals and at international conferences. In more recent times
in-depth qualitative analyses of cases across systems in Botswana has been
most pronounced in the field of family law (e.g. Comaroff and Roberts 1981;
Griffiths. A. 1997). Where there has been any resort to the quantitative format
at all among researchers working in that area it would be at the most basic
level of representation of absolute numbers in tabular form as a way of
summarising data rather than as a preferred tool of analysis as such. Thus
studies in the area of family law have remained firmly on the qualitative side
of the methodological divide. There have been virtually no cross-system
studies of similar magnitude and depth to those in the field of family law in
the area of criminal law since independence. This is not to overlook
Bouman's (1984) pioneering work, which though limited in depth, makes up
for that in that it examines various aspects of trials in customary and
magistrate courts.
2.3 Cross-systems study of sentencing: Methodological challenges
It should be evident from the foregoing discussion that any study that
proposes to examine and compare sentencing practices in two different
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systems to discover how certain variables or factors may be influencing
sentencing outcomes must find itself in an unusual position as far as matters
of methodology are concerned. The apparently strong commitment to either
quantitative or qualitative methods among researchers working in the areas
of sentencing and cross-systems research makes the dilemma unusually
stark. The range of methods within the two brackets and the possible mix of
methods is so wide that it confuses. This is where MMR becomes important
because its guiding philosophy is that the choice of methods must be
determined by the question to be answered. MMR advocates a pragmatic
combination and use of quantitative and qualitative methods for purposes of
data gathering, and eschews the 'either/or' approach of traditional
methodological purists. In that way it sidesteps epistemological
controversies that tend to pre-occupy and divide those who identify
strongly with either quantitative or qualitative methods. It is mainly
concerned with finding ways of combining qualitative and quantitative
methods in a way that best answers the research question. It is MMR's
emphasis on the question rather than philosophical arguments surrounding
qualitative and quantitative methods that appealed to me.
A number of factors made the flexibility that MMR provides particularly
important in this study. First because the nature of the question to be
answered in this study required an interdisciplinary perspective, it was
always likely that a variety of methods would have to be used to obtain data.
Second, following on the previous point, it became obvious as the project
developed that it was in fact going to be necessary to employ multiple-
methods in the study. In particular since it was clear that the preferred
methods in sentencing research especially where the focus is on sentencing
disparities are generally those of a quantitative variety. On the other hand
since the study was concerned with normative sources of disparities it was
also clear that qualitative data was going to be necessary. Because the present
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study is a cross-systems study concerned with the impact of convergences
and divergences between these systems on justice, it was imperative to
understand the normative underpinnings of both systems in order to make
sense what the quantitative data would be telling me. I had to use qualitative
methods to capture courtroom dynamics and other processes. Moreover,
research on the customary legal system, and more recently, research
comparing processes and outcomes in the received and indigenous legal
system which forms the background material for this study, has been
dominated by anthropological methods.
In these circumstances traditional triangulation would not have sufficed as it
is more concerned with the validation of findings using different methods
rather than with the pragmatic use of multiple methods as such. While,
unlike some of the leading proponents of MMR, I would not argue that
triangulation as a concept has lost meaning or value, I believe it would not
have served our purposes well in this study.
Above mentioned advantages notwithstanding, MMR has a number of
theoretical and practical limitations. On a practical level MMR may prove too
daunting for many who may wish to use it, for a variety of reasons
(Cresswell 2003: 210; Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). First, it requires the
researcher to be competent in both quantitative and qualitative methods, a
combination of skills that is rare among researchers in the social sciences as
most tend to have a bias towards one or the other of the two methodological
orientations. Second, a researcher using MMR may find that MMR requires
extensive data collection. Third, the amount of data generated and the
variable forms (i.e. text and numeric) that the data takes means that data
analysis may take longer than usual.
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Whilst justifications for the adoption of MMR based on practical concerns is
easy enough to appreciate and understand especially for a project such as the
present one, the paradigmatic claims made for MMR or the movement
associated with it remain, it must be conceded, shaky. MMR has a long way
to go before it can make convincing claims about paradigmatic or
philosophical independence from quantitative and qualitative approaches. It
is difficult to see how MMR can rise above paradigmatic squabbles between
committed quantitative and qualitative methodologists given that MMR does
not have independent philosophical roots as it is built around the idea of
pragmatic use of already existing methods. It is therefore not surprising that
MMR advocates concede that amongst the issues that remain unresolved in
MMR, are, nomenclature and definitions used in MMR and issues
concerning the paradigmatic foundations of MMR. MMR advocates also
recognise that it may be some time before TMM gains wide recognition as
movement that has truly shifted thinking in the social and behavioural
sciences. However, for most researchers it is the practical rather than the
theoretical elements of MMR that matter most, not least because emphasis on
practical issues allows them to choose methods appropriate for their research
without having to pay homage to quantitative or qualitative philosophical
concerns.
2.4 The Strategy for the Study
This study employed a mixed method research strategy known as
concurrent-nested strategy (CNS hereafter). CNS is basically a data collection
strategy that involves the simultaneous use of quantitative and qualitative
techniques whereby one primary method guides the study. CNS has a
number of features that distinguish it from other MMR strategies. It is
characterized by contemporaneous use of quantitative and qualitative
methods but with one method being given priority over the other. This
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particular feature distinguishes it from ordinary triangulation. In terms of
CNS, the second method may be used to answer a different question from
the main method or obtain information from different levels and in that way
address issues that could not be dealt with using the dominant method. In
this study the primary data collection methods were, as already stated,
quantitative while secondary or complimentary methods were qualitative.
Concurrent Nested Strategy has a number of limitations (Cresswell,
2003:218). First, data may be difficult to integrate given that it would take
different forms. Second, there may be an imbalance in the quality of the
evidence because of different methods used and the imbalance inherent in
the strategy itself. The foregoing points notwithstanding, the suitability of
any given strategy depends on the nature of questions to be answered and as
yet there is no method or combination of methods that does not have
shortcomings.
2.4.1 Project-Specific Factors Motivating Choice of CNS strategy
First, one of the main objectives of the project research was to measure and
compare the impact of a variation in sentencing rules that appear to have
been introduced with the intention of admitting into the sentencing process
the peculiarities of the customary legal system. The first part of the question
required the use of quantitative techniques, in this case multiple regression,
while the second part required the knowledge of the context in which these
decisions were made including possible similarities and differences in
philosophy and logic that could and should possibly manifest themselves as
a result of the variation in the applicable rules. Yet it is also recognised that
one of the major barriers that research on western and non-western courts
often had to confront was the problem of equivalence of concepts, principles
and precepts across the board including whether a particular wrong should
or should not be classified as criminal or civil wrong under one or other
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system (Schapera 1938:47). It was precisely this kind of problem that, in
anthropology, led to the well-known Bohannan-Gluckman controversy that
divided researchers (Moore 1997).
Comaroff and Roberts (1981) have argued that a full understanding and
appreciation of the logic of the Tswana courts can only be achieved by
locating the dispute process within its cultural context. However, in the field
of criminal law the influence of rules that would normally apply in
customary court cases has been restricted by the unification of substantive
law and the introduction of semi-standardised procedures based on common
law principles as a consequence of which the dynamic between the social and
the legal domain has been transformed in a fundamental way. Yet at the
same time exemption clauses and other rule variations that allow value-
based differences to manifest and assert themselves have been retained.
Rule standardisation and variation in the current system presents us with
new opportunities not available to researchers who might have been
interested in comparing the two legal systems before the unification of
criminal law and partial standardisation of rules of procedure. In this study,
we decided, because of the nature of the rule variation, to look at the
variation through the prism of discretion. Other important factors considered
were the possible influence of the training and background of key court
personnel even though these were only included as background material.
The focus on key court personnel was considered important in this study
because background training and qualifications of court personnel is one of
the constant themes in the public debate about comparative studies in
Botswana. Moreover, differences in the skills and competences of court
personnel were used as the justification in 1972 for granting customary court
judges lesser substantive powers than magistrates. Furthermore, it has been
suggested that lay and professional personnel tend to approach cases
29
differently (Asquith 1983, Damaska 1986) and it follows that differences
would be expected to register in at the sentencing stage as well.
2.5 Methods of Data Collection
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methods was used to gather
data for the present study. In keeping with the strategy of the study, the bulk
of the data was collected using quantitative methods. Data gathering on the
quantitative part of the study involved a general census survey of court
records of magistrate and customary courts at Kanye and Mochudi and a
more detailed survey at Mochudi focusing on certain variables and for
selected offences only. Whereas the information for the general census was
obtainable from both court registers and court files, the more detailed
information was only available in the latter. Qualitative methods employed
in the study included court observations, interviews, field notes and
examination of a wide range of documents more especially archival material,
newspapers, statutes, memoranda to Bills, the Hansard and authoritative
anthropological texts.
2.5.1 Quantitative Techniques
Most of the data used in this study was gathered by means of a census of
recorded criminal cases going back ten years (1991-2001). The census yielded
a total of 10 024 criminal cases tried before magistrate and customary courts
at Kanye and Mochudi. Data from the general census was the primary source
of data used in the analysis of general patterns. This was data that was
gathered contemporaneously with qualitative data.
More detailed data pertaining to offence and offender characteristics was
obtained from the main site at Mochudi after the main census had been
completed. These data covered the period 1996-2000 and involved 1014 of
cases. The data was used to determine to what extent similar offences or
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similarly situated offenders received dissimilar sentences from customary
and magistrate courts.
Looking at the size of the general census sample it might be thought that it is
perhaps too large. However, if considered in context the questions that the
study sought to address, then the sample sizes are reasonable. This is a study
that examines trends and patterns over an extended period of 10 years.
Universal coverage was essential in respect of the general part of the study so
that we could be certain that changes in patterns, if any, were not merely
temporary effects of known or unknown factors restricted to a particular year
or period. Sentencing studies that look at trends over extended periods of
time tend to use large samples. This was particularly important because as
can be surmised from the number of cases in the second sample (Mochudi
1996-2000) which is a universal sample of selected offences, triable-either
way only constitutes a narrow band of offences in the lower middle-to-
bottom end of the offence scale. The triable-either way band does not
include some fairly common offences (with the exception of drug-related
offences and stock-theft) at the top-end of certain offence categories. For
instance triable-either way offences in the assault-related and theft-related
offence categories do not include grievous bodily harm and armed robbery
respectively. In addition to this, the skewed distribution of triable either-way
offences between the courts made it necessary for the coverage to extend
over a number of years if we were to accumulate enough cases in each
offence category to be able to make meaningful comparisons.
(a) The General Census Survey
The following information was extracted from the case registers and case
records at Kanye and Mochudi for the period 1991-2001: case number; type
of case (offence type); status of case (i.e. whether concluded, pending, closed
or withdrawn); number of accused persons involved in the case; type of
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disposal; type and quantum of punishment(s) (i.e. where the court imposed
punishment); name and rank of the officer(s) presiding over the case. In
respect of cases handled by customary courts comments of case reviewers
and any action taken by the court following the review were noted. Data
from the general census was intended to answer non-directional hypotheses
1-2A which postulate that the distribution and punishment of offences
triable-either-way would vary by type of court.
(b) Selected Offences
More detailed case information than that obtained in the general census was
collected at Mochudi, the main site for the study. Data gathering involved
universal coverage of selected triable either-way offences belonging to two
major offence categories namely: Property Offences and Offences against the
Person. In terms of our classification, Property Offences consisted of a range
of theft-related offences such as theft common, burglary, stealing from
dwelling while Offences against the Person included assaulted-related
offences like assault common, actual bodily harm and unlawful wounding.
These offences were selected because a preliminary analysis of the general
census survey data indicated that they were the most common triable
either-way offences and as such had the potential to yield the relatively large
numbers of cases so enable comparisons to be made between magistrate and
customary court disposals. From these cases I extracted information on legal
(type of offence, prior record, mitigation) and non-legal variables (gender,
age, employment status). Information based on legal and non-legal variables
was used to address postulations made under directional hypotheses 3-4.
These hypotheses postulated that there would be significant variations in
sentencing outcomes of magistrate and customary courts in certain specified
directions regardless of whether the cases involved were similar or the
offenders were similarly situated.
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2.5.2 Instruments and Procedures for Collection of Qualitative Data
In this study, qualitative methods were used to gather information regarding
organisational set up and dynamics of the courts, the training and
background of court personnel as well as the attitude of some of these
officers brought into the courtroom regarding sentencing of offenders and
the justice system as a whole. As explained below both the selection of cases
to be observed and the selection of individual subjects for interview was not
done in a rigorous scientific fashion because of certain constrains that I
describe in detail below. In any case, it was never intended that the
qualitative data should be subject to the same rigours of selection because of
the way it was going to be used.
Data gathered using qualitative methods was used primarily to compliment
statistical data. More specifically, it was used as a backdrop to the
comparative analysis of sentencing patterns of magistrates and customary
courts that is based on statistical data. Qualitative data provides a context
that bald statistics do not in and of themselves supply and as such it fills an
important gap in main data. It provides us with the context, logic or
narrative that helps us to make sense of differences/similarities in sentencing
patterns of received and indigenous courts. This is achieved, inter alia, by
drawing on existing narratives on punishment in Tswana communities in
anthropological and other literature, as well as through analysis of
information gathered by means of court observations and interviews
conducted during field work.
(a) Interviews: Court Personnel
One of the recurrent themes in debate on comparative justice was the relative
quality and competence of personnel in magistrate and customary courts.
Interviews supplied some of the necessary information on these aspects as
they provide biographical data on the subjects' and as well as their views on
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the competences of colleagues. To understand exercise of sentencing powers
by magistrates and chiefs I thought it was important to capture the dynamics
of and the general setting in which the decision-making process takes place
in magistrate and customary courts. Organisational context here includes
both the general orientation of the type of court concerned and the
background and training of court personnel that operates it. The focus of the
inquiry in this context was on the latter.
A semi-structured interview, directed at key court personnel, was used to
obtain data from respondents regarding information enumerated above. The
following personnel were interviewed during the study: court clerk (2),
interpreters (1) local police (2), Botswana police (2), Assistant Commissioner
of Customary Courts (1), member of Customary Court of Appeal (1),
customary court presiding officers (3) and magistrates (3).
I decided to include a member of the Customary Court of Appeal and the
Assistant Customary Courts Commissioner on the list of interviewees
because of information that emerged during fieldwork which led me to
believe they would illuminate certain areas of the study. I thought I should
interview a member of the Customary Court of Appeal following two
Customary Court of Appeal circuit sessions at Kanye and Mochudi which I
attended where members of the court of appeal made particularly telling
comments about standards of justice in the customary courts. The interview
with the Assistant Customary Court Commissioner was intended as a follow
up on exchanges between the Customary Courts' Commissioner's office and
Chiefs' Courts that I came across in case review notes and in official
communication concerning the handling of cases. I had intended to interview
the District Commissioner as well but he was not available due to official
commitments. I wanted to capture these oversight officers' views on
standards of justice in customary courts, and about whether and how they as
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appellate and review bodies ensured that principles that they established in
their decisions were transmitted down to and followed in customary courts.
(i) Presiding Officers
Even though the Paramount Chief rarely has time to spare for adjudication,
we will describe as the Chiefs Courts not least because that is how it is
perceived by ordinary people. In the villages it is called 'Kwa Kgosing' or the
Chiefs Court. It is at the centre of village and tribal life. More importantly,
despite the chiefs absence the Chiefs Court continues to fulfil its assigned
function.
Initially the category of presiding officers to be interviewed was restricted to
Magistrate Grade I and the Paramount Chief. The rationale for this choice
was that even though the chief is the highest (if we exclude officers of the
Customary Court of Appeal) ranking officer in the customary court system
and Magistrate Grade I was the lowest ranking officer in the received system,
the gap between them in terms of substantive powers is the smallest that can
be found to exist between any two officers from the received and the
indigenous legal system. I believed this fact alone should make them more
comparable than other cadres, the fact that the powers of Magistrate Grade I
far outstrip those of a chief, notwithstanding. I realized during the pilot
study that it was not going to be possible to pick only officers from these two
ranks/cadres for interviews as I had intended. I found that almost all the
magistrates operating the courts at the selected sites belonged to grades other
than the ones selected for attention in this study. I encountered a problem of
a similar nature in customary courts in that the Paramount Chiefs hardly
ever attended court because of other responsibilities. Other senior chiefs such
as the Deputy Chief and the Senior Chief's Representatives did very little
criminal work and seemed more interested in civil cases which tended to
attract larger crowds than criminal trials (with the exception of cases
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involving stock theft). As it turned out about 70-90% of criminal cases that
were tried before the customary court at Kanye and Mochudi were handled
by the chief's representatives. It was for these reasons that I decided that the
choice of candidates for interviews would depend on whether such
individuals were heavily involved in criminal work rather than on rank as
such.
(ii) Chiefs
Paramount Chiefs are not the only administrative heads of their tribes but
they are also the highest judicial authorities in their districts and represent
their tribes in the House of Chiefs. Because their duties in the House of
Chiefs keep them fully engaged most of the time, chiefs hardly have time to
discharge their other functions, including judicial functions. As a result, these
functions are performed by the Deputy Chiefs and other lower ranking chiefs
such as the Senior Chief's Representative and the Chief's Representative.
The Chief's Courts serve as both courts of first instance and courts of appeal
for other customary courts within their districts (see section 41(1) Customary
Court (Amendment) Act, 2001. Appeals handled by the chiefs' courts may
originate from lower customary courts or internally within the Chief's Court
itself. Internal appeals are possible because the Chief's Court usually
consists of chiefs of different rank with different sentencing powers. Those
cases tried by chiefs of a rank lower than the Paramount Chief or Deputy
Chief such as the Senior Chief's Representative and the Chiefs
Representative are appellable internally; otherwise cases proceed to the
Customary Court of Appeal (Section 41(2), Customary Court (Amendment)
Act, 2001). Cases from the chief's court are subject to review by the District
Commissioner (Section 38, Customary Court (Amendment) Act, 2001) and
until recently the Customary Court Commissioner.
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(Hi) Magistrates
Magistrates preside over what are in effect the lowest courts in the received
courts hierarchy. Amongst the general courts, magistrate courts have the
greatest reach because they are found in most major centres and generally
cover the entire administrative district in which they are located. The
magistracy is made up of professionally trained lawyers whose substantive
jurisdictions vary according to rank. It is not quite clear when the magistracy
became fully professionalized but it probably happened in the 1990s. Before
that, senior administrative officers in the District Administration such as the
District Commissioner doubled up as magistrates. The Magistrate courts as a
forum offers the sort of justice at local level that is generally believed to
satisfy internationally recognised minimum standards for a fair trial.
Defendants who may not want to be tried before a customary court can
apply to the customary court of appeal to have their cases transferred to a
magistrate court though this may prove difficult if the person concerned
does not have legal representation.
(iv) Court clerks
Even though Court Clerks working in magistrate and customary courts share
the nomenclature, 'Court Clerk/ the roles they play in the court processes are
quite different.
Court clerks based in magistrate court play a different role as far as criminal
trials are concerned from those who work under chiefs in customary courts.
Unlike their counterparts in customary courts, court clerks in magistrate
courts are not directly involved in trials. Perhaps, understandably, Court
Clerks are not transferable between general and customary courts. This
section focuses on Court Clerks based in customary courts because they are
directly involved and play a more central role in the criminal process than
those based in magistrates' courts.
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Apart from general functions of an administrative variety that they have to
perform, Court Clerks are charged with recording, in long hand, the
proceedings of cases that come before customary courts for trial. The notes of
Court Clerks form the official record of the case, and it is generally speaking,
unusual for chiefs to take notes of their own during proceedings. There is an
expectation that under normal circumstances court clerks will guide chiefs if
the latter should require some assistance regarding any aspect of the criminal
process during the course of a trial. Court Clerks are particularly expected to
provide guidance to chiefs or headmen where the latter is not illiterate or
semi-literate.
By law clerks (Customary Court (Procedure) Rule 5, Customary Court Act)
are supposed to register case charges but in practice the framing of charges is
done by the police even though the actual allocation of cases to various
presiding officers remains the responsibility of Court Clerks.
(v) Prosecutors
Like in other jurisdictions the duty of the prosecutor is to represent the
complainant or the state. His/her primary task in a criminal case is to
persuade the court to convict the accused person. Botswana Police, the
national police force, are responsible for prosecutions in cases that come
before magistrate courts, which function they perform on behalf of the
Attorney General. They also conduct prosecutions in customary courts. The
Local Police, (a rough equivalent of community police), on the other hand are
restricted to prosecutions in the customary courts. The Local Police is based
in the tribal court complex or urban court complex as the case may be. Even
though the Local Police may, and do appear, in Magistrate courts as
investigators particularly in those cases that have been transferred from
customary courts to the former, they are, however not allowed to prosecute
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cases there. Like Court Clerks they are not transferable across the legal
systems.
(vi) Interpreters
The role of a Court Interpreter is to translate the proceedings from English
into Setswana and vice-versa for the benefit of the accused person, witnesses
or the court, in the general courts. When there is no court work, Court
Interpreters perform administrative duties. Court Clerks step into the role of
Interpreters when the latter are not available for whatever reason.
Customary courts do not employ any Interpreters, presumably because the
language of the court in these courts is Setswana, and it is therefore assumed
parties that take part in trials before such courts would have basic
knowledge of the language.
(b) Court observations
The purpose of court observations was twofold. First court observations
were used to gather material on court processes, including sentencing.
Second, they were also used to gather background material on court
dynamics not generally available in or discernable from court records such
as pre-trial and post-trial reconciliation attempts initiated by the presiding
officer. All together, 26 cases were observed live in magistrate and customary
courts at different sites during the pilot and the main study. Of these only 21
were usable. Material from court observations was used mainly as
background and supplementary material for the study.
Court proceedings were recorded using an audiotape. In all, 20 cases were to
be covered in the study. But in the event, more than 26 cases were recorded
as precaution against possible loss of data, due perhaps, to damage to tapes
or poor quality of the recording in a particular instance. For reasons of
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comparability, cases chosen for observation involved mostly those offences
that were triable in both types of courts during the pilot stage that was the
main guiding criterion. For the main study however a further criterion was
added to the existing one, namely that offences involved had to be either
Property Offences or Offences Against the Person. These offence categories
are described in one of the preceding sections above. These offence
categories themselves included a range of offences of varying degrees of
gravity. Offences Against the Person consisted of assault-related offences
such as common assault, unlawful wounding, and actual bodily harm,
grievous bodily having and associated attempts. Property Offences
encompassed theft-related offences which included: theft common,
housebreaking with a theft element, burglary with a theft element, stock theft
and associated attempts. The rationale for selection is discussed in preceding
sections of this chapter.
(c) Interaction Schedule:
An Interaction Schedule was provisionally included in the pilot study for
purposes of capturing other aspects of the court hearings. More specifically,
it was intended to record in summary form the exchanges between the
participants in a case and the content of those exchanges. However, it was to
be dropped from the main study when it appeared to distract from other
aspects of the cases under observation. That indeed turned out to be the case,
and it was accordingly abandoned.
(d) Field Notes:
Apart from the material generated directly from individual cases, detailed
notes were used as a supplementary source of data on various aspects of the
trial process such as non-verbal behaviour. Occurrences that I thought might
add an interesting dimension to the research or those that raised matters I
wanted to make a follow up on in the interviews were noted in a field
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notebook. I paid particular attention to, amongst other things, the court set
up, procedures and courtroom interaction. This method was essentially
meant to compliment tape recordings by helping me to reflect on the main
concepts, themes and issues as well as to facilitate coding. This strategy was
also intended to enable the researcher to find patterns in the data. Where it
seemed appropriate and necessary to do so, official recorders' reports/notes
were used to supplement audio materials and notes. Observations made
during the course of trials informed some of the questions that were later put
to key court personnel during interviews.
In the case of customary courts, case review notes contained in the case
files that I came across as I was collecting material for the quantitative
part of the study proved a rich source of information on customary courts.
Information from case review notes was recorded as part of field notes. Case
review information was very useful in providing insights into the review
process and more importantly, the dynamic between reviewers and the
chiefs. A number of useful insights were gained from case review notes. It
became clear from some of the comments and exchanges between the
reviewers and customary court judges that the relationship between them
was characterized by uneasiness if not outright hostility in some cases.
Interviews with chiefs at Kanye and Mochudi confirmed the impression that
they were unhappy about having their cases reviewed by government
officers outside traditional court hierarchies such as District Commissioners
and the Customary Courts Commissioner's office. Even more important,
information on reviews revealed differences between chiefs and government
bureaucrats about how severely certain types of cases should be punished.
Resistance from chiefs also meant that sometimes decisions of reviewing
officers were not implemented. More generally, it means that attempts to
shape patterns of punishing in customary courts through review decisions,
was thwarted or severely undermined.
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It is difficult to say whether the study captured all the reviews for all cases
recorded because some of this information was written on loose pieces of
paper some which might have fallen out of the files at some point or other
and might therefore not have been available to be recorded. It appeared that
there was no consistency in the way review comments and related
communications were archived by the courts. However, this shortcoming did
not diminish the value of the review information for purposes of this project.
2.5.3 Documents and texts:
A range of documents, including official communications, newspaper
cuttings , statutes and texts which I considered to be of some relevance as
regards any of various aspects of the legal system which fall to be discussed
were collected for later analysis and reference. Some of these documents
were retrieved from the National Archives.
2.6 Selection of Research Sites
Initially, five sites were selected for the study as a whole (i.e. the pilot plus
the main study), two of these sites being urban (Lobatse and Gaborone) and
the rest rural/peri-urban sites (Molepolole, Mochudi and Kanye). One of the
rural/peri-urban sites was included as backup (Molepolole). Both magistrate
and customary courts were to be covered at each of the sites.
Ideally, two sites should have been adequate for the study but I considered
that an expanded list afforded me some measure of flexibility should
problems requiring a change of site occur while I was still in the field.
Moreover, I felt it was essential to have a list of sites large enough to choose
from to avoid having to re-apply for the research permit if it turned out that
a particular site proved, for whatever reason, to be unsuitable for the study.
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The rationale for selecting sites in urban and peri-urban areas was that I felt
that the rural-urban divide represented to a greater or lesser extent,
differences in social organisation and other dynamics. I sought to find out
how the tension between the modern and the customary expresses itself in
these two very different environments. As I explain elsewhere in this
chapter, other considerations came into play during the course of the study
which altered my thinking somewhat regarding the question whether the
rural/urban dimension was really necessary.
The choice of the places named above was dictated to a large extent by
pragmatic reasons, not the least of which were distance from my base
(Gaborone) and availability of financial resources and time. Out of ten
potential sites, 5 were chosen and 3 (Kanye, Mochudi and Lobatse) were
actually used in the study. Sites were pre-specified (in the proposal) for
purposes of securing a permit for the study. Researchers are required, when
applying for a permit, to name in advance the areas they propose to cover in
their study. Despite these constraints, I considered, for reasons described
elsewhere, that the sites selected, suited the research problem as it was then
framed.
(a) The Pilot
It was originally intended that the pilot would cover only one site. Since the
emphasis in the proposal was on the development of instruments and data
collection techniques, this seemed like a good idea at first. However, when
other factors were taken into consideration, it soon became clear that one site
would not be adequate even for this purpose. The most important of these
included the opportunity to test the instruments and the data gathering
techniques in urban and peri-urban settings. It would have defeated the
purpose and logic of the pilot if it had excluded either type of site. Moreover,
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the interview schedule that I took with me to the field had sections that
applied exclusively to urban customary courts. Information relating to this
particular aspect of the study would not have been recorded and reflected
upon prior to the main study if the urban sites had been left out altogether.
Kanye and Lobatse, which are 40 kilometres apart, representing peri-urban
and urban sites respectively, were chosen as pilot study sites. Mochudi and
Gaborone, also 40 kilometres apart and also representing the peri-
urban/urban split were reserved for the main study.
(b) The Main Study
It was originally intended that the main study would be conducted in
Gaborone and Mochudi, however, I was forced to drop Gaborone altogether
from the main study due in large part to the instability caused by staff
movements at the various magistrate courts in the city. It will be recalled
that the focal point of court observations was intended to be decision-making
patterns of particular Presiding officers in respect of a selected class of
offences across a given number cases. As such a stable environment was
necessary in relation to personnel and handling of the selected offences.
After being assigned about five different officers in succession over a period
of two months, I realized that I had little choice but to drop Gaborone from
the study. As regards staff movement, I found that those on some kind of
staff leave or those who would be leaving the public service shortly or those
whose contracts were up for renewal, sometimes decided not to try cases
which they had been assigned or any fresh matters. These, therefore, often
floated from one officer to another.
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Internal practices did not help matters either. Officers, often, understandably,
transferred fresh cases to other officers if they had emergences or if they
could not, for whatever reason, try those matters. Furthermore, the relevant
cases were often spread between different officers so that it would take a
long stretch of time before s/he could accumulate the requisite number of
cases. Yet another factor was that, unlike in the rural areas, a significant
number of cases in Gaborone were defended and this tended to cause delays
and postponements as the courts tried to synchronize their diaries with those
of defence lawyers. Withdrawals were also common, due in part, to the
backlogs and delays (police sometimes lost contact with witnesses).
Dropping Gaborone from the study meant that I had to reconsider the value
of the urban/peri-urban split. Accordingly, over 5 000 cases collected in
Lobatse courts in the course of the census survey were not included in the
data set used in this study. However, the interviews with court personnel
were retained as part of the qualitative data. This essentially meant I was left
with two rural or peri-urban sites of Kanye and Mochudi with the latter as
the site for the main study. While general census data was collected from
both of these sites, the majority of court observations data and the more
detailed part of the study which focused on legal and non-legal variables
were done in Mochudi.
2.7 Post-Pilot Study Reviews
2.7.1 Instruments:
The interview schedule proved quite effective in eliciting some useful
information from the respondents. However some questions were not clear
and were accordingly revised. At least one question proved not to be that
useful. The Interaction Schedule was also dropped because it had become
redundant. First, it was rather cumbersome and too complex. Second, I
found it difficult to use because I had at the same time to operate the audio-
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recording machine. Third, its inclusion had been, as I stated in the proposal,
provisional.
2.7.2 Court Observations:
Being aware that it is difficult for the researchers to be unobtrusive when
doing court observations, I initially used a micro-recorder to try to minimise
the impact of my presence in court on the behaviour of actors involved in the
trial process. But the micro-recorder could not produce usable data and had
therefore to be replaced with other more visible equipment.
2.8 Generalizability of Results of the Study
At a general level the practices of the Chiefs Courts may be taken to reflect
those of other customary courts of similar level, and more broadly, of the
customary courts as a form.
Generalizability: Chiefs Courts
Apart from the Ngwaketse and Kgatla tribal communities covered in this
study there are altogether six other groups within the Tswana ethno-
linguistic community that have courts of roughly similar jurisdiction (see
Schapera 1938;1970). Kanye and Mochudi are the tribal capitals of
Bangwaketse and Bakgatla respectively. These communities belong to the so-
called major tribes. As a unit the Tswana constitute the majority of
Botswana's population. Even though there may be variations in local
practices of these tribes it was expected that these would be minor. It will
be recalled that the procedural rules that are applicable in customary courts
are partially standardised so that to a substantial degree they are similar to
those that apply in general courts, there will be those rules (written) that
apply to customary courts only (Customary Court Procedure Rule 19 (f)) and
there will be those areas where customary law rules and principles
(unwritten) apply (S 29 Customary Courts Act). Some of the rules in the
second set of rules (i.e. written rules applicable to customary courts but not
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general courts) attempt to capture and formalise traditional Tswana practice
and procedure. The third set of rules (unwritten customary rules) was
expected to be broadly similar across the board though some regional
differences of a minor variety could be expected. These groups have been
regarded as being so similar in their philosophical approach to disputes, in
social organisation and cultural patterns that in discussing certain practices
and patterns researchers/writers dispense with the usual group names and
use instead the generic term for the compound group: the Tswana. Such
usage is evident in Comaroff and Roberts' (1981) discussion of the logic
dispute among the Tswana in Rules and Processes as well as Schapera's
(1938) discussion of punishment in Tswana communities. This would seem
to suggest amongst other things, that customary court judges may be seen as
belonging to the same interpretive community. These factors would tend to
make the results of this study generalizeable to courts of a similar type
around the country.
Customary Courts: General
Organisational patterns of the Tswana, including those of smaller
communities outside the territories of the eight tribal communities referred
to above, are similar. Today the Kgotla as a form exists in most communities,
including the non-Tswana communities. Even some sections of formerly
acephalous groups such as Basarwa (San) have, where such groups have
assumed a sedentary lifestyle, seemingly embraced it or been encouraged to
do so by the government. It has emerged in urban centres in the form of
urban (customary) courts though its role as the centre of community life is
much more circumscribed in urban environment. So the Kgotla has become a
near universal mechanism for community organisation and dispute
resolution in Botswana even though in some communities it is a borrowed
form and in those instances perhaps much more likely to be more of a
juridico-administrative adjunct of the state than in those places where it has
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always existed. While those customary courts that have been transplanted
to a new environment may be different from those forged in the natural
habitat, they are expected to perform similar functions to a greater or lesser
degree and are governed by similar rules so that some of the practices of
courts covered by this study are probably generalizeable to all customary
courts.
Like customary courts, magistrate courts are governed by uniform
procedures and are operated by personnel with similar training: professional
lawyers. The patterns emerging from the study may be seen (without
discounting the role of individual judges) as representing those of magistrate
courts in general.
2.9 Limitations of Methods
Problem of offence distribution:
A major problem that became evident in both phases of the study was that it
seemed that cases triable in both types of courts were, at some of the sites
concentrated in either the magistrate or customary court, suggesting that
prosecuting authorities tend to send certain types of cases to one type of
court rather than the other. Alternatively, it might well be that offenders who
commit particular types of offences in certain localities prefer to be tried in a
particular type of court. In theory offenders have a choice regarding where
they may be tried but in practice they may not be aware that such a choice is
available to them or they may in some cases be prevented by authorities from
exercising it. I observed one such instance at Kanye though it was not one of
the cases I was recording. Because of these factors, amongst others , it was
not always easy in the second (main) phase of the project to find cases,
within a suitable time frame, that fell within the bracket of offence types
already selected (i.e. theft-related and assault-related offences).
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Court Observations
Following the failure of the micro-recorder I had secured for use in court
observations to produce audio material of usable quality I was forced to use
highly visible recording equipment for recording purposes. It is conceivable
that the actors adjusted their behaviour in response to the presence of the
highly visible recording equipment, at least in the early stages of the
observation exercise. Even though I do not know the extent to which the
presence of recording equipment in court during trial affected courtroom
behaviour, some actors did show interest in it.
Court Records
Even though customary court records exclude researcher influence on the
content, they are far from being problem free. Detailed as they often are, they
are nevertheless a very selective rendition of the trial process. They actually
mask a lot regarding some procedural aspects of the trial. Another major
draw back, is that they do not show as clearly as live cases do, the processes
of control that underpin courtroom discourses. Clerks and other recorders,
including magistrates, are selective about what they record. For a study such
as the present one in which courtroom processes are an important ingredient
these omissions are significant and only live cases can close the gap.
Furthermore, court records do not reveal post-trial processes such as
attempts by the presiding officers to reconcile the disputants.
Documents and texts
A general point that could be made about the use of documentary
sources, including transcribed material was that lack of space often makes it
necessary to make use of extracts to illustrate a particular point. The reader
is, in consequence, denied the opportunity to form an independent opinion
regarding the context of the extract.
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2.10 Data Analysis Procedures and Limitations
This section summarises data analysis techniques used in the study. More
detailed description of these techniques is provided in the relevant sections
of chapter 5 for immediacy and ease of reference. The SPSS software used
was for quantitative data analysis. The analysis section of the study attempts
to answer questions posed by the primary hypothesis and the minor
hypotheses on three levels.
Level 1: The first level of analysis focused on general trends pertaining to the
nature and distribution of offences by type of court generally; the
distribution of offences triable-either-way; how the courts punish generally;
how they punish offences triable-either-way and more specifically how they
punish two major categories of selected offences triable-either-way . The
latter, broadly defined as Property Offences and Offences Against the
Person, included a range of theft-related offences such as theft common,
burglary, stealing from dwelling and assault -related offences like assault
common, actual bodily harm, unlawful wounding etc, respectively. The
rationale was to get a general picture of the nature of offences that the two
types of courts deal with on a daily basis and the punishments they award so
that we could see in what ways the punishment patterns fit in with the
ranking system of offences in the Penal Code (the primary source of criminal
law). I also focused specifically on the distribution of offences triable-either-
way in order to confirm or disconfirm postulations in the non-directional
hypotheses 1-2A which suggest that distribution and punishment of
offences triable-either-way will vary by type of court. Simple descriptive
statistics such as tables were used to display and determine patterns.
Level 2: Having considered aggregated values in relation to Property
Offences and Offences Against the Person at Level 1, I then proceeded to
disaggregate these values according to individual offences which made up
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these broad categories and analysed punishment patterns in relation to these
offences. Level 3: I considered the use of various punishments individually
and in combinations
Level 3: Last a multivariate analysis of certain factors defined in this study as
legal and non-legal variables in order to determine whether and/or to what
degree they affected the nature and severity/leniency of the punishment
imposed by magistrate and customary court judges. Following Martin and
Stimpson (1997/98) legal variables were broadly defined as those variables
that refer to or constitute the offence type and such other elements as the law
requires must be considered when a sentence is passed such as prior
conviction, aggravating factors and mitigating factors while non-legal
variables on the other hand were defined as demographic elements or
variables such as age or gender. In order to determine the extent to which
cases were similar or dissimilar I looked for features defined briefly above as
legal and non-legal variables. But in choosing these I wanted variables or
elements that were;
a) Common to all cases e.g. age
b) Reasonably discrete and therefore measurable
c) Known to or believed to be good predictors of sentencing outcomes
The object of Level 3 analysis was to see whether if we controlled for certain
variables or conversely we took into account certain variables, there would
be a significant variations in sentencing outcomes of magistrate and
customary courts as postulated in hypotheses 3-4. Further, we wanted to find
out whether these disparities (if any) would be of such a nature or
magnitude as to significantly distort the ranking of punishments.
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Analysis of Qualitative Data
While the quantitative elements of the study provide us with statistical data
and measurements that form the basis for comparison of sentencing patterns
of the two types of court, bald statistics do not in and of themselves explain
much. Data gathered using qualitative methods was intended to fill in that
gap. It provides us with the context, logic or narrative that helps us to make
sense of differences/similarities in sentencing patterns of received and
indigenous courts. This project provides the background to the study by
drawing on existing narratives on punishment in Tswana communities in
anthropological and other literature as well as through analysis of
information gathered by means of court observations and interviews during
field work.
Literature
The value-based differences that exemption and flexibility clauses were
intended to allow expression of can only be fully understood in the context of
established practices of the courts. This is where ethnographic literature
becomes important (see Chapter Three). However literature only provides a
starting point in the analysis because our interest lies not so much in how
received and indigenous legal systems might have operated in their purest
form (in the past) as in the underlying philosophy associated with their
differing approaches. This should be useful in explaining, if not simply
making sense of differences in sentencing and punishment patterns
especially where a variation in rules was ostensibly designed to allow
customary courts to be different by following (theoretically), traditional
patterns of punishing. As suggested in the preceding sections of this chapter
and in the introductory chapter the ethnographic literature, taken together
with the presumptions behind exemption/flexibility clauses in the law
appear to argue for the assumption that despite structural convergence of the
courts towards the top, and a common offence framework (Penal Code),
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customary and magistrate courts have fundamentally different underlying
philosophies. The central issue here is whether it could reasonably be
argued, having regard to all the circumstances, that the presumed value-
based differences are in anyway implicated or manifest themselves in the
sentencing patterns of magistrate and customary courts.
Court observations and interviews
Although anthropological literature may provide us with narratives about
punishment in traditional Tswana communities, it can not fully explain
current trends as so much of what is happening may, to a certain degree,
have been conditioned and shaped my more recent events such as changes in
the law and social dynamics of these communities. It was necessary to make
up for that shortcoming by gathering more up-to-date information on
magistrate and customary courts. Court observations and interviews were
used in this study for precisely that purpose.
Court observations afforded me the opportunity to appreciate differences in
the atmosphere of and approach to cases in the two types of court. I was also
able to capture and gain insights into pre-trial and post-trial processes such
as interventions by presiding officer to reconcile the disputing parties.
Interviews were designed to elicit information about the training, experience
and educational background of the informants. The rationale was that this
would give us an idea about the professional/lay ideologies ('ideal norms')
and concerning justice respondents might be bringing into the court and
would also help us make sense of the way cases were conducted. For
purposes of analysis information gathered from the court observations and
the interviews was broken in a manner consistent with the indicative and
emerging themes of the study so that some impression, however limited,
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could be garnered about organisational set up and dynamics of the trial
courts.
Limitations
Measurement of general patterns of sentencing based on the two broadly
defined offence-categories was very useful as a first step in the comparative
exercise. There were, however, some factors which it is considered hampered
the exercise and to that extent may be regarded as limitations. The first
problem revolved around offences involving more than one offender. To
facilitate computation of results I chose the most serious outcome. For
instance, if there were three offenders involved in a case and if accused
number one was discharged and accused number two was sentenced to three
months imprisonment, it was the latter sentence that would be chosen for
inclusion in the tables. This was done uniformly regardless of offence
category or type of court involved so as not to cause imbalances in the
figures. However, such cases were very few compared to offences involving
only one offender. Second, if case involved more than one offence it was not
selected for fear it might distort the figures even if the offence involved
belonged to the two selected categories. Third, data was missing for Kanye
and Mochudi magistrate courts for years 1992 and 1993 and 1993 and 2001
respectively. It is considered that the missing data did not affect the averages
and overall patterns. Besides, if we exclude all the missing years the patterns
still remain the same (see Chapter Five).
2.11 Conclusion
This chapter considered methodological aspects of the study. It reviewed and
discussed traditional approaches to cross systems research and it found that




3.0 THE CHANGING NORMATIVE CONTEXT OF DUALISM
In Chapter One it was observed that the convergence of legal systems system
in Botswana was intended primarily to bring about changes in the normative
practices of the courts. At the same time, it was noted that existing
differences between the two systems produced disparities that have become
the subject of continuing debate in the country hence the present thesis. This
Chapter discusses legal developments in Botswana before and after
independence. It considers the normative context/ thrust of the colonial and
post-colonial dualism. In that context, it discusses general factors and
orienting values that give, or are generally thought to give, pre-
independence and post-independence dualism their character. It focuses on
the apparently different imperatives that drove the legal system as a whole
and the two systems individually, at different stages in their evolution.
3.1 The Emergence of the State in Botswana
In 1885, Sir Charles Warren declared Botswana a British protectorate,
thereby, securing what was then considered, from the British point of view, a
strategic corridor to the north, from possible occupation by the Germans or
the Boers (Stevens 1967). The declaration of a protectorate over what,
henceforth, became known as the Bechuanaland Protectorate brought
together, under one administration, various entities that had previously
existed as independent polities. It was envisaged that the running of the
country would be handed over to the British South Africa Company. After
that idea was abandoned, it was for a long time thought that the territory
would eventually become part of South Africa. However, determined
opposition from chiefs to incorporation into South Africa ensured that the
territory remained free to take its own path to independence which finally
came in 1966.
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3.2 Colonial Legal Dualism: The Specific Context of its Emergence in
Botswana
It was not until 1891 that the British government established formal
structures, headed by a High Commissioner, to administer the territory. The
High Commissioner had the power to:
"amongst other things, from time to time by proclamation, provide
for the administration of justice, the raising of revenue, and generally
for the peace, order and good government of all persons within the
limits of this order, including the prohibition and punishment of acts
tending to disturb the peace"(Order in Council of May 1891).
Even so, no elaborate administrative structures were set up in the territory as
it appeared it might be costly to set up structures in what was essentially
regarded as a vast, but thinly populated desert territory whose strategic
significance derived purely from the geopolitical manoeuvres of the
Germans and the Boers rather than its economic value as such. Most
writers believe that this explains why the British chose from the very
beginning to rely on existing indigenous structures and institutions such as
chiefly rule to help them control the new territory despite their misgivings
about the latter.
Under the doctrine of Indirect Rule customary law operated, at least initially,
more or less undisturbed by general law in the tribal reserves. It must be said
though that this arrangement suited both the colonial administration and the
chiefs. As far as the British were concerned the arrangement meant that the
costs of running the territory were kept at a minimum while for the chiefs it
provided a comfort blanket in so far as it seemed to reassure them that they
would continue to govern their people much as before with little interference
from the state. This arrangement was to endure for many decades before
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some attempt was made to wrest some of the powers from chiefs (see for
example Khama and Another v the High Commissioner 1936HCTLR9).
Shortly after the authority to legislate had been conferred upon him, the
High Commissioner used his powers to legislate for the establishment of the
legal system (Proclamations of the 10th June 1891). As noted earlier, the
absence of state structures with the same reach as the indigenous system
meant that structures such as the customary courts not only continued to
operate pretty much as before, but would, where necessary be pressed
directly into the service of the state policy as it happened when poll tax was
introduced. Apparently recognising the value of these institutions, the
Colonial Office enjoined the High Commissioner to respect native law and
custom as long as it did not interfere with the 'exercise of His Majesty's
power and jurisdiction' or was not 'repugnant to morality, humanity or
natural justice, or injurious to the welfare of natives' (S.I (2) Bechuanaland
Native Courts Proclamations 1942).
In the event, colonial authorities found that they did not have to create new
structures to deal with disputes among indigenous peoples because the
Tswana judicial system was already so sophisticated that it obviated the need
to do so (Roberts 1972:16). When the official legal system was finally set up,
(see Otlhogile 1994) existing customary structures were allowed to operate
alongside the former until reforms were instituted in the 1930s that required
all customary courts to be recognised by the state. Indigenous courts were
concerned with the application of customary law in respect of Africans but
could administer such general law as they were instructed or authorised by
the High Commissioner and/or his subordinates to administration (African
Courts Proclamation 1961 S 11(b), (c), (d) and S12).
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In policy terms this arrangement meant was that people living in the
territory at the time were put into fixed categories in terms of which they fell
under the jurisdiction of one system or the other. The received courts
(western style courts) were primarily concerned with administration of
justice for the European population whilst African courts only dealt with
matters which affected the indigenous population.
Access of Africans to the received courts was restricted. As far as matters
involving Africans only were concerned, it was left to the discretion of the
clerk of court and judge in Subordinate Courts and High Court respectively
to decide whether the court could entertain such matters. However, if a
matter involving an African, (usually a Chief) was considered important to
the peace and order of the territory it could be tried in the general courts of
one variety or another. However, Africans were not considered bearers of
rights like settlers so that being tried in a western style forum did not mean
that they enjoyed the same protections as Europeans during the course of the
trial (Khama and Another v the High Commissioner 1936 HCTLR9; Rv Earl of
Crewe Ex parte Sekgome (1910) 2KB 576). No African court was allowed to try
an European, and any Chief who tried to do so was severely punished or
removed from his position. For instance, Tshekedi Khama of the Bangwato
was tried and punished by an ad hoc tribunal for trying a certain Mckintosh
in his court at Serowe (Crowder 1988). African courts were not even allowed
to try cases in which a non-African was a witness (African Courts
Proclamation 1961 S. 9) In the case of Toperdo Mookodi v Ngwaketse Kgotla
(1968-70 B.L.R. 293) a conviction was overturned precisely on this ground.
Thus under indirect rule, dualism was understood to mean that customary
and general courts were charged mainly with the application of customary
and European law respectively. Theoretically, indirect rule as a philosophy
did not seek to reshape African socio-political and legal institutions after the
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European model but rather sought to keep them separate and distinct. This
apparent separation probably fostered the notion of a 'dual'/parallel legal
system that was articulated by colonial administrators in official
communication. Colonial rule in Botswana in its early years seemed to
follow the classic pattern envisaged by indirect rule theorists like Lugard.
Having said that, western law was undoubtedly the dominant legal form
during colonial rule. Power was mediated through received law because it
purported to settle the question of sovereignty and the relationship between
the two legal systems (Rv Earl of Crewe ex prate Sekgome). It is clear that the
legal order as a whole was constituted by external or imposed law.
Even though the High Commissioner was directed to respect native law and
custom such recognition was conditional: customary law was recognised
only to the extent that it did not interfere with the 'exercise of His Majesty's
power and jurisdiction' or was not 'repugnant to morality, humanity or
natural justice, or injurious to the welfare of natives'(S I (2) Bechuanaland
Native Courts Proclamations 1942). Customary law was not regarded as law
or part of 'The law of The Territory' which was defined as 'the common law
and statute law from time to time in force in the Territory but does not
include Tswana Law and Custom'(African Courts Proclamation (ACP) 1961).
As the legislating authority the High Commissioner had the power to
'recognize or establish in the Territory such African Courts as he thinks fit'
(ACP 1961) including the power to define jurisdiction. Furthermore, he
reserved the right to 'suspend, cancel or vary' (ACP 1961) the warrant.
Despite the policy of 'non-interference' with native law, the High
Commissioner responsible for the territory reserved the right, according to
Khama and Another v The High Commissioner, to alter customary law as he saw
fit. Clearly those who had the authority of 'The Law of The Territory' behind
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them wielded more power than those who exercised power within the
customary domain. The ostensible separation of legal systems was, to a
certain extent, designed in such a way as to preserve these power dynamics.
This asymmetrical relationship was also racialized so that in effect it
translated into super-ordinate/subordinate relations between blacks and
whites and this was reflected in the master /servants ordinances and other
statutes borrowed from The Cape. Any chief who failed to appreciate this
soon came to grief as Tshekedi Khama of the Bangwato did when he tried a
certain Mckintosh in his court (Crowder 1988, Wylie 1990).
After the Second World War the Colonial Office embarked upon a different
type of reform: it began to lay out plans for the eventual integration of the
two legal systems. According to some writers this reflected a shift in the
power matrix as colonial authorities tried to accommodate an expanding
educated African elite. As the independence movement began to gain
momentum there were further reforms many of which were based on
principles agreed at various conferences on modernisation of customary law.
Thus the nature of dualism changed once again.
From the 1950s onwards, there was an inexorable movement towards
standardisation of procedures and unification or integration (Allott, 1984: 65)
of criminal law in Anglophone Africa despite official/policy commitment to
preserve the indigenous legal system/law. Piece meal reforms introduced at
the instance of the colonial administration and ideas and recommendations
of the wider reform movement connected with a series of conferences on the
modernisation of African law were incorporated into procedures that
customary courts were expected to follow even though it was not
mandatory, at that point to do so.
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3.3 Post-Colonial Dualism
Like elsewhere in Anglophone Africa, post-colonial dualism in Botswana
grew out of and was animated by attempts to overcome the institutional
legacy of colonial dualism which was shaped by the specific requirements of
colonial rule (see Agudal973, Barton et al 1983). A number of significant
developments occurred in respect of both the substance of law and the
overall environment in which the legal system operated that fundamentally
altered both the dynamic and underlying values of the system as a whole.
These included, amongst other developments, the adoption of a new
constitution the results of which were the de-racialization of the legal system
and the installation of a new charter of citizens' rights in the form of the Bill
of Rights.
The evolution and development of post-colonial dualism in Botswana
followed the basic model of legal reform that had been suggested at the
series of conferences on modernisation of African law (Allott 1984, Bennet
and Vermeulen 1980). It was proposed that with respect to civil matters,
customary law and received/state law should be allowed to exist side by
side. The application of substantive customary law in such areas was to
remain largely a matter for the customary courts. It was also decided that in
the case of criminal law, 'unification'/ 'integration' should be the route to
take. As a result of the latter recommendation many countries opted to
abolish customary criminal law altogether and introduce a universal code
instead.
In keeping this general trend the government promulgated, the Courts
(Amendment) Act (1972) effectively led to the suppression of customary
criminal law and the predominance of a universal code. The Courts
(Amendment) Act (1972) included the so-called written law requirement
which essentially meant that it was no longer permissible to charge anyone
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with a criminal offence unless such an offence was contained in any written
law. The new rule was categorical: 'No person shall be charged with a
criminal offence unless such an offence is created by the Penal Code or some
other written law' Customary (Amendment Act) 1972.
This in effect made the Penal Code (1964) the principal source of criminal
law. 'Unification' of substantive criminal law marked a historic shift in the
complex relationship between the customary and the general legal system in
Botswana. It may be seen as a milestone for several reasons. First, it
represented an important stage in the modernisation of customary law and
the implementation of a principle articulated at various international
conferences on the future of customary law (Allot 1984, Bennet and
Vermeulen 1980).
Second, it brought to an end complete dualism that had characterised the
legal system in Botswana since the early days of colonial rule. Under indirect
rule dualism was understood to mean that customary and general courts
were charged with the application of customary and European law
respectively. With the unification of criminal law both customary and
general courts applied the same law. Third, following from the previous
point, it effectively meant the abolition or suppression of customary criminal
law, which was an unprecedented step. Fourth, the use of customary courts
to enforce the new substantive criminal law and the introduction of
standardised procedural rules to regulate the conduct of cases in this area of
law meant essentially that the customary system was being grafted into the
received system. The system has been in place for about three decades now.
As far as criminal matters are concerned it would appear reforms intended to
unify/integrate criminal law were prompted by and reflected the long term
aim of narrowing the differences in standards of the two legal systems in
respect of criminal trials. In Botswana's case the high point of the reforms
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intended to bring about convergence in the practices of the customary and
the received legal system was the promulgation of the Customary Courts
(Amendment) Act, 1972. All these processes were conditioned and shaped by
the Constitution. The Constitution of Botswana, which is the fundamental
law of the land, not only guarantees citizens and non-citizens living within
Botswana's borders certain rights but also provides the basic framework and
broad normative parameters within which all courts must operate.
Accordingly as normative standards changed, the Constitution became the
primary instrument determining whether certain forms of punishment
would continue to be used or not (Clover Petrus & Another v The State 1984
BLR 14).
3.3.1 Divergences in Trial Process
The CCA and Customary Court Procedure Rules provide the framework for
the trial process in the customary courts. The normative framework is
centred on three distinct but related approaches built into the Act and the
Customary Court Procedure Rules. First, rules that apply to different aspects
of the trial process in customary courts were deliberately designed to be
similar to or different from those applicable in the general courts to varying
degrees, presumably, with some value or benefit in mind. These form the
bedrock of the framework. Second, the law leaves some gaps in some areas
regarding certain aspects of the process or in relation to structural
arrangements in the expectation that the traditional way of doing things will
come into play.
(a) Procedure and Evidence
Apart from the unification or integration of substantive law, one of the most
profound changes to the customary courts system was the introduction of
customary court procedure rules (see Customary Court Act). The rules were
first introduced in skeletal form during the colonial period but the version
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published under statutory instrument No 74 of 1971 which was expected to
be observed in criminal trials under the 1972 Act, was more detailed than any
previous version. More importantly unlike under the previous regime these
rules now had 'the force of law' (Republic of Botswana 1971 (a):2). These rules
not only partially standardised rules governing procedure and evidence in
customary courts but also brought them broadly into line with principles and
standards observed in the general courts.
Customary courts were required, in a departure from customary practice, to
strictly adhere to the rules of procedure and to that end S. 14A of the 1972
Act provided that 'No customary court shall impose upon any person any
punishment unless and until a criminal trial has been held in accordance
with the provision of the Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules, 1971'
(Customary Court (Amendment) Act, 1972). This point was similarly
stressed in the guidelines for chiefs and court clerks which also stated that
the procedures ' must be carefully complied with at all times' (Republic of
Botswana 1971 (a):2). The incorporation of what are essentially common law
courts procedures into the law governing the trial process in customary
courts narrowed considerably the previously existing gulf between common
law courts and customary courts.
Even though some of the basic elements of criminal procedure and evidence
governing trial processes in customary and magistrate courts are similar,
they were enacted under separate and different statutes: the CCA and the
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act respectively (See the Constitution of
Botswana and the Magistrate Court Act (MCA)). The two statutes vary
greatly in breadth, depth and the extent to which, if at all, laws from outside
the self-described legal system (i.e. customary or received) are applicable in
that system in the areas of procedure and evidence.
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Thus, very large differences remain between these courts in the areas of
criminal procedure and evidence despite the significant convergence referred
to and described above. Perhaps, one seemingly superficial but ultimately
significant difference is that whereas the approach of magistrate courts to
evidence and procedure is governed and circumscribed by written and
clearly ascertainable rules and principles, the rules applicable in the
customary courts (outside the written rules of procedure), are known only to
the particular court (it may be accurate to say in some cases the particular
judge) and the tribal community in that particular locality.
These differences appear to be the result of a deliberate attempt by the
legislature to preserve certain aspects of customary law in these areas by
leaving them outside the scope of new rules or simply making provision in
various enactments that require that a particular aspect of the trial process to
be governed by customary law. Two clear examples of such provisions are S.
29 and S. 49 of the CCA.
Section 29 of the CCA provides that: 'subject to such rules as may be made
under section 48 the practice and procedure of a customary court shall be
regulated in accordance with customary law'.
To that extent customary courts procedure is, apart from elements regulated
by the common law-based customary procedure rules, governed by
customary law. This, in terms of the law, will remain the case unless the
Minister of Local Government under whose authority customary courts fall,
makes rules allowing them to follow practices of the ordinary courts such as
those contained in the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. None have
been made so far.
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In a similar vein S. 49 of the CCA provides that:' except where the context
otherwise requires, the provisions of any other law in force in Botswana
relating to evidence or procedure in civil or criminal proceedings of
customary court shall not have any application to the proceedings of a
customary court or to proceedings transferred to a magistrate court under
section 36, to revisory proceedings in a magistrate court under section 38 or
appellate proceedings therein under section 41'.
Similarly, S 31 of the CCA extends the prohibition of legal representation in
criminal cases tried in Customary Courts to 'any Magistrates Courts in any
criminal proceedings or in any civil proceedings which fall to be determined
by customary law'.
Even though large areas of procedure and evidence are governed by
customary law the general courts have the ultimate say regarding what is or
not acceptable. While the general view that customary law approaches
matters of evidence in a way that is different from those of the general courts
was confirmed in Maszvikiti v Masivikiti (1974-1975 BLR57) there nevertheless
are broad parameters within which all courts including customary courts
must operate. For instance in relation to evidence the High Court held in
Tlhokomelo and another v State (1981) BLR 272 that:
"A customary Court may only take cognisance of evidence that is
relevant, which it finds credible, and which does not offend
against the principles which must commonly apply in all courts
where the same criminal laws are administered".
Thus, the general courts police even those areas where customary courts
have been given considerably leeway to apply customary law. Having said
that, procedure and evidence remain some of the most controversial aspects
of criminal trials in customary courts and the point of significant divergence
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between them and magistrate courts in spite of the considerable convergence
brought about by incorporation into customary procedure of rules similar to
one degree or another, to those applicable in the ordinary courts. Despite the
accepted virtue of simplicity that customary law brings to matters of
procedure and evidence in those areas where it has been given some leeway,
it is still regarded as arbitrary and difficult to ascertain.
(b) Sentencing
Following a transitional period (1964-1972) in which customary courts
continued to apply customary criminal and while ordinary courts applied
the Penal Code it was considered that it was necessary to bring punishments
in the two systems more into line with each other. To that end the Customary
Courts (Act) was amended. The Customary Courts (Amendment) Bill 1971
was primarily intended, according to the memorandum to the bill 'to limit
the offences for which a customary court may impose a sentence of corporal
punishment' (Republic of Botswana 1971(b)). The amendment was meant to
ensure, amongst other things, that customary courts could only sentence
offenders to corporal punishment in those cases for which the offenders
could be sentenced to corporal punishment by a magistrate.
These realignments made it possible for all the recognised courts to begin to
operate according to broadly similar principles and within the overall
framework created by the Constitution. In regard to punishment the
Constitution provides, amongst other things that: 'No person shall be
convicted of a criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty
therefore prescribed in written law' (the only exception being contempt)
(Section 10(8) of the Constitution of Botswana). Accordingly offence-creating
sections of the Penal Code and other statutes generally prescribe appropriate
punishment for those offences. Where there is no penalty provided for the
offence charged, the court must turn to section 33 of the Penal Code, a
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general punishment section, wherein the court is directed to impose a
sentence of not more than 2 years or a fine or both.
3.4 Colonial and Post-colonial Dualism As Constructs in Official Policy
The popular view among scholars implicitly regards dualism as evidence of
difference (Barton et al 1983). Formal pluralism has traditionally been
represented as constituting, amongst other things, the state's response to the
problem intractable of cultural differences, which are assumed to translate
into differences in legal cultures (Barton et al 1983, Hooker 1975,
Mamdanil996). This assumption is rarely questioned in most of the literature
and this has tended to confuse the debate about the nature of the difference
with the debate about the objects of policy on dualism. Traditional accounts
on dualism suggest that it emerged as a pragmatic response to shortage of
personnel needed to administer newly acquired territories when the
Scramble for Africa was at its height based on a philosophy that recognised
cultural differences between those subject to the different systems (Mamdani
1996). It appears from this that in policy terms differences between the legal
systems have almost always been taken as a given. Yet the meaning of those
differences has tended to change with shifts in political power and policy-
ends sometimes radically so (see Kuper and Kuper 1965:15). Post-colonial
dualism in Anglophone Africa grew out of and was animated by attempts to
overcome the institutional legacy of colonial dualism which was shaped by
the specific requirements of colonial rule. According to Mamdani (1996)
colonial dualism practiced under the umbrella of indirect rule was mainly
about political control of the colonized.
After independence, two basic varieties of dualism emerged: namely one that
represented an impulse to de-racialize and detribalize institutions through
homogenization and replacement (Mamdani 1996:7) or one that sought to de-
racialize without fully detribalizing (see Allot 1965). Botswana followed the
latter route. The shift of policy immediately before and after independence to
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a non-racial but still ethnically-and-lifestyle-based system of legal pluralism
shows that explanations of dualism based on culture alone are not adequate.
To that extent it is probably misleading to regard dualism as evidence of, in
a straightforward sort of way, difference. In the hands of the state, difference
has always been and continues to be both the subject and instrument of
policy in service of a variety of stated and un-stated goals. Notwithstanding
the preceding observations legal dualism implied official recognition of
alternative notions of justice, an idea promoted by anthropologists who were
often engaged as advisors to the administrators on indigenous law in various
British territories. Early anthropologists generally emphasised the relativist
nature of justice particularly in respect of substantive justice (Dembour: 1996:
21).
To that extent it is probably misleading to regard dualism as evidence of, in a
straightforward sort of way, difference. I would therefore argue that in the
hands of the state, difference has always been and continues to be both the
subject and instrument of policy in service of a variety of stated and un¬
stated goals.
3.5 The Normative Implications of Post-colonial Dualism
Among early anthropologists the most widely held view was that imposed
and received legal systems operated in parallel to one another with very little
interaction between them, hence the notion of dualism(see Hookerl975
Schaperal938) Later theorists have cast doubt on this( Snyder 1981 Griffiths J
1986). With respect to Botswana, later researchers have shown that the nature
of the relationship between the transplanted and indigenous legal systems in
post-independence period, is, at least in the field of family, neither as
watertight as the notion of dualism (Griffiths. A1983; 1997, Molokommel991,
WLSA1999)
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Griffiths A (1983) has raised doubts about the notion of dualism as
commonly applied to customary and general courts in so far as it is used to
suggest separateness or insularity of the two systems from one another.
Contrary to the idea of separateness conveyed by the concept of dualism, she
argues that there is cross-fertilisation of legal orders. Even more significantly,
Griffiths argues elsewhere that the results of her study amongst one of the
Tswana groups in southern Botswana," undermines any theoretical
distinction drawn between Western and customary" (Griffiths 1997:2).
This would appear to raise fundamental questions about those areas such as
criminal law where there has been deliberate policy to converge the two
systems. As we have noted before, the general relationship between
customary and received law in Botswana is not uniform across different
areas of substantive law. It seems more starkly so if we contrast civil law
with criminal law. The attitude adopted by the state with regard to civil law
amounts to what has been referred to as 'deep pluralism'. Deep pluralism,
has been described as, 'the state of affairs in which a category of social
relations is within the fields of operation of two or more bodies of legal
norms.'(Woodman 1996:157). In other words state law and customary law
are allowed to exist side by side. The application of substantive customary
law in such areas remains largely a matter for the customary courts. But in
the area of criminal law, the state has always limited the scope of
independence of customary courts. Since 1964 the penal code has not only
been the law of general application in criminal matters but it also has (along
with a few other sources) been the primary source of legally recognised and
enforceable criminal law in Botswana thus producing what Woodman (1996)
has described as 'state law pluralism.' Thus in this case we have duality of
the courts without duality of substantive law, differences in procedural rules
notwithstanding.
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3.6 Codified Law and the Dispute Process in Traditional Settings
There is a general consensus amongst writers that reconciliation and
maintenance of harmony are important aspects of the Tswana dispute
process (Schapera 1938,Roberts 1971(b);1972 Comaroff and Roberts 1981 )
Comaroff and Roberts(1981) have suggested that the dispute resolution
pattern in the Tswana legal system is based on negotiation-mediation-
adjudication model regardless of the type of court involved in the dispute
resolution process. This means the system as a whole was oriented towards
amicable settlement of disputes inside and outside formal structures both as
a goal and a process value. They have observed in that regard that:
" ..In all circumstances settlement-directed activity is said to be an
ideal and appropriate response to situations of conflict" (Comaroff
and Roberts 1981: 107).
Evidently, in the traditional Tswana set up, the way disputes were handled
when they broke out ensured, as far as possible, that mechanisms outside the
regular courts played their part in any attempts at settling the dispute. Thus
attempts at dispute settlement could be played out in a variety of situations
and contexts, both formal and informal. According to Schapera, not only did
non-regular courts play a vital role in most civil wrongs but they actually
settled a significant proportion of such cases. These courts included family
group courts, regimental courts and women's courts. But the dispute
resolution mechanism/process extended beyond these informal structures to
include direct party-to-party negotiations, mediation and negotiation
involving a third party such as a neutral third person known to both parties,
a trusted relative of both disputants, non-neutral family groups or a
headman. As might be expected, informal contexts tended to be more flexible
than formal structures in matters of procedure. Under the traditional set up,
disputes entered the formal stage only when they could not be settled by the
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informal structures. According to Schapera this was a mandatory part of
procedure in the dispute process involving civil wrongs. He observed that:
"When a civil wrong has been committed, the first legal duty of
the parties concerned is to attempt a settlement of the matter out
of court" Schapera (1938: 283).
By contrast, Comaroff and Roberts suggest that the settlement-directed
nature of the dispute process was not restricted to any specific category of
legal wrongs in that way (Comaroff and Roberts 1981:107). In their view the
basic model of negotiation-mediation-adjudication was the generally
preferred approach regardless of the type of court involved in the dispute
resolution process. Comaroff and Roberts (1981) have suggested that the
relationship between law and society in the Tswana society, which they
believe is different from that observed between western law and western
society, affects the way in which the law operates more closely. They suggest
that Tswana law is less differentiated from other norms in the social universe
than western law, a factor that necessarily influences how rules operate in
relation to other processes or ordinary transactions. It is a system constructed
around social relations especially relations among kin and the face-to-face
nature of the society and disputes are therefore fundamentally about the
state of social relations. Disputes are about trying to restore, reconfigure
those social relations and so that how a dispute was framed depended on the
state of social relations between disputants. Thus in such a context disputes
were structured by daily social intercourse in a way that is hardly
conceivable for western law.
In direct contradiction to the model described above Schapera (1938:285) has
suggested that under Tswana law cases involving criminal wrongs were not
negotiable. According to him, in such cases "there can be no attempt to settle
the matter out of court" (Schapera 1938:285). But this is not the whole picture.
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First, offences that Schapera identifies as being non-negotiable only
constituted a small number of legal wrongs. It was by no means exhaustive
of all wrongs especially because it did not include of lower level legal wrongs
which are now classified as criminal wrongs under the Penal Code but
whose classification under Tswana law could be ambiguous. Schapera
himself recognized the difficulties of classifying legal wrongs under Tswana
system, a problem often encountered when using western conceptual tools to
describe aspects of non-western systems. Thus he was aware of the
limitations of the classification scheme based on the civil/criminal wrong
dichotomy. He conceded in one of his books that the Tswana, "distinguish in
practice, though not in terminology, between what we call "crimes" and
"civil disputes" (Schapera 1938).
It was probably because of classification problems that Schapera resorted to
different labels for criminal and civil wrongs in different publications. In his
seminal work, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom, Schapera used
Civil/Criminal Wrong classification he uses Civil/Criminal in way that
broadly corresponds with the Delict/Penal Offence split as used in his other
writings. But the former classification system did not seem to overcome the
problems of ambiguity hence some subsequent writers have modified it.
Schapera used the term "delicts" to refer to those types of wrongs where the
offender might be ordered to pay compensation to the wronged party, or
where s/he might be punished, and or be required to pay compensation and
still be subjected to punishment (Schapera 1943: 32). On the other hand he
considered "penal offences" to be those wrongs which were dealt with
purely by punishment without any resort to compensation (Schapera 1943:
32). But the dividing line between these categories was often not as clear-cut
as it would seem at first glance. Kuper (1969:38) argued, for instance, that
sanctions were not a reliable guide for the classification legal wrongs. Instead
he replaced Schapera's Delicts and Penal Offences with Private Delicts and
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Public Delicts respectively. The latter classification is based on Radcliffe-
Brown's schema from which Kuper suspects Schapera derived his own
system in the first place (Kuper 1969:38). Writing slightly later Roberts
(1972:109-111) retained Schapera's scheme, though he too was not satisfied
with it. It has also been observed that in some cases it may not be clear from
a fact situation what the nature of the proceeding would be( Schapera 1938,
Robertsl972 ). It has been suggested that in such instances how the dispute is
framed depends on the aggrieved party and/or the other disputant (Roberts
1972:110). Comaroff and Roberts (1981: Chapters 3, 4 and 7) have suggested
that the very nature of dispute is contested or contestable, at least in some
cases. Sometimes the nature of the case may become clear only after it has
concluded though this may not be true in every instance. The process leading
to and the determination of the nature of the dispute may by implication be
negotiable. Such a process may in turn result in a negotiable or non-
negotiable legal wrong. So legal wrongs under Tswana law could not all be
unambiguously classified as criminal wrongs or civil wrongs as Schapera
seemed to suggest because the boundaries of these classes of wrongs were
not always coterminous with those of western law. These problems suggest
that the general scheme of Tswana dispute process may not fit neatly into the
western conceptual scheme.
3.7 Summary
The present system preserves to a considerable degree the duality of the
previous system. However there are also a number of significant differences
between the colonial and post-colonial duality. First, individuals are allowed
to choose whether they want their affairs to be regulated by customary law
or Common law regardless of race. Second, all individuals enjoy protection
under the bill of rights on the one hand but so does the customary legal
system. This has effectively created potential for a clash between the two
legal systems over the rights of the individual.
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The post-independence state's approach to customary law remains within
traditional mould even though it differs somewhat from that of the colonial
state. The traditional approach tends to associate law with cultural identity.
Greenhouse (1998) correctly argues that such an approach in fact makes law
a priori, a symbol of cultural identity. In terms of this formulation law
follows the fault lines of culture hence modern/customary dichotomy.
There is consensus in the literature that fundamental differences exist
between the customary and the general system regarding process-values and
end-values of the dispute processes and of dispute processing mechanisms.
More, importantly for our purposes, literature suggests that in the context of
Botswana there were historically some deep-seated differences in the way
western style legal system and the customary legal system classified and
punished many wrongs.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we considered legal developments in Botswana since
emergence of a modern state and the advent of legal dualism. There has been
a change of a most fundamental nature as regards the values that underpin
the whole system particularly the general courts: from a racially-based
system animated by administrative justice to one based on democratic values
and modern legal principles.
Thus theoretically access to courts is no longer restricted, at least not on the
basis of race, and equality before the law is one of the guiding principles of
the system. For the customary courts the most profound change has been
shift to criminal wrongs based on English common law with its emphasis on
written law and easily ascertainable procedures.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 CONTEXT: SENTENCING DISCRETION AND DISPARITY
The previous Chapter considered the emergence of dualism of the law and
courts and the changing normative context in which the courts had to
operate before and after Botswana's independence. The present Chapter
describes and discusses the sentencing discretion of judges in Botswana and
the general framework that guides the exercise of such powers. More
specifically, it considers the discretionary powers of magistrates and
customary court presidents in relation to sentencing.
4.1 Introduction
Discretion: Its Various Meanings
The margins or scope of discretion and the context within which it is
exercised vary enormously from one situation to another. Thus the concept
of discretion carries a variety of meanings. One of the more useful definitions
has been proffered by Vidal who describes discretion as: 'on the one hand,
the freedom enjoyed by a legal body to make decisions when choosing
between different options; and, on the other hand, the fact that this freedom
is not absolute but is, on the contrary, defined by a certain legal framework'
(L.I Vidal www.udg.es/dretprivat/filosofia/PonenciesII/IsabeI Lifante.rtf).
Discretion may take two basic forms. The first type or sense of discretion
represents a situation where actors exercise perfect, absolute or near absolute
discretion because they determine to one degree or another, the standards
that will apply to situations (undefined standards). In terms of the second
sense of discretion actors must act within certain limits defined by clear and
ascertainable rules (pre-defined standards) and principles. These situations
fall within the two of Dworkin's (Dworkin 1977) well-known three sub¬
species of discretion namely ( a) situation where the decision of the actor is
regarded as final and non-reviewable (b) where the decision amounts to
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interpreting a particular standard before applying it; (c)where the actor or
agency creates his/her/its own standards. Dworkin describes the first two
as constituting discretion in the weak sense and last one in the strong sense
(Galligan 1986).
By way of example and to continue with the theme of freedom suggested in
the definition proffered by Vidal, it is clear that discretion may involve a
situation where freedom to choose a particular course is restricted or more
positively freedom to choose a course of action without constraint (absence
of pre-defined standards) (L.Iidal ww.udg.es/dretprivat/filosofia/Ponencies
II/Isabel Lifante.rtf). While it might be thought that prescribing standards
limits discretion as judges are generally accustomed to believe, some analysts
do not see standards as necessarily antithetical to discretion (Galligan
1986:16-17). They take the view that, even where the freedom of action of the
decision-maker is severely constrained, mere interpretation of standards
constitutes discretion (Galligan 1986).
Clearly, discretion as a concept does not lend itself to analytical precision and
is attended by controversy. Part of the problem is that there is a tendency
among analysts to define certain situations as constituting discretion and
others as not, and then using the parameters of the definition proffered to
structure arguments about discretion.
4.2 Sentencing Discretion
Sentencing discretion derives from and is an aspect of the widely used notion
of judicial discretion (Galligan 1986, Dworkin 1977, Ashworth 1995). The
latter encompasses discretion across all areas of judicial competence in the
decision-making processes of courts whilst the former refers to discretion at
sentencing stage. Sentencing discretion is, therefore, a subspecies of judicial
discretion that is exercisable in relation to sentencing.
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Most of the leading writers on sentencing do not put forward a specific
definition of discretion or sentencing discretion despite its centrality to the
debate on sentencing reform over the past three decades or so (Tonry 1996).
It would appear that most take it as given, while others generally prefer to
discuss it in the context of the specific sentencing framework of the
jurisdiction under discussion (Tonry 1996; Spohn 2002;) Still it is worth
mentioning that in sentencing matters judges may have discretion in relation
to: (1) the aim of sentence in respect of a particular offence, class of offences,
or type of offender(s) (2) quantum of punishment that may be suffered by the
offender (3) choice of punishment or disposal. Generally speaking, the scope
of discretion of a judge varies by jurisdiction (substantive or territorial); rank
of presiding officer or by type of court.
Much of the debate around sentencing discretion among reformers,
legislators, the judiciary as well as many of those interested in sentencing
research issues tends to proceed from the assumption that interference with
the sentencing discretion of judges is likely to affect sentencing practices and
patterns of disagreements regarding the direction of change. It is interesting
to consider the relationship between the debate on sentencing discretion and
the wider jurisprudential debate about judicial discretion. The starting point
of jurisprudential debate on judicial discretion is curiously at odds with that
of the debate on sentencing discretion. In jurisprudence, the starting point is
whether and in what ways judges exercise discretion and on these points
opinions vary (Dworkin 1977). In contrast the debate on sentencing
discretion does not revolve around the question whether judges do exercise
discretion but is rather more concerned with the scope or margin of
discretion (Tony 1996, Spohn 2002).
It is necessary for our purposes to provide a rough definition of discretion to
guide our discussion. In the context of this thesis sentencing discretion refers
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to the decision making powers reserved for and exercisable by the judge
regarding sentencing of convicted offenders. Under this definition
discretionary powers include the decision whether to impose penalties at all
once the offender has been convicted and any decision regarding the type or
types of punishments the offender will suffer upon conviction as well as the
severity or otherwise of such/those punishment(s). In terms of S19 (1) of the
Customary (Amendment) Act 1997 and S32 (1) of the Penal Code, a court
may, having regard to certain stipulated facts or factors, discharge an
offender without punishing him/her.
Discretionary powers may include the articulation of the aims of the sentence
where the primary sentencing aims are not stated in statute as is the case in
Botswana. Exceptions include the treatment of juveniles under the Children's
Act. Even though this definition has some flaws, it is nevertheless a useful
guide for the discussion that follows. I have deliberately given the definition
a bias that allows us to discuss the situation in Botswana without having to
refine it (too often). Tire scope of discretion in Botswana is, as we shall see,
quite wide and to that extent the definition I have provided encompasses
most elements that are broadly associated with the concept as it is
understood and used in other jurisdictions.
4.2.1 Trends in Control and Management of Discretion
Legislatures in the common law world, including Botswana, appear
increasingly to regard structuring sentencing discretion as the most
immediate and effective way of changing sentencing patterns, sentencing
practices, and more broadly sentencing policy (Tonry 1996, Ashworth 1995).
A notable trend over the past three decades or so has been that legislative
enactments in different jurisdictions that have had a bearing on sentencing
discretion have tended to be designed mostly to restrict rather than extend
judicial discretion. This trend, which represents the most important
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paradigm shift to have occurred in recent times in respect of sentencing
matters generally and judicial discretion in particular, began in advanced
English-speaking countries in the 1970's (Tonry 1996, Ashworth 1995).
As rehabilitation, which had hitherto been the dominant philosophy in
sentencing, began to lose its appeal as the main aim of sentencing, the
assumptions that underpinned the sentencing structure associated with it
inevitably came in for criticism (Frankel 1972/2004, Tonry 1996). When
rehabilitation held sway, the judiciary, together with penal institutions were
given wide powers to tailor punishment to the 'treatment needs' of each
offender resulting in what reformers regarded as an unjust system. For
instance, in the United States of America, the rehabilitation ideology was
linked with the notion of indeterminate sentencing (Tonry 1996). Critics of
the system from both the left and the right called for restructuring of judicial
discretion.
Throughout the 1980's and 1990's there were numerous legislative
interventions in the common law world to re-shape judicial discretion
amidst much opposition from judges. In England and Wales the Criminal
Justice Act 1991 was regarded as a milestone in sentencing reform in the past
century even though it was not nearly as radical as similar legislation passed
in the U.S in general and in states like Minnesota in particular (see Ashworth
1992(a), Henham 1996). Readiness of legislators regularly to intervene to
reshape sentencing policy and to restrict the sentencing powers of
judges in recent decades contrasts sharply with the legislative abstention
for much of the 20th century. Legislative abstention is believed by some to
have led to the attitude among the judiciary that sentencing policy is the
province of judges rather than the legislature (Ashworth 1995).
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4.2.2 Sentencing Discretion: The Botswana Model
The approach to controlling judicial discretion in Botswana is different from
that of various U.S jurisdictions, but similar instead, to that of England and
Wales. The approach in England and Wales is that the legislature sets high
maxima and that allows the judges to award what they consider to be the
appropriate sentence in the circumstances (Ashworth 1995). The system
places great reliance upon guideline judgements of the Court of Appeal
which, in the England and Wales have helped create a tariff system
(Ashworth 1983). In Botswana's case the general courts follow the lead of the
higher courts which may take the form of appeal or supervisory review.
Customary courts are presumed to follow their own patterns of sentencing
but are subject to appeal and supervisory (administrative) review. But the
general courts may not impose their way of doing things on customary
courts. Still they do define the broad normative parameters for all courts
including customary courts (Tlhokomelo and another v State BLR272)
4.2.3 Reasons for Adjustment of discretion: Aims/Objectives
Alteration or re-adjustment of judicial discretion may be done in pursuit of
a variety of objectives ranging from overtly political goals (Cavadino and
Dignan 2003 Chapters 1 and 4) to those supposedly strictly concerned with
sentencing principles (Frankel 1972/2004). From the narrow perspective of
sentencing, restriction of the sentencing discretion of judges is usually done
with the aim of, amongst other things, increasing consistency in sentencing,
reducing or increasing severity of sentences for particular offences, reducing
or extending the menu of possible disposals and increasingly, in many
jurisdictions, to achieve a deterrent effect in respect of a particular offence
(Tonry 1992, Nsereko 1999). Quite often one or more of these objectives is
given primacy perhaps with only secondary importance given to the others if
applicable.
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4.2.4 Evidence of Effectiveness of Adjusting of Discretion
The question whether the modification of the discretionary powers of judges
is effective depends entirely on what the objectives of the exercise were in the
first place. These may range from ideologically motivated belief that wide
discretion is in and of itself a bad thing to be very specific but limited goals
such as containing prison populations, reducing discretion or deterring
offenders from committing specific offences (see Ashworth 1995). Alteration
of discretion may also have unintended effects which may be or may not be
easily measurable but which may nevertheless affect the original goal of
reform in ways that are not readily noticeable or quantifiable.
Major reform initiatives in the developed common law countries in the post-
19708 period appeared to target unstructured discretion following the
disenchantment with rehabilitation as the controlling aim of sentencing
when it failed to produce the expected results (Frankel 1972/2004, Tonry
1996). As already noted critics associated rehabilitation with widely varying
and unfair sentences. A leading critic described the relatively wide
discretion that characterised sentencing during this period as indicating
'lawlessness in sentencing' (Frankel 1972/2004). These factors probably
encouraged the view that curtailing discretion curbs disparity.
4.2.5 Sentencing Commissions
Post-reform impact evaluation research literature is surprisingly thin despite
the vast amount of literature on sentencing reforms generally (Tonry, 1996:
31). Most of the available research is from the United States of America. A
number of factors make it difficult to generalise from this research. One of
the most important of these is that the objectives, scope and emphasis of the
reforms which are the subject of evaluation research vary from one U.S state
to the next, making comparison difficult.
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However, giving an overall assessment of the impact of guidelines designed
by sentencing commissions in the United States of America, Tonry concluded
that such guidelines had 'changed sentencing patterns, reduced disparities,
ameliorated gender and differences and helped states control their prison
populations' (Tonry 1996:32). Spohn made broadly similar observations and
conclusions with respect to disparities generally including racial and gender
after comprehensive review of evaluation research in these areas (Spohn 2002
Chapters 4, 5 and 6). In another paper Tonry claimed that evidence existed
that showed that modification of structure of discretion could increase
consistency, reduce disparity and change sentencing outcomes substantially
(Tonry 1988: 269). But the two authors also suggest that racial and gender
disparities have not been satisfactorily dealt with or eliminated and that
changes in the various areas offer, on closer scrutiny, a more complex picture
than appears at face value suggesting that evidence on some of the areas is
less conclusive than is imagined (Ashworth 1983).
4.2.6 Guideline judgements
Appellate reviews offer the judiciary an opportunity to regulate themselves
through guideline judgements passed by higher courts. The little evaluation
research that there has been in the U.S.A on appellate review in states
without detailed standards showed that the effectiveness of appellate
reviews in those states is constrained by ad hoc nature of appellate decisions
and the fact that such decisions tend generally to deal with extreme cases
(Tonry 1996:188-189). Similar doubts, though not necessarily supported with
research evidence, have been raised about appellate review in England and
Wales (Ashworth 1992(a); 2004). The same arguments should apply with




Mandatory minimum legislation by definition imposes the most severe
limitations on the powers of judges to decide cases according to their own
judgement and in that regard lies at the extreme end of the discretion
continuum. However, mandatory minimum legislation has, despite
determined opposition from the judiciary, been growing in volume in most
common law countries in recent decades (Tonry 1992). Yet it appears,
perhaps primarily because of its iniquitous nature to have attracted more
difficulties with compliance within agents of the criminal justice than other
legislative formulae (see e.g Bjerk 2005). In some jurisdiction it has also been
shown to have failed to achieve the goal likely to be associated with or use as
justification for such legalisation: deterrence (Nsereko 1999, Lowenthal 1993).
4.3 The Nature of Disparity
As a concept, disparity carries a variety of meanings and that some writers
claim that on its own disparity is an empty word (Galligan 1986, Tonry 1996:
186). Disparity is often used to denote unjustified disparity, and in the
context of sentencing, disparity has been used broadly to refer to unjustified,
or more narrowly, unjust differences in sentences imposed by the court on
similarly situated offenders for a similar offence. It is difficult to agree as to
what should be regarded as unjustified variations in sentencing, even for
that matter, what constitutes an unjust sentence or which types of disparity
are warranted or unwarranted. Spohn (2002) has identified three other more.
Some scholars have argued that when the term disparity is used without
reference to a particular standard, it is an empty word (Tonry 1996:186).
'Unwarranted disparity' is the phrase commonly used to describe
unjustifiable or unjust differences in sentences or sentencing patterns.
However what is regarded as unwarranted may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction so that the substitution of words does not necessarily resolve the
problem on a philosophical level. Determining whether unwarranted
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disparities exist in any given instance involves both subjective perceptions
and objective elements so that:
"For most people in most places, as a normative matter,
"unwarranted" disparities exist when sentences in general are
disproportionate to the relative severities of offences for which
they are imposed" (Tonry 1996:187).
Even where a general consensus exists as to what sort of disparities in a
given context constitute unwarranted disparities, the question of degree of
difference between sentences as well as the severity of sentences form an
important part of the evaluation.
It has also been argued that disparity is sometimes wrongly used
interchangeably with discrimination (Spohn 2002:132-133).This not is
surprising since it is the research on disparities associated with
discrimination especially race and gender discrimination, that attracts the
most attention ( see for example Martin and Stimpson 1997/1998, Hood
1992,Spohn 2002).
4.3.1 The Merits and Demerits of Consistency: The Equality Problem
One of the objectives of the international reform movement since the 1970s
has been to reduce disparity and discrimination in sentencing (Ashworth
1992 (a&b); 1996, Spohn 2002). Consistency in and of itself is not
unproblematic. Consistency may undermine justice if applied in a manner
that would tend to undermine any of the two limbs of the equality
injunction: 'treat like cases alike' and 'treat different cases differently' (Tonry
1992:32).
Some sentencing guidelines (e.g. Minnesota guidelines) are relatively rigid in
that they exclude from calculus any consideration of such variables as age,
and sex when sentencing. It is possible to argue that the exclusion of age, sex
and similar variables though, intended to reduce variations in sentences
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based on these variables, means that there is a violation or a risk of violating
the second part of the equality injunction if one believes that individuals
with varying attributes should be regarded as objectively different or
differently-situated. The argument in the other direction also carries equal
force. It may be argued that the inclusion of variables such as age, gender or
race in the calculus means that offence situations that are otherwise
similar would be treated differently simply because of these variables thus
undermining the first part of the equality injunction.
These factors have been identified as being amongst other factors likely to
have an influence on the decision-making process at sentencing stage
(Ashworth 1983:46-55). Some of these factors especially previous convictions
have been shown to have some influence on the outcome (Ashworth 1983:
29-30). Numerous studies in the United States of America have shown that
legal variables are reliable predictors of the sentences likely to be passed by
the courts (Martin and Simpson 1987/88). It has been found that it is
important when measuring the impact of legal variables, to separate them
from non-legal variables (Hagan 1974; Spohn and Welch 1987, Spohn 2002).
Sometimes the judge is required by law to take into account factors that we
have here classified as non-legal variables thus to all intents and purposes
treat them as legal variables. That somehow blurs the boundaries that are
assumed under in the classification to separate the two groups of factors.
Whether these variables tend to increase disparities or reduce them or
perhaps more accurately, whether such disparities are warranted or
unwarranted is clearly a contentious point.
4.3.2 Use of Sentencing Commission Guidelines to Manage Discretion and
Reduce Disparities
Research shows that sentencing guidelines introduced by sentencing
commissions in the US reduced disparities (Anderson et al 1999) and
including racial and gender differences in the punishment of offenders
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(Spohn 2002:288-289). Evaluative research seeking to measure the impact of
adjustment of discretion has tended to use the level of compliance with
guidelines as an indirect measure of consistency. Consistency in its turn is
often used to imply lack of unwarranted disparity. In the states that
introduced guideline the compliance rate was over 80% (Tonry 1988).
However, the impact of guidelines tended to vary to a significant degree
according to, amongst other factors, whether the guidelines were voluntary
or prescriptive (Tonry 1988). It also shows that, generally, voluntary
guidelines have lower compliance rates than prescriptive guidelines (Tonry
1988). This may well explain to some degree at least, why, many states in the
U.S that initially experimented with voluntary guidelines after they
discarded indeterminate sentencing, have, with a few exceptions, abandoned
them.
High or low compliance levels are not in themselves a completely reliable
indicator of success or failure of any attempt to structure discretion. What
may appear, superficially, to be a high compliance rate may, in some
instances, actually mask displacement of discretion to other areas or the
circumvention of new rules (Tonry 1988). This is more likely to be the case
where judicial resistance to reform is particularly strong (Ashworth 1992(a)).
That in turn suggests that other variables, such as the attitude of the
judiciary and other officers within the criminal justice, also play an
important role in the success or failure of any reform initiatives concerning
the use of discretionary powers. This has tended to blunt somewhat claims
that have been made about the effectiveness of prescriptive guidelines as a
tool for reducing disparities.
Above criticisms, notwithstanding, the overall conclusions of reviews of
research on guidelines show that, compliance with prescriptive guidelines
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was high. Thus it appears that the form guidelines take is critical to the
success of any initiative designed to alter sentencing patterns and practices.
4.3.3 Mandatory Minimum Sentences
Mandatory minimum penalties tend to increase the risk that there will be a
violation of the second half of the equality injunction ('treat different cases
differently') because mandatory minimum legislation takes away the
flexibility that judges require to take account of circumstances peculiar to
each case may be. So in effect the judges find themselves having to impose
the mandatory sentence whatever the circumstances of the individual case.
Research from the U.S shows that judges and prosecutors find ways of
circumventing mandatory minimum penalties if they are unhappy with the
mandatory minimum penalty (Tonry 1988). A study by United States
Sentencing Commission found 40% non-compliance rate with mandatory
sentences while other studies found high levels of non compliance and
circumvention in New York, Massachusssets and Michigan. Even though it
is not clear whether the same degree of non- compliance and
circumvention occurs in Botswana, the difficulties caused by mandatory
penalties have been clearly articulated in a number of cases that have gone
to the higher courts on appeal(e.g Badisa Moatshe v the State(Court of Criminal
Appeal No 26/2001). Thus despite lack of systematic research on mandatory
penalties in Botswana, the nature of cases that reach the higher courts
would appear to suggest they increase risk of violating the second part of
the equality maxim.
4.3.4 Guideline Judgements
Appellate review has not been found to be a satisfactory corrective measure
as far as consistency in sentencing is concerned in the English legal system.
(Ashworth 1992(a):282-284). However, appellate review would appear to be
more suited to dealing with extreme cases. Even though wide powers that
judges have in sentencing might well be the source of disparity in each of the
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two systems that make up the dual system in Botswana, the focus of much
public discontent seems to be inter-system rather than intra-system
disparities (see Kirby 1985, Hansard 1996, Boko 2000).
4.4 The Nature and Scope of Sentencing Discretion in Botswana: An
Overview
There has been relatively little debate in Botswana outside the courtroom
concerning the subject of judicial discretion and less still that of sentencing
discretion. The only time in recent memory when sentencing discretion
entered public discourse was after the outrage caused by case of Baeta
Ngwenya v The State High Court Miscellaneous Application No. 47/97
(unreported). The case involved a woman who was given a 10 year
mandatory penalty for robbery after she had allegedly used force to extract a
very small amount of money from her friend. Thus unlike in developed
countries where discretion is widely debated in national newspapers,
academic and public forums, especially parliament, in Botswana it is hardly
ever given serious coverage or treatment. It has featured as a subject of
serious debate in the House of Chiefs but then only as part of a broader
debate about the loss of powers by chiefs. To that extent it has been and
remains only of symbolic value in the politics of dualism. Similarly reference
to it has been made in the National Assembly during the passing of a bill on
Stock Theft. But such concern as was expressed did not provoke further or
broader debate outside parliament itself. In any case parliamentary debates
have not generally been concerned with principles surrounding discretion as
such.
Under Botswana's legal system the discretionary powers of judges in
sentencing matters vary in relation to different aspects of sentencing. These
range from how the penalty is fixed to broader matters such as the aim of the
sentence in the specific instance or in respect to a particular class of offences
or to principles and policies that govern sentencing in its various dimensions.
In assessing what sentence is appropriate in a particular instance, judges are
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expected to weigh three factors: the nature of the crime, circumstances of the
offender and the interests of society (Kolagano v The State 1992 BLR 419 per
Gyke-Dako). The factors to be considered are cast in such broad terms that
they do not really mean much so further analysis is required to develop an
appreciation of what these elements entail. Appellate review offers general
guidance and sometimes very specific directions regarding various aspects of
sentencing and in that has the effect of channelling the thinking of judges in
the desired direction and may occasionally restrict the discretion of judges in
sentencing matters.
4.5 General Framework for the Exercise of Sentencing Discretion in
Botswana
4.5.1 Sentencing Aim(s)
In Botswana there is no general aim or primary sentencing rationale with a
statutory or similar force behind it to provide a guidance and direction in
sentencing. Generally speaking, it is left to the judge to determine the
sentencing aim for herself/himself in respect of most offences. There are at
least three exceptions to this general rule. The first concerns mandatory
minimum sentence enactments. Often passed in response to a perceived
escalation in a particular type of crime they usually have deterrence as the
stated aim of the enactment. The second exception is juvenile justice, whose
aims unlike those of the adult system are clearly stated. The third concerns
those instances where, for public policy or other reasons, higher courts take it
upon themselves to direct what the sentencing aim in respect of a particular
offence shall henceforth be. In such cases the higher courts often state the
sentencing aim that must be at the back of the trial court's mind when
dealing with such offences. It could therefore be said that the higher courts
have, within these limits, tried to develop a sentencing policy. For instance
they have indicated when it may be appropriate to impose sentences for
reasons of deterrence, retribution and reform. The theme of deterrence is one
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that courts return to quite regularly. The higher courts have also pronounced
on the general approach to custodial sentences where the persons concerned
are first offenders (State v Sethunya 1986 BLR 423).
4.5.2 Sentencing Principles
The higher courts (i.e. the High Court and the Court of Appeal) provide
guidance regarding general principles to be considered when passing a
sentence. Where principles are laid down in guideline judgements regarding
such matters as mitigation they tend to be very general so that the weight to
be given to different factors is a matter of discretion for the judge. Even
though these judgements tend to constrain the discretionary powers of
judges somewhat, their powers nevertheless still remain fairly wide. In
deciding what the quantum of punishment should be, judges must take into
consideration aggravating and mitigating factors. The range of factors that
may be taken into account, especially mitigating factors, is potentially vast,
and only a tiny percentage is mentioned in guideline judgments. It is
therefore necessary to consider some form of rough classification in order to
facilitate discussion. Following Ashworth (1995 Chapter 5) I find
classification of aggravating and mitigating factors according to whether
they are general to all offences or specific to particular offences, useful.
Ashworth (1995) has usefully further broken mitigation down into an
additional category of personal mitigation.
4.5.3 Aggravating Factors
(a) General aggravating factors
Some general aggravating factors in Botswana include, amongst other factors
premeditation and wickedness of the offender. For instance Puso v The State
(1998 BLR 422) in which Tebbutt J on behalf of the bench of the Court of
Appeal in an appeal by a youthful murderer against death sentence for
murder said: "The death sentence is, by virtue of the provisions of section 203
92
of the Penal Code, mandatory where a person of 18 years of age or older is
convicted of murder without extenuating circumstances. It ought to be
imposed on a teenager who has committed murder if it actually appears that
he killed out of inherent wickedness" (Puso v The State 1998 BLR 422) (emphasis
added).
(b) Specific aggravating factors
There are two ways in which specific aggravating factors may be
incorporated into an offence. The offence-creating statute may specify
aggravating factors or provide for a separate offence incorporating an
aggravating feature. In Botswana legislation tends to be crafted in such a way
as to separate sub-categories of the same general offence thus obviating the
need to emphasise specific aggravating features, as is often the case where
the offence categories are very broad. That is generally the case with most
common offences such as those offences triable-either-way that have been
selected for special attention in this study. The main offences categories are
in effect gradations of the same general offence e.g. Assault Common,
Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm, together with Grievous Bodily Harm
belong to the same broad category. Each of these sub-categories may be fairly
wide. As a result there may be some overlap between sub-categories of the
same offence and therefore confusion as to that appropriate charge/sentence;
consequently the higher courts have sometimes had to refine the meanings of
particular offences where they find that statutory meanings of particular
offences are vague or insufficiently distinct from parallel offences. However,
each of these sub-categories may have some aggravating features specific to
it.
4.5.4 Mitigating factors
Even though there is no law requiring the trial court to allow the offender or
her/his legal representative the opportunity to address the court in
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mitigation, the Courl of Appeal has ruled that failure to do so is an
irregularity (Hilda Ofetotse v The State (Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No.
5/1989)). Such an irregularity may not be fatal if it does not result in the
failure of justice but is nevertheless regarded in a serious light by higher
courts. In Hilda Ofetotse v The State, Bizos J.A said in relation to mitigation:
"...Despite absence of any statutory provision entitling an accused to address
the court in mitigation, there is a well established rule of practice in the
Courts of Botswana, South Africa and elsewhere whereby the defence is
afforded the opportunity of tendering evidence in mitigation and making
submissions to the Court before the sentence is passed. This practice is well
known to all of us and we intend it to be followed".
(a) General mitigating factors are those that go to the seriousness of the offence.
These may relate to harmfulness/potential harmfulness of the conduct for
which the offender has been convicted and her/his culpability.
As regards the latter Ashworth (1995) has quite rightly pointed out that some
of the factors that are seen as reducing culpability are factors or
circumstances that fall just short of a defence. In other words while they
would fail as a defence in respect of the offence for which the offender has
been convicted they could work to the advantage of the offender if raised in
mitigation.
(b) Specific mitigating factors
Certain mitigating factors are specific to the offence concerned, for example,
in murder cases the Penal Code provides that: 'in deciding whether or not
there are any extenuating circumstances (Puso v The State, 1998 BLR 422) the
court shall take into consideration the standards of behaviour of an ordinary
person of the class of the community to which the convicted person belongs'
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(Section 203 of the Penal Code). Such considerations do not apply in respect
of other offences.
(c) Personal Mitigating Factors
These cover a range of factors some of which may also fall under general
mitigation e.g. youthfulness.
(i) Youthfulness: courts in Botswana are anxious to give the young,
especially where there appears to be a chance for reform, (State v Baliki
Charlie High Court Review Case No. 140/1983), a second chance. In-
school youth with a prospect for further education may find that they
often escape imprisonment for minor to moderately serious offences.
If it is deemed necessary to send them to prison part of the sentence
may be suspended and in serious cases reduced on account of their
youthfulness. Immaturity and other factors associated with being
young such as impulsivity are matters that courts must weigh when
sentencing young persons. In Puso v The State 1998 BLR 421 Tebbutt
J.A stated that 'Youthfulness is in itself regarded as an extenuating
circumstance. In South Africa, where the law is the same as in
Botswana, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court has held that
a teenager is prima facie regarded as immature and on that ground
extenuating circumstances can be found unless there are factors which
would negative such immaturity'.
(ii) First offenders: the general courts are slow to send first offenders to
prison. However a statement such as this must necessarily be qualified
as the practice is not immutable (State v Sethunya 1986 BLR 423).
Previous convictions are not, if the correct principles are followed,
aggravating features. An offender with prior convictions for a similar
offence generally loses the sympathy of the courts in relation to that
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particular offence as it would appear that s/he is incorrigible
(Ashworth 1995) There is no guidance as regards to weight given to
previous convictions of a similar kind. Previous convictions for the
same category of offences may be of entirely different value in terms
of seriousness but they are not generally reflected in the current
sentence. Suppose offender A, who has just been convicted for the
offence of Assault Common and records show that he has a previous
conviction for Grievous Bodily Harm. Offender B has similarly been
convicted for Assault Common but has previously been convicted of a
minor assault (affray). All other things being equal, is it fair that he
should receive the same punishment as A? Furthermore as things
stand it does not appear that a considerable crime - free period would
earn the offender a discount on her/his sentence.
(iii) The Guilty Plea: The courts do not appear to have taken a firm view
on what the effect of guilty plea on the sentence should be (State v
Rahii 1982 BLR 252). It would appear that some believe the effect of
the guilty plea should be neutral (Ashworth 1995) but generally if
certain elements like a display of contrition is present many judges
would take the view that should earn the offender a discount on
her/his sentence (State v Mavele Pliili and Another) High Court Review
Case No. 355/1982 (unreported). However, it is misdirection for the
sentencing court to punish an offender more harshly than it would
otherwise do simply for pleading not guilty (State v Phillimon 1983
BLR 30).
(iv) Social Circumstances of the offender and Social Impact: the courts in
Botswana do not, as a matter of general practice, call for a probation or
social inquiry or pre-sentence report when they are set to pass a
sentence on an offender. However the offender is free to call attention
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to his personal circumstances and how those around him might be
affected by the sentence. Generally such matters as the employment
status of the offender may very well influence the court's thinking if it
appears that sending an offender to prison is likely not to benefit
society or might have an excessively negative impact when all factors
are taken into account. As regards other personal factors, however, the
courts appear to have ruled out the accused person's ill health as a
mitigating factor 'save in exceptional cases or unless it has some
relevance to the causation of the offence.'
4.5.5 Modulating Disparities through Observance of Proportionality
Principle
The present study is concerned with apparently unjust variations in the
punishment of similarly situated offenders for similar offences. The dual
system appears to be designed to allow or accommodate tolerable differences
possibly emanating from value-based differences between the received and
indigenous systems without presumably undermining the ranking of
offences in the system as a whole. In other words, it was not intended that
allowable differences in punishment should undermine the proportionality
principle. A system may for instance be said to embrace the proportionality
principle:
"if the object is recognised to be a rough attempt to equate the size
of the fine or the length of imprisonment to the gravity of the
category of offence as contrasted with offences of other categories
(theft contrasted with murder, for example) and the gravity of the
circumstances in which the offence was committed as contrasted
with those in which other offences of the same category are
committed.." (Cross (1975) as quoted in Walker 1991:101).
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The legal system in Botswana may be said to take cognisance of this principle
for a number of reasons. Firstly, it recognises the proportionality principle
implicitly in so far as the primary source of criminal law in Botswana, the
Penal Code, is predicated upon the idea of proportionality in that it is based
on an underlying system of ranking offences and punishments. However,
that in itself does not tell us much about how the gravity of offences may be
measured. This issue is explored further in Chapter Five.
Secondly, the proportionality principle is given statutory expression in S. 17
of the Customary Court Act, which requires customary courts to adhere to
the proportionality principle. It provides that "no customary court shall
subject any person to any punishment which is not in proportion to the
nature and the circumstances of the offender. Thirdly, higher courts have
accepted and applied the principle in a number of cases while at the same
time showing disapproval of certain degrees of disproportionationality
punishment (Desai v The State 1985 BLR 582; and Fredrick Mokone v The State
Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. 26/2001 Badisa Moatshe v the State(Court
ofCriminal Appeal No 26/2001).
4.5.6 Significance of the Proportionality Principle in Modern Legal Systems
Proportionality is widely recognized and acknowledged in modern criminal
justice systems, even if only implicitly and inconsistently as being of value in
itself, if not for pragmatic reasons then from an ethical point of view (von
Hirsch 1990, von Hirsch and Ashworth 2004). Proportionality is associated
instinctively with fairness in the mind of the ordinary person.
There is hardly any state-sanctioned system of penalties anywhere in the
world that does not at least pay lip to the broad principle that offences must
follow sliding scale that accords with severity of punishment, even if
disagreements remain between societies regarding the ranking of offences
and appropriate punishments for those offences. To that extent
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proportionality is an important clement in modern justice systems and is as
such incorporated into their philosophies and practices in one form or
another. The international community generally disapproves of the kind of
arbitrariness such as that which characterised punishment in pre-
enlightenment Europe (Roshier 1989 Chapter 1).
Thus proportionality informs punishment in modern criminal justice systems
even though in terms of general justifications of punishment it sits rather
well with retributivism and less so with other philosophical justifications
(von Hirsh: 1990). While it has come to be seen as rather unconvincing for
modern utilitarians to argue in favour of proportionality, Bentham, the father
of utilitarianism recognised the value of proportionality in sentencing
(Walker 1991:103-104).
The principle of proportionality is regarded as a part of the Common Law in
some countries that belong to the common law tradition such as Australia
and Canada. However, it is also clear that even in the Common Law
countries it has been given varying degrees of prominence in different
jurisdictions at different times (Ashworth 1995: 86).
More broadly, the importance of proportionality has been recognised and
underlined by the United Nations' International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR). Many countries have ratified the ICCPR
protocol and agreed to be held up to its standard(s).
From a purely pragmatic view it has been suggested that proportionality is
important for inspiring respect for law (Hart 1968). Conversely,
disproportionate punishment undermines respect for the law. Perhaps that is
why it has been argued that most people intuitively regard proportionality as
part of a fair system of justice.
99
A series of decisions from the higher courts in Botswana have affirmed the
importance of proportionality in the country's legal system. For instance,
in Badisa Moatshe v The State (Court ofCriminal Appeal No 26/2001
(unreported)):
"The cumulative effect of such consecutive sentences is
undoubtedly likely to result in an accused person being
imprisoned for excessively lengthy periods, which would be
disproportionate to the offence concerned. It would go beyond the
purpose of the legislature in wishing to curb the mischief created by those
offence" (emphasis added).
In the case of Desai and Modi v The State (1985 BLR 585) almost a decade
earlier the court ruled that to impose a long term of imprisonment and
together with strokes amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment.
Bearing in mind that the cases cited concerned serious crimes which are
subject to mandatory minimum penalties, the point I am making here is two¬
fold. The first point is that higher courts have established that the
phenomenon of disproportionate punishment exists and that the
proportionality principle operates as a limiting principle in sentencing even
in cases involving consecutive mandatory minimum sentences (see e.g Badisa
Moatshe v the State Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No
26/2001(Unreported), Frederick Mokone and Moses Dikago v The State Criminal
Appeal No 22/2003(Unreported).
Second, that combining punishments may result in disproportionate
punishment, at least in some cases, and in serious crimes such combinations
could even amount to cruel and inhuman punishment (Desai and Modi v The
State 1985 BLR 585).
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4.5.6 General Factors Tending to Increase Disparities
The preceding discussion suggest that there are some factors inherent in
the legal system that would tend to increase disparities. Firstly, it is
evident that judges in Botswana have very wide discretion in sentencing
matters safe for a few areas where the legislature has for purposes of
deterrence, introduced mandatory minimum sentences. For most common
crimes the applicable regime is that which allows the judge to decide on the
appropriate sentence below a fixed maximum for that offence or offence
category. As a rule the maxima is pitched very high.
Secondly, there is no general overarching sentencing aim or policy to which
judges may tailor their sentencing decisions. It is most often a matter for the
judge to decide what s/he considers to be the appropriate sentencing aim.
However, the higher courts do from time to time, after taking due account of
emerging crime trends, public and governmental concerns, direct that certain
crimes should be punished in a certain way. But this on its own does not
amount to a general sentencing policy. A sentencing policy requires
statutory authority and articulation.
Thirdly, higher courts may not interfere with sentences passed by lower
courts purely for reasons of consistency. More substantial reasons than that
must be present before they interfere.
Fourthly, judges also enjoy a lot of discretion in respect to other aspects of
sentencing such as mitigation. There is very little guidance as to what factors
may be considered and what weight they should be given.
These factors individually and together increase the sources and likelihood
of disparities in sentences including inter/intra judge disparities as well as
various types of inter-court disparities. The question is whether these
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disparities are warranted or unwarranted disparities, or whether, if they are
warranted, they are of an acceptable magnitude.
4.6 Discretion as to Punishment and Combination of Punishments
All things being equal, magistrate courts are expected to inflict the penalty
prescribed in the offence-creating section of the applicable law (usually the
Penal Code), and providing the prescribed penalty is not a mandatory
minimum penalty, they may impose any quantum beneath the maximum
(see Appendix C). Otherwise the court may replace the prescribed penalty
with another punishment where substitution is allowed (see Table 1 below)
or suspend the sentence partially or wholly upon certain conditions, (Section
308 CP&E) release offender with a caution or upon some other condition
(Section 32,CP&E).





Imprisonment Fine instead or in addition
Corporal Punishment instead or in addition
Corporal Punishment -
Fine or Imprisonment Either one or both. Choice between the two at
court's discretion
Fine Only Offender will suffer imprisonment if they
default.
Apart from restrictions relating to substitutability of punishments a number
of restrictions apply in to the application of some of the punishments (see
Appendix C). A customary court may sentence a person who has been
convicted to a fine, imprisonment, corporal punishment or a combination of
these providing it does not, amongst other things, exceed its jurisdiction in
respect of any of these penalties (section 17(1) Customary Court
(Amendment) Act, 2002) or run foul of certain stipulated restrictions. Courts
may also bind a convicted person to keep the peace (Section 18(1) CCA). The
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court may, where a charge has been proved, and having regard to certain
factors, discharge the accused without proceeding to conviction if it thinks
that it is 'inexpedient to inflict any punishment (Section 19(1) CCA).
Customary courts also have the power to suspend the sentence partially or
wholly upon certain conditions (Section 23 CCA) release offender with a
caution or upon some other condition.
Customary courts are not bound to impose sentences that are prescribed in
the offence-creating sections of the Penal Code and other laws except where
they are otherwise required to do so. Thus the punishment or mix of
punishments that a court imposes in any particular instance is a matter
entirely at the discretion of the court. By extension, the maximum penalty
that a customary court may impose for a particular offence is entirely
independent of the maximum prescribed by the Penal Code. The upper limit
in each instance is a function of the sentencing powers of the judge presiding
over the case (Section 11(2), Customary Court Act). However, whether a
customary court can actually exceed the maximum penalty prescribed in the
Penal Code remains only a theoretical possibility because the warrants of
chiefs fall far short of the maximum allowable punishment for virtually all
the offences.
Section 17(1) of the CCA imposes some restrictions on the powers of
customary courts to punish. It provides that 'Subject to the provisions of
subsections (2), (3) and (4) and section 20 and to the provisions of any other
law for the time being in force a customary court may sentence a convicted
person to a fine, imprisonment, corporal punishment or any such
combination of such punishments but shall not impose any punishment
exceeding those set out in its warrant (SI7, CCA).
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Let us consider briefly the character and import subsections 2, 3 and 4 of the
CCA 17 as well as CCA 20 in the context of the differences between the
discretion of magistrate and customary court judges in relation to choice of
punishment or combination of punishments.
(a) S 17 (2): 'No customary court shall sentence any female or any person
who is, in the opinion of the court, over the age of 40 years, to corporal
punishment'. Section 17(2) is similar to S28 (c) of the Penal Code which
essentially means that from a comparative point of view its effects are
cancelled out by the latter.
(b) S 17 (3) 'No person shall be sentenced to corporal punishment other than
for an offence specified in the Schedule of, to this Act: provided that
where any person under the age of 18 years is convicted of any offence a
customary court may, in its discretion, order him to undergo corporal
punishment in addition to or in substitution for any other punishment.'
The following offences are listed under the Schedule referred to in CCA17
(3): attempted rape, indecent assault on a female, defilement and attempted
defilement of (i) girls under the age of 16 years and (ii) idiots and imbeciles,
disabling in order to commit an offence, assault occasioning actual bodily
harm, robbery and attempted robbery, burglary, stock theft and offences
contrary to the Stock Theft Act.' The majority of the offences listed in the
Schedule are not triable in customary courts except for assault occasioning
bodily harm, burglary and stock theft and related offences. The effect of the
qualification of the restriction in respect of males under the age of 18 years is
that corporal punishment becomes applicable to a broad band of offences
commonly tried in the customary courts such as common nuisance, theft
common, assault common and use of insulting language. However, the
Penal Code has similar provisions relating to males under the age of 18
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years though the applicability of corporal punishment in respect of this
group is prohibited where imprisonment of a convicted person has been
ordered for defaulting from the payment of a fine or a sum ordered to be
paid as compensation and where imprisonment has been ordered for failure
to surrender any sum ordered to be forfeited to the state (Section 28(4), Penal
Code).
CCA 17 (4) 'No customary court shall subject any person to any punishment
which is not in proportion to the nature and the circumstances of the
offender.' It is on the face of it doubtful that this provision has any, or more
generously, much effect, on the sentencing practices of customary courts
even though in relation to imprisonment certain safeguards have been put in
place (Sections 22(3), (4) and 44 of the CCA).
Section 20 of the CCA reads thus 'No customary court shall impose upon any
person any punishment unless a criminal trial has been held in accordance
with the provisions of the Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules.' As is
evident, this provision does not, like the others we have considered so far,
relate to choice as punishment but rather to procedure.
But overall, the law gives customary courts flexibility as to punishment and
punishment combinations that is not available to magistrates. However
CCA17 (4) cautions against and prohibits customary courts from inflicting
punishment which is 'not in proportion to the nature and circumstances of
the offence and the circumstances of the offender' (Section 17(4) Customary
Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002) However, the value of CCA 17(4) as a
restraint against disproportionate punishment is doubtful.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has considered the general framework for exercising sentencing
discretion in Botswana. It also considered various aspects of sentencing
discretion which are likely to lead to disparities. In addition the chapter
discussed variations in the structure of discretion of magistrate and




5.0 RESULTS: CENSUS SURVEY, SUPPLEMENTARY SURVEY
AND DERIVATIVE DATA
This chapter considers results of the study in relation to the primary
hypothesis and the minor hypotheses on four levels by order of complexity
of the question to be answered. First, it considers the basic questions relating
to the distribution and punishment of offences generally, by type of court
(Section A). Second, it examines general sentencing patterns for offences
triable-either-way (Section B). To that end it looks at combined figures in
relation to two broad categories of offences: property offences and offences
against the person. Third, the various offences that make up these broad
categories are examined and discussed. Fourth, certain offence factors, here
identified as legal and non-legal variables, are examined and compared to
see the extent of their influence on sentencing outcomes (Section C).
5.1 Methods and Limitations
Even though the issues of methodology were canvassed in the Methodology
Chapter, it would be remiss not to remind the reader in general terms what
types of data were used in the study and about the major limitations relating
to the use of such data before we proceed with the analysis of the results of
the study. For ease of reference some of the issues relating to the strengths
and limitations of various techniques used in the study such as those
concerning measurement of and relative weight assigned to a certain
variables are discussed in the sections devoted specifically to those variables.
5.2 Types of Data Used
Four sets of data were used in this study namely data from the general
census survey, data from detailed study of case records from the main site at
Mochudi and data extracted from and based on an analysis of census and
supplementary data tables. Primary data for the study was gathered through
a census of records spanning the years 1991-2001 and involved a total of 10
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024 cases. Of these were 504 unclassifiable because of missing details so that
those that could be unambiguously assigned numbered 9 520. A
supplementary study to gather further information relating to legal and non-
legal variables was also conducted at Mochudi. It involved 1014 cases. These
cases involved a number of triable-either-way offences that were tried in
magistrate and customary courts at Mochudi from 1996 to 2000.
Data relating to the distribution and punishment of cases was generated
mainly from the census data. However, supplementary information
regarding these issues was also gleaned from the interviews. For




In this section I consider patterns in the distribution of offences by type of
court. In addition I make findings in relation to hypothesis number 1 (HI)
and consider possible explanations for patterns in the distribution of
offences.
Hypothesis 1: There should generally be an uneven distribution of criminal
cases between the courts.
5.3.1 Presentation of Results
5.3.2 Distribution of Offences
Figure 1 below shows combined figures of all offences tried in customary
and magistrates in the period 1991-2001. Figures indicate that assaults and
theft-related offences dominated court business in these courts at 20.5 % and
16 % of all transactions, respectively. Nuisance and riot-related offences were
the third common offence group at 11.5 % of the total.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Offences (All Courts)
Distribution of Offences (All Courts)
20.5
Source: General (census) survey data
NB: Any offence group that on its own constituted less than two percent of
the total was subsumed under Miscellaneous Offences.
5.3.3 Changes in the Distribution of Offence Groups as a Proportion of
Business Transacted By Each Type of Court
Distribution of Offeiices by Court Type 1991-2001
Figure 2 below show trends and patterns pertaining to the distribution of
offences tried by type of court from 1991 to 2001. Overall, figures for
customary courts for the period 1991-2001 show that the most common
offence group tried by the customary courts was assaults and related
offences. Of the 5 694 offences tried in customary courts over that period,
32.1 percent of the cases were assault-related offences, followed by theft -
related offences and nuisance and riot-related offences at 20.6% and 18.4 %
respectively. It is interesting to note that nuisance-related offences, which are
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amongst the lowest ranked offences or the least serious offence category,
were the third most common offence in the customary courts.
In contrast, the most common offences tried in magistrate courts over the
same period were motor vehicle/traffic-related offences (18.4 %), offences
against morality (10.6 %), theft-related offences (9.2 %) and miscellaneous
offences (31.4 %). liven though nuisance and riot-related offences were the
third most common group of offences tried before customary courts, they
constituted less than two percent of offences handled by magistrate courts.
Figure2: Distribution of Offences by Court Type 1991-2001
Offences by Court Type (1991-2001)
■ Magistrate ■ Customary ■ Total
32.1 31.4
Source: General survey data
NB: Any offence group not shown on its own in the chart was subsumed
under Miscellaneous Offences.
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5.3.4 Periodized Distribution of Offences All Courts
Table 2 shows periodized statistics for all offences, for all the courts,
covered by the study spanning three sequential time segments namely
1991-94, 1995-98 and 1999-01 representing the early, middle and closing
years of that decade. Of the three most common offences, namely assaults,
theft and nuisance-related offences, only theft-related cases showed a
consistent decline as a proportion of offences tried in the three periods. It
declined from 18% to 13.4%. The other two offence groups show neither a
consistent pattern of growth or decline, with figures going up or down at
different time periods. A breakdown of the overall figures (Tables 3 and 4)
shows periodized patterns for magistrate courts and customary courts
respectively over a ten year period.
Table 2: Periodized Distribution of Offences (All Courts)
All courts
91-94 95 - 98 99-01 Total
Type of
Offence N % N % N % N %
OASA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
RPT 72 2 71 1.9 29 1.4 172 1.8
CAO 0 0 2 0.1 0 0 2 0
ORAJ 13 0.4 6 0.2 3 0.1 22 0.2
E&O 59 1.6 42 1.1 25 1.2 126 1.3
OAPA 291 8 183 4.8 91 4.3 565 5.9
ORR 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
OAM 88 2.4 196 5.2 137 6.5 421 4.4
ORMPC 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
NHC 414 11.4 299 7.9 209 10 922 9.7
MM 19 0.5 41 1.1 36 1.7 96 1
OMS 35 1 55 1.5 42 2 132 1.4
OELH: 128 3.5 113 3 78 3.7 319 3.4
CRN 0 0 1 0 2 0.1 3 0
Assaults 745 20.5 793 21 413 19.7 1951 20.5
Theft 654 18 589 15.6 282 13.4 1525 16
OAS 31 0.9 29 0.8 1 0 61 0.6
R&E 11 0.3 31 0.8 33 1.6 75 0.8
Ill
B&H 118 3.2 177 4.7 82 3.9 377 4
False
pretences 25 0.7 32 0.8 17 0.8 74 0.8
RPS 163 4.5 81 2.1 29 1.4 273 2.9
MDP 86 2.4 93 2.5 47 2.2 226 2.4
FCC: 9 0.2 14 0.4 8 0.4 31 0.3
ACA 2 0.1 1 0 0 0 3 0
MVRO 139 3.8 361 9.5 221 10.5 721 7.6
MO 243 6.7 289 7.6 165 7.9 697 7.3
DRO 137 3.8 119 3.1 61 2.9 317 3.3
Other 159 4.4 161 4.3 86 4.1 406 4.3
Total 3642 100 3781 100 2097 100 9520 100
Source: General survey data (NB: In this table, unlike in the preceding
graphs, some offences are not subsumed under certain general categories like
in the latter e.g Riots and Other Offences against Public Tranquility is not
combined with Nuisance-Related Offences)
Keys: OASA: Offences Against State Authority ; RPT: Riots and Other
Offences Against Public Tranquillity; CAO: Corruption and the Abuse of
Office; ORAJ: Offences Relating to Administration of justice; E&O: Escape
and Obstructing Officers of Court of law; OAPA: Offences Against Public
Authority; ORR: Offences Relating to Religion; OAM: Offences Against
Morality; ORMPC: Offences Relating to Marriage and Possession of
Children; NHC: Nuisances and Offences Against Health and Convenience;
MM: Murder and Manslaughter ;OMS: Offences Connected with Murder and
Suicide; OELH: Offences Endangering Life and Health; CRN: Criminal
Recklessness and Negligence; OAS: Offences Allied to stealing; R&E:
Robbery and extortion; B&H :Burglary, Housebreaking and similar offences;
RPS: Receiving Property Stolen or Unlawfully Obtained and like offences;
MDP: Malicious Damage to Property or Offences Causing Injury to
Property; FCC: Forgery, Coining and Counterfeiting; ACA :Attempts and
Conspiracies to Commit Crimes and Accessories After the Fact; MO:
Miscellaneous Offences; MVRO: Motor Vehicle Related Offences; DRO:
Drugs Related Offences; Other: Other type of offences.
5.3.5 Periodized Distribution of Offences in Magistrate Courts
Two of the most common offences in the magistrate courts namely ,motor-
vehicle-related offences, and offences against morality, showed a steady
rise over the three periods while theft, which was the third most
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common offence, showed a dip in the middle period, and a slight growth in
closing period.
Table 3: Periodized Distribution of Offences in Magistrate Courts
Magistrate Courts
91 - 94 95-98 99-01 Total
Type of Offence N % N % N % N %
OASA 1 0.1 0 0 0 0 1 0
RPT 4 0.4 15 0.9 7 0.7 26 0.7
CAO 0 0 2 0.1 0 0 2 0.1
ORAJ 2 0.2 3 0.2 2 0.2 7 0.2
E&O 1 1 1.1 23 1.3 13 1.3 47 1.2
OAPA 67 6.5 136 7.7 87 8.4 290 7.6
OAM 78 7.6 191 10.9 137 13.2 406 10.6
ORMPC 0 0 1 0.1 0 0 1 0
NHC 4 0.4 14 0.8 2 0.2 20 0.5
MM 19 1.8 41 2.3 36 3.5 96 2.5
OMS 33 3.2 54 3.1 39 3.8 126 3.3
OELH 61 5.9 68 3.9 39 3.8 168 4.4
CRN 0 0 1 0.1 2 0.2 3 0.1
Assaults 28 2.7 68 3.9 29 2.8 125 3.3
Theft 111 10.8 148 8.4 93 9 352 9.2
OAS 3 0.3 0 0 1 0.1 4 0.1
R&E 10 1 30 1.7 30 2.9 70 1.8
B&H 68 6.6 129 7.3 64 6.2 261 6.8
False pretences 6 0.6 16 0.9 12 1.2 34 0.9
RPS 76 7.4 31 1.8 15 1.4 122 3.2
MDP 9 0.9 30 1.7 11 1.1 50 1.3
FCC 6 0.6 13 0.7 7 0.7 26 0.7
MVRO 129 12.5 359 20.4 215 20.7 703 18.4
MO 110 10.7 140 8 82 7.9 332 8.7
DOR 75 7.3 105 6 37 3.6 217 5.7
Other 121 11.7 139 7.9 77 7.4 337 8.8
Total 1032 100 1757 100 1037 100 3826 100
Source: General survey data
(NB: Comment on offence classification made in relation to Table 1 is also
applicable to this table)
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5.3.6 Periodized Distribution of Offences in Customary Courts
Table 4 below indicates that the most common offences tried before
customary courts present a mixed picture in terms of distribution patterns
over the three periods. Assault-related offences show a steady rise from
27.5% to 35.8% in 95-98 followed by slight increase to 36.2% in 1999-01.
Meanwhile thefts show slight increase in the first two periods and a dip in
the third. Nuisance-related offences which were the third biggest category,
show a slight fall in the second period followed by a rise in the third.
Table 4: Periodized Distribution of Offences in Customary Courts
Customary Courts
91 - 94 95- 98 99- 01 Total
Type of Offence N % N % N % N %
OASA 68 2.6 56 2.8 22 2.1 146 2.6
RPT 11 0.4 3 0.1 1 0.1 15 0.3
E&O 48 1.8 19 0.9 12 1.1 79 1.4
CAO 224 8.6 47 2.3 4 0.4 275 4.8
ORR 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
OAM 10 0.4 5 0.2 0 0 15 0.3
NHC 410 15.7 285 14.1 207 19.5 902 15.8
OMS 2 0.1 1 0 3 0.3 6 0.1
OELH 67 2.6 45 2.2 39 3.7 151 2.7
Assaults 717 27.5 725 35.8 384 36.2 1826 32.1
Theft 543 20.8 441 21.8 189 17.8 1173 20.6
OAS 28 1.1 29 1.4 0 0 57 1
R&E 1 0 1 0 3 0.3 5 0.1
B&H 50 1.9 48 2.4 18 1.7 116 2
False pretences 19 0.7 16 0.8 5 0.5 40 0.7
RPS 87 3.3 50 2.5 14 1.3 151 2.7
MDP 77 3 63 3.1 36 3.4 176 3.1
FCC ">J 0.1 1 0 1 0.1 5 0.1
ACA 2 0.1 1 0 0 0 3 0.1
MVRO 10 0.4 2 0.1 6 0.6 18 0.3
MO 133 5.1 149 7.4 83 7.8 365 6.4
DRO 62 2.4 14 0.7 24 2.3 100 1.8
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Other 38 1.5 22 1.1 9 0.8 69 1.2
Total 2610 100 2024 100 1060 100 5694 100
Source: General survey data
(NB: Comment on offence classification made in relation to Table 1 is also
applicable to this table)
5.3.7 Cases Committed to the High Court
Figure 3 shows the types of cases committed to the High Court by magistrate
courts in the period 1991-2001. In all, 75 cases, most of which were murder-
related, were transferred to the High Court in that period. It is worth noting
that murder is not triable in magistrate courts even though certain
preliminaries are done there. As for other offences magistrate court would
send them to the High Court for sentencing.
Figure 3: Cases Committed to the High Court by Offence Type
Cases Committed to the High Court by
Offence Type
50.7
Source: General survey data
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5.3.8 Patterns, Interpretation and Analysis
Statistical data from the two sites of Kanye and Mochudi showed large
differences in the volume and type of offences tried in customary and
magistrate courts over the period 1991-2001, generally. More significantly,
there were differences in terms of overall and relative proportions as well as
in real terms of triable-either-way offences processed by magistrate and
customary courts. Furthermore, there were differences in the patterns and
trends pertaining to these offences over time.
Overall, magistrate courts tried fewer offences (4187) than customary courts
(5908) despite having the jurisdiction to try a wider range of offences than
the latter. This pattern is consistent with patterns found by Bouman (1984) in
the early 1980s and Women and Law Southern Africa more recently (1999).
Customary courts try more criminal cases overall because they are more
numerous and more widely dispersed geographically than magistrate courts.
Whereas the volume of cases generated by Kanye and Mochudi magistrate
courts represents the extent of cases handled by the general courts in those
magisterial districts, cases handled by the Chief's Court at Kanye and
Mochudi did not represent the majority of cases tried by customary courts
within these villages and the areas under their jurisdiction because many
more cases are handled by lower customary courts. The Chiefs' Courts serve
as both courts of first instance and courts of appeal within their districts
(Section 41(1) Customary Courts (Amendment) Act). Appeals handled by the
chiefs' courts may originate from lower customary courts or internally within
the Chief's Court itself. Internal appeals are possible because the Chief's
Court usually consists of chiefs of different ranks with differing sentencing
powers. Those cases tried by chiefs of a rank lower than the Chief or Deputy
Chief namely Senior Chief's representative and Chief's representative are
appellable internally, otherwise cases proceed to Customary Court of Appeal
(Section 41(2) Customary Courts (Amendment) Act). An inspection of court
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registers at Kanye and Mochudi revealed that the overwhelming majority of
criminal cases, from 70% upwards, were tried by Chiefs' Representatives.
Notwithstanding differences in geographic reach on the overall numbers,
differences in the substantive jurisdiction of the courts clearly had an
impact on the distribution of offences overall as well as on the relative
proportion of one offence group as against others tried in a particular type
of court. The most common offences tried in magistrate courts were motor
vehicle-related offences (18.4% of all offences) while in customary courts the
dominant offence group was assault-related offence (32.1%). The former
group of offences are not triable in customary courts while the latter are
triable-either-way. Not only did customary courts not have
sufficient/enough powers to try these offences but they were prohibited
from doing so (Section 12 Customary Courts Act). However, it was evident
from the case register and case records that customary courts sometimes
exceeded their jurisdiction by trying cases that were not triable there,
perhaps out of ignorance or defiance.
Other fairly common offences triable in magistrate courts but not in
customary courts were rape, and armed robbery. The common denominator
among offences excluded from the jurisdiction of customary courts is that
they generally tended to be offences of a serious nature.
While offence seriousness was probably the main consideration in allowing
or denying jurisdiction to customary courts, it was certainly not the only
consideration. Customary courts do try two serious offences, namely,
stock theft-related and drugs-related offences in respect of which they have
been granted extra-ordinary jurisdiction. In terms of these exceptional
powers customary courts can send offenders away for up to ten years. Thus,
customary courts have been granted extra-ordinary jurisdiction despite the
117
seriousness of these offences (as judged by the penalties they attract) and the
government's apparent misgivings about the technical competence of chiefs
and headmen (Republic of Botswana 1971(a)). A number of arguments have
been put forward to justify extending to customary courts powers to try
stock theft cases. First, it has been argued that customary courts are well
versed in matters relating to cattle ear-markings based on family groups and,
colour. In fact, Tswana colour codes have been adopted in magistrate
courts even though the language of magistrate courts is English, supposedly
for the convenience of parties but more likely because Tswana descriptions
are more precise and abbreviated than English ones. The Tswana adjectives
used to describe colour(s) incorporate colour and sex e.g. a black and white
cow is simply naana and black and white ox is nala. Customary courts are
believed to have special expertise in respect of this offence. The second,
perhaps more persuasive reason for granting extra-ordinary jurisdiction to
customary courts in respect of stock theft is that in Botswana cattle are
regarded as a symbol and source of wealth and stature (Schapera 1938).
There has always been a feeling among traditionalists that since the
majority of ordinary people in the rural areas own cattle, customary courts
must therefore be allowed to try stock theft cases even though the
penalties they attract are well beyond the ordinary jurisdiction of these
courts. A parallel argument also put forward by some traditionalists and
politicians is that magistrate courts do not treat stock theft with the
seriousness it deserves, and that accused persons often escape conviction on
technicalities (Hansard 1996 ). Under customary law livestock theft attracted
very heavy penalties and the owner reserved the right, amongst other things,
to kill the thief if they caught him in the act (Schapera 1938). Penalties for
stealing cattle included compensation of the owner for up two times the
value of the stolen beast or severe thrashing where the thief was incapable of
compensating the owner of the stolen animal(s). In addition to this, a thief
might be required to pay a fine to the court in the form of a beast. Even
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though there is no written evidence to support the assumption that
customary courts are allowed to try drug offences because many of those
involved in the drug-related offences include ordinary Batswana who sell or
consume marijuana, it is in all probably just such a consideration that
motivated the extension of their powers by parliament. Case registers
showed that customary courts tried marijuana-related cases but not those
involving narcotics.
Further analysis of figures subsumed under the generic category of
'miscellaneous' showed magistrate courts were more likely than customary
courts to try multiple offences. An inspection of court registers as well as
analysis of census survey data confirmed that whilst it was fairly common to
find offenders in magistrate courts charged with anything between five to
eight counts, by contrast, in customary courts the upper limit was generally
three counts. Even though it was not possible to obtain details showing
which of the two police forces handles cases with the highest average
number of counts in customary courts, it was nevertheless clear from the
results of the analysis undertaken that magistrate courts handled most cases
with a large number of counts. Indeed it was this particular factor that
caused me to increase the number of variables in the data to accommodate a
larger number of counts when it became clear that the average number of
counts where multiple charges were preferred tended to be higher in cases
going to magistrate courts than those going to customary courts.
Related to this, we also found through a survey of court registers and
observations during fieldwork that magistrate courts are more likely to
handle cases involving more than three offenders than the other type of
court. The majority of cases coming before customary courts involving more
than one offender usually involved two offenders and very rarely three to
four offenders. In contrast, magistrate courts sometimes tried cases involving
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up to eight offenders. To that extent, it is justified to conclude that the
number of charges /offenders involved in a case is probably one of the factors
that Botswana Police take into account when they consider an appropriate
trial court for a particular offender.
Cases involving multiple charges/offenders are more likely than the average
case to be complicated. Furthermore, if a case involving multiple offenders is
sent to a customary court for trial, if one of the accused persons should elect
to exercise his/her right to be represented by a lawyer then the case might
have to be transferred to the magistrate court. It therefore, makes sense to
send such cases to magistrate courts for trial in order to avoid delays in
processing them. While the right to legal representation is guaranteed under
the Constitution, lawyers are not allowed to represent their clients in
proceedings before customary courts, hence the transfers. In practice, only
less than a dozen cases were transferred to the magistrate courts annually.
The overall number of cases transferred during the period 1991 - 2001 was
less than fifty. The majority of transferred cases involved stock theft. This is
not surprising because stock-theft has always attracted heavy penalties, and
since 1996, it has carried mandatory minimum sentences for first time and
second time offenders. Common assault and assault occasioning bodily
harm together constituted another major group of cases transferred from
customary to magistrate courts. These offences are fairly serious in that they
may result in a lengthy prison term for the offender if convicted. Another
fairly large category of offences transferred were low level social disorder
offences namely common nuisance and related offences. Despite being low
level offences these may result in prison sentences.
Theft-related offences provide an interesting contrast to other offences in that
they ranked amongst the top four offences tried in both customary and
magistrate courts probably indicating the prevalence of common theft
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generally, relative to other offences. But burglary, which is often
accompanied by theft, was tried mostly in magistrate courts.
The decisive factor in terms of choice of forum by the police in such cases
may have been the potential value of items involved or it may simply have
been the seriousness of the offence itself or the potentially complex nature
of the case. Those where finger print experts might have to be called to give
evidence would almost certainly have been tried before a magistrate. It was
also clear from the patterns that within any given general offence category,
magistrate courts tended to try higher level offences than customary courts.
Thus all other things being equal, the higher an offence was ranked within a
given band of offences, the more likely it was that it would be tried in the
magistrate courts. By logic it becomes correspondingly more important for
the presiding officer to have more sentencing powers so that it is arguable
that it is the seriousness of the offence which becomes the decisive factor in
such instances. Seriousness in this case refers to differentiation of offences
based on the maximum level of punishment an offence of that kind would be
likely to attract relative to other offences in the same broad offence category.
The police may decide on the basis of the facts of the case that it is likely to
attract serious penalties and that customary court judges may not have
sufficient sentencing powers to impose the penalty the police believe is
appropriate in that instance, so may decide to take it to a magistrate court for
trial.
On the other hand it is evident that certain types of offences amongst the
least serious nevertheless featured amongst the top four offences tried before
customary courts. These were offences against morality and nuisance-related
offences which ranked third and fourth respectively in list of offences most
likely to be tried in customary courts. An analysis of the distribution of
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offences by type of court shows that common nuisance and riot related cases
were the most likely of any triable-either way offences to be tried before
the Chief's Court. Overall figure for the ten year period covered by the study
indicate that while customary courts tried over nine hundred such cases,
magistrate courts tried only about twenty. Botswana Police and the Local
Police informed the researcher that they had an informal arrangement
between themselves and the customary courts whereby the former were
encouraged to send certain types of cases to customary courts for trial (see
Chapter Seven). The police were asked to send cases involving young
offenders in particular and those involving social disorder offences,
generally. Cases involving young persons/the youth are considered
particularly suitable for trial in customary courts as they are more likely to
receive strokes there than in magistrate courts for such offences. Social
disorder offences are defined here as those offences involving disturbance to
peace and status offences. These include assaults, affray, and various types of
nuisance-related offences such as use of insulting language. Statistics suggest
that customary courts dealt with a disproportionate amount of cases
involving minor assaults and other social disorder offences like common
nuisance. These offences have several notable features. First, the parties
involved in many of these cases were usually relatives, neighbours or
friends. It was not unusual for such cases to be withdrawn before or during
the course of the proceedings. Interestingly the complainant would
sometimes state that what s/he really wanted was for the parties to be
reconciled with one another (see Chapter Six). Customary courts tended to
incorporate this in their approach to cases. In magistrate courts the
procedure was somewhat different in that the prosecution must make an
application for the matter to be withdrawn and for parties to be reconciled
(Aquah-Dadzie and Sechele 2000:71) This may explain why many people
report such offences to the Local Police instead of the national police .
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In cases involving use of insulting language complainants may well consider
that some of the insults might not make sense to a magistrate court where
English is the language of the court. Besides, the magistrate might be a
foreigner who might well not appreciate the insulting nature of the language
used. It appeared from the interviews I conducted and other sources that
low level social disorder was one of the issues customary courts liked to
focus on because they saw it as a sign of decay of the social fabric of tribal
communities.
Arrangements to channel particular types of cases to customary courts may
reflect community concerns. Where it appears that government institutions
are ineffective in relation to crime control, communities tend to revert to
chiefs and customary courts to tackle the problem. This happens regularly
when communities feel threatened by youth gangs, for instance. Some
communities have been known to revert to age regiments after losing
confidence in the police (Letsididi 2001; Sekokonyane 2001).
Sometimes the pressure to have certain cases tried in customary courts
reflects not only local opinion but that of the nation as a whole ( see Hansard
1996 ). Cases involving stock theft are a case in point.
While the decision to consistently send certain types of cases triable in either
type of court to a particular court may be influenced by existing
arrangements between the police and customary courts, but there may be
other considerations beyond this. Such decisions may also be influenced by
the police's perceptions regarding the normative values and practices of the
courts. They probably decide where to take a case based on the predictions
they make concerning how a particular type of court is likely to deal with
certain offences/ offenders ( see Baillie 1969; Kirby 1985 ).
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Baillie (1969) and Kirby (1985) have suggested that the police are more likely
to send a case to a customary court if evidence available is too weak to
withstand the rigours of a magistrate court. As indicated earlier, this was
confirmed by police prosecutors as one of the reasons why they take certain
minor cases to customary courts for trial. Even though I did not obtain
direct evidence to support this particular claim, it is probably true given that
procedures in the customary courts are less elaborate than those applicable in
magistrate courts. In fact, Section 49 of the CCA allows customary courts to
follow customary law in relation to those aspects of procedure that are not
covered by the Customary Courts Procedure Rules. As data on interviews
(Chapter Seven) and court observation (Chapter Six) suggests, trial in a
customary court probably means technical defences that may be available to
a defendant in a magistrate court under the Criminal Procedure and
Evidence Act are not available to a defendant in the former. It is therefore,
plausible that Botswana Police would naturally want to take advantage of
the more relaxed rules of evidence applicable in customary courts in order to
secure a conviction in weak cases (Kirby 1985).
One of the critical factors in determining whether a case would be tried
in a magistrate or customary court was whether it was reported to
Botswana Police (BP hereafter) or the customary court-based Local Police
(LP hereafter). The latter operate from and only handle matters reported to
the customary court to which they are assigned. They are not allowed to
prosecute cases in magistrate courts even though investigators are allowed to
play their part as prosecution witnesses where a case has been transferred
from a customary to a magistrate court. In contrast, Botswana Police is a
national rather than a local force. Unlike Local Police, they are not attached
to a particular court even though they tend to do most of their business with
the customary and magistrate courts within given geographical areas.
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For reasons outlined above, all cases reported to the Local Police at the chief's
court are tried there save for those that are transferred to the magistrate
court. As noted earlier, no more than a dozen or so a year cases were
transferred to magistrate courts at Kanye or Mochudi. Botswana Police has
the discretion to take any criminal matter that is triable-either way to any
court whether customary or magistrate subject to jurisdictional limits of the
court concerned and having regard to the seriousness and complexity of the
case. At the time of the study they handled almost all prosecutions in the
Magistrate courts. But the fact that the majority of cases that come before
customary courts are brought by the Local Police further distorts the picture
with regard to offences triable in either court. Firstly unlike Botswana Police,
Local Police have not been appointed by the Attorney General to prosecute
cases on his behalf, which means that they can not take their cases to
magistrate courts. So, all the cases handled by the Local Police are tried only
in customary courts. Secondly, because the Local Police are based in the
customary court complex, and are in effect, the tribal police may well have
implications for the type of cases that find their way into the customary
courts. Because of their relationship with customary courts, the types of cases
they focus on may well reflect the anti-crime agenda of the Chiefs and their
communities.
5.3.9 Explaining Trends: Cases Involving Offences Triable-Either-Way
Factors discussed so far, are not on their own sufficient to explain changes in
the volume and the distribution of particular offences and offence groups in
customary and magistrate courts over the years, relative to other offences
triable-either way. Other factors, some transient and others structural or
systemic, and possibly in some cases the net result of the interaction between
these, may provide a better explanation of trends. However, all these factors,
including those alluded to earlier, are not always different and distinct from
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more transient factors. The same can be said for their effects. Some are,
however, sufficiently strong to register on the national radar. The response
to such factors may in turn be conditioned by the orientation of the particular
institution or type of institution, courts included. An example of transient
phenomenon which provoked sharp but varying responses from modern
state institutions and those associated with the traditional indigenous
structures is the phenomenon of peri-urban youth gangs which emerged in
the early 1990's, and resurfaced again in some of these centres in the late
1990's. Even though not all factors that account for this increase are known,
the emergence gangs of out of school youths in the major villages around
Botswana around 1995 may explain the jump in assault figures (Okavango
Observer 1995). These gangs engaged mostly in intimidation and assaults.
Kanye, Molepolole and Maun emerged as the areas in which the gang
activity was most widespread. Traditional authorities seem to have been
more concerned about gang activity than the general courts, which like other
'government institutions' were perceived as having failed to effectively
contain gang activity (Letsididi 2001). Traditional authorities saw this as a
problem of social disorder, more specifically, youth disorder.
However, it is important to consider each shift in its proper context as
these shifts are a matter of degree and their significance or otherwise in
the present analysis depends on the level and direction of the shift. There are
three levels here, namely, 1) all offences, 2) those triable-either-way or 3) a
subgroup of either of these, but most likely in the present analysis, a
subgroup of the triable-either way group of offences. It would probably take
a massive increase in the volumes of other offences or groups of offences for
an offence which may have increased in real terms to register a diminution in
proportional/relative terms. All other things being equal, an upward trend
of that nature may be an indicator of real rather than apparent changes
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despite an apparent decline in the offence or offence group we may be
focusing on.
5.3.10 Findings: Distribution of Offences
Finding5Al: There were differences in the distribution of offences by court,
generally.
Finding 5A2: There were significant differences overall in terms of volume,
and in terms of relative proportions of triable-either-way offences processed
by magistrate and customary courts as postulated in FI2. These differentials
could neither be attributed to differences in the substantive jurisdictions of
the two courts alone nor to chance. Processing of lower-end criminal cases
was dominated by customary courts while serious offences, including
middle to top-end triable-either-way offences were most likely to be tried in
a magistrate courts.
Finding5A3: The distribution of some offences, such as nuisance-related
offences, was highly skewed as thus confirming non-directional hypothesis
H2.
5.3.11 Conclusion
The findings A1-A3 confirm non-directional hypothesis HI on the
distribution of offences, which postulated that there would be differences in
the distribution of offences between customary and magistrate courts,
generally. The distribution suggests that a variety of inter and intra-system
factors beyond the expected one of jurisdiction, were at play
SECTION B
5.4 Introduction
In this section I consider general outcome patterns, sentencing patterns and
frequency of use of different types of punishment across offences. I used
cumulative data about case processing decisions around cases whatever
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stage they might have reached, to help build a more complete picture of case
processing in the two types of court.
The presentation and analysis in this section was intended to address
hypothesis 2 and 2A (H2-2A):
(a) Hypothesis 2: There should generally be variations in the outcome of
triable- either-way offences registered for trial in customary courts viz-a-viz
those registered for trial in Magistrate courts.
(b) Hypothesis 2A: There should generally be variations in both
sentencing patterns of customary and magistrate courts in terms of
sentencing outcomes for triable- either-way offences and regarding the most
frequently deployed punishment(s) by each type of court overall.
5.4.1 A Note on Disposals, Sentencing Patterns and Uses of Punishments
In this section I present results on the disposal of cases registered for trial in
customary and magistrate courts. Disposal, as used here, encompasses all
outcomes of cases regardless of whether or not they proceeded to the
sentencing stage, so that in effect, it includes withdrawals, pending cases and
acquittals/convictions. Even though the present section focuses mainly on
sentencing patterns and trends, on their own these can only provide us with
a partial understanding regarding what happens to cases involving different
offences or offence groups once they have entered the court system. To
obtain a more complete picture concerning outcomes of the justice process in
customary and magistrate courts, it became necessary to extend the scope of
analysis beyond sentencing. In that way I was able to capture what happened
to those cases that did not reach sentencing stage. Thus, in this section we
consider disposals generally, sentencing patterns and uses of punishments in
relation to particular offences.
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Sentencing patterns as used here refers to the apparent trends suggested by
the aggregation of figures relating to outcomes in respect of particular
offences or offence categories that have been tried up to conviction and
sentencing stage. In that context, I consider which punishments are more
likely to be imposed in respect of various offences/offence as categorized
under various classification schemes formulated and/or adopted for
purposes of this study. More generally, I consider which punishments were
cumulatively the most frequently used regardless of whether such
punishments ranked among the top three or so of most frequently deployed
penalties in respect of the identified offence categories. Cumulative figures
could possibly indicate likelihood of a particular court to impose a particular
penalty. Even though a penalty may not feature amongst the top three or five
most frequently awarded punishments in respect of categories identified for
analysis in this section, it may, in cumulative terms, be the penalty that a
particular court is likely to impose, generally.
As suggested above, a number of offence classification schemes were
constructed or adopted in order to facilitate analysis and illuminate the
relationship between disposals and offences/offence groups. The first
classification scheme was based on the division of offences into Property
Offences and Offences Against the Person, a universally understood and
frequently used offence classification scheme in the common law world. The
second schema, much narrower than the first, was based on what I have
defined as Social Disorder Offences. This category of offences consisted of a
number of offences in the Offences Against the Person categories and a
variety of Nuisance offences such as common nuisance and use of insulting
language. The third approach was based on groups that brought together
subgroups of offences of larger offence categories used in the Penal Code.
These subgroups included into offences such as Assault-related Offences,
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Burglary and Related Offences, Nuisance-Related Offences and Malicious
Damage to Property.
The distribution of cases by court type observed in the preceding sections
also influenced the decision to explore further certain aspects of data in this
section. Because variations in the clustering of triable-either-way offences
may be assumed to reflect to a greater or lesser extent the focal concerns of a
particular court type, it was logical that we should explore further emerging
patterns and trends to find out whether any more differences or similarities
would emerge in relation to the disposal or punishment of those offences.
For reasons of space, however, this section focuses for the most part on top-
end figures concerning the relationship between punishments and type of
offence. Where, as was the case in the majority of instances, the distribution
of middle range and lower-end figures was evenly but thinly spread it was
clear that meaningful comparisons could not be made, I focused only on top-
end figures. But where the distribution of a particular offence group or
penalties was heavily skewed such that a particular offence/offence group
was overwhelmingly tried either in a customary or magistrate court or
particular punishment(s) combinations were levied exclusively or almost
exclusively by a particular court type, it was crucial to examine these more
closely.
5. 4.2 Presentation of Results
5.4.3 Disposals for Offences Against the Person and Offences Relating To
Property: All Courts
The combined figures (Table 5 below) for both courts show that the top five
disposals in respect of all offences in the categories designated Property
Offences and Offences Against the Person were the fine at 16.5%
withdrawals at 16% strokes at 12.3%, imprisonment at 7.9% and acquittals at
6.7%. Flowever, statistics also indicate that there were differences in the way
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the two types of court disposed of cases from these two major offence
categories.
Disposal patterns varied by offence group. The leading disposal for OAPs
was the fine at 22.9% followed by withdrawals and strokes at 18% and 17.2%
respectively. In contrast the main disposal for ORPs was withdrawals at
14.1%, imprisonment at 11.9% and the fine at 10.2%.
Table 5: Disposals OAPs and ORPs- General (All Courts)
Type of offence
Offences against Offences relating
All courts the person to property Total
Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 429 17.2 195 7.5 624 12.3
Fine 572 22.9 265 10.2 837 16.5
Imprisonment 95 3.8 309 11.9 404 7.9
Compensation 4 0.2 37 1.4 41 0.8
Committed to high court 54 2.2 7 0.3 61 1.2
Transferred 14 0.6 15 0.6 29 0.6
Reviewed 13 0.5 29 1.1 42 0.8
Withdrawn 449 18.0 365 14.1 814 16.0
Property restored 0 0.0 3 0.1 3 0.1
Reconciliation 44 1.8 18 0.7 62 1.2
Acquitted & discharged 132 5.3 211 8.2 343 6.7
Cautioned/warned 1 0.0 3 0.1 4 0.1
Disqualified 0 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0
Community service 16 0.6 12 0.5 28 0.6
Pending 23 0.9 29 1.1 52 1.0
Fine& disqualified 2 0.1 1 0.0 3 0.1
Fine & imprisonment 1 0.0 7 0.3 8 0.2
Strokes & Imprisonment 28 1.1 79 3.1 107 2.1
Strokes & compensation 13 0.5 107 4.1 120 2.4
Strokes, Fine & Compensation 0 0.0 6 0.2 6 0.1
Abscond 3 0.1 1 0.0 4 0.1
Strokes & fine 53 2.1 39 1.5 92 1.8
Compensation& imprisonment 0 0.0 30 1.2 30 0.6
Case closed 2 0.1 0 0.0 2 0.0
Fine & compensation 22 0.9 184 7.1 206 4.1
Fine & compensation 3 0.1 1 0.0 4 0.1
Fine, Compensation &Imprisonment 2 0.1 2 0.1 4 0.1
Fine & Community service 8 0.3 2 0.1 10 0.2
Fine, community service & Compensation 0 0.0 2 0.1 2 0.0
Stroke_, Compensation & imprisonment 1 0.0 17 0.7 18 0.4
Stroke fine and compensation 0 0.0 1 0.0 1 0.0
Imprisonment and CDO 0 0.0 28 1.1 28 0.6
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Strokes and community service 4 0.2 2 0.1 6 0.1
Strokes, imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment 5 0.2 24 0.9 29 0.6
Imprisonment, suspended imprisonment 107 4.3 127 4.9 234 4.6
Strokes and probation 2 0.1 6 0.2 8 0.2
Fine, imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment 7 0.3 4 0.2 11 0.2
Imprisonment, suspended imprisonment &
compensation 2 0.1 6 0.2 8 0.2
Imprisonment, suspended imprisonment,
strokes and imprisonment 1 0.0 4 0.2 5 0.1
Missing 184 7.3 227 8.7 411 8.0
Other 198 7.9 182 7.0 380 7.5
Total 2494 100.0 2588 100.0 5082 100.0
Source: General survey
But as Table 6 and Table 7 below show, the pattern for OAPs and ORPs in
magistrate courts was different from that of customary courts. Overall, the
overwhelmingly dominant disposal in the magistrate courts in respect of
both offence groups was withdrawals which stood at 22.8% well above the
second most common disposal namely, acquittals which stood at 14.7%. and
was closely followed by the combination punishment of imprisonment and
suspended imprisonment at 13.6% and imprisonment at 12.7% respectively.
Withdrawals dominated disposals for OAPs (22.3%) followed the by the
combination of imprisonment and suspended prison term (12.7%), acquittals
at 12.5% and committal to high court for sentencing (10.4%). In the ORP
category the main disposal was also withdrawals (23.2%), acquittals were
second at 16% while imprisonment and the imprisonment/suspended
imprisonment combination followed at 14.6% and 14.2% respectively.
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Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 5 1.0 11 1.2 16 1.1
Fine 17 3.3 23 2.6 40 2.8
Imprisonment 49 9.4 130 14.6 179 12.7
Compensation 3 0.6 2 0.2 5 0.4
Committed to high court 54 10.4 7 0.8 61 4.3
Transferred 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Withdrawn 116 22.3 207 23.2 323 22.8
Property restored 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Reconciliation 25 4.8 9 1.0 34 2.4
Acquitted and discharged 65 12.5 143 16.0 208 14.7
Cautioned/warned 1 0.2 3 0.3 4 0.3
Fine and imprisonment 1 0.2 6 0.7 7 0.5
Strokes and Imprisonment 5 1.0 29 3.2 34 2.4
Strokes and compensation 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Strokes and fine 0 0.0 2 0.2 2 0.1
Compensation and imprisonment 0 0.0 2 0.2 2 0.1
Fine and compensation 0 0.0 4 0.4 4 0.3
Strokes, imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment 5 1.0 24 2.7 29 2.1
Imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment 66 12.7 127 14.2 193 13.6
Strokes and probation 2 0.4 6 0.7 8 0.6
Fine, imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment 7 1.3 4 0.4 11 0.8
Imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment and compensation 2 0.4 6 0.7 8 0.6
Imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment, strokes and
imprisonment 1 0.2 4 0.4 5 0.4
Missing 89 17.1 112 12.5 201 14.2
Other 8 1.6 29 3.2 37 2.6
Total 521 100.0 893 100.0 1414 100.0
Source: General survey data
5.4.4 Customary Court Disposals for OAPs and ORPs
Overall the fine was the main disposal for both OAPS and ORPs in the
customary courts. It topped the figures at 21.7%, followed by strokes at 16.6%
and withdrawals 13.4%. The fine was the leading disposal for OAPS (28.1%),
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followed by strokes 21.5% and withdrawals (16.9%).With regard to ORPs the
main disposal was also the fine at 14.3% closely followed by strokes at 10.9%
and imprisonment at 10.6%.
Table 7: Disposals OAP and ORP: Customary Courts
Type of offence
Offences Offences
against the relating to
Customary person property Total
Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 424 21.5 184 10.9 608 16.6
Fine 555 28.1 242 14.3 797 21.7
Imprisonment 46 2.3 179 10.6 225 6.1
Compensation 1 0.1 35 2.1 36 1.0
Transferred 14 0.7 14 0.8 28 0.8
Reviewed 13 0.7 29 1.7 42 1.1
Withdrawn 333 16.9 158 9.3 491 13.4
Property restored 0 0.0 2 0.1 2 0.1
Reconciliation 19 1.0 9 0.5 28 0.8
Acquitted & discharged 67 3.4 68 4.0 135 3.7
Community service 16 0.8 12 0.7 28 0.8
Pending 23 1.2 29 1.7 52 1.4
Fine and imprisonment 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0
Strokes & Imprisonment 23 1.2 50 2.9 73 2.0
Strokes & compensation 13 0.7 106 6.3 119 3.2
Strokes, Fine & Compensation 0 0.0 6 0.4 6 0.2
Abscond 3 0.2 1 0.1 4 0.1
Strokes & fine 53 2.7 37 2.2 90 2.5
Compensation & imprisonment 0 0.0 28 1.7 28 0.8
Case closed 2 0.1 0 0.0 2 0.1
Fine & compensation 22 1.1 180 10.6 202 5.5
Fine & Compensation 3 0.2 1 0.1 4 0.1
Fine, Compensation & Imprisonment 2 0.1 2 0.1 4 0.1
Fine & Community service 8 0.4 2 0.1 10 0.3
Fine, community service & Compensation 0 0.0 2 0.1 2 0.1
Stroke Compensation and imprisonment 1 0.1 17 1.0 18 0.5
Stroke, fine & compensation 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0
Imprisonment & Compensation 0 0.0 28 1.7 28 0.8
Strokes and community service 4 0.2 2 0.1 6 0.2
Imprisonment & suspended imprisonment 41 2.1 0 0.0 41 1.1
Missing 94 4.8 115 6.8 209 5.7
Other 192 9.8 155 9.1 348 9.5
Total 1973 100.0 1695 100.0 3668 100.0
Source: General survey data
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5.4.5 Disposals: Selected Offences
This section presents disposals for selected offences namely assault-related
offences, burglary and related offences, theft-related offences, malicious
damage to property, nuisance-related offences and multiple offences. Even
though the main concern here was disposals, we provide a breakdown of
figures for the different categories of offences before presenting disposals for
the particular offence group.
Assault-related Offences
According to Figure 4 assault common (50.2%) dominated business in this
category in the customary courts though assault occasioning bodily harm
was a close second (49.6%). In the magistrate assault occasioning actual
bodily harm was the overwhelmingly dominant offence (75.2%).
Figure 5 below shows that the fine was the most common disposal (28%)
customary courts for assault related offences. It was followed by strokes at
22.1 % and withdrawals at 17.1%. In magistrate courts withdrawals (25.6%)
were far and away the most common disposal for assault-related offences
followed by acquittals and reconciliation at represented 14.4% each.
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Figure 4: Breakdown: Assault related offences
Assault related offences
■ Magistrate ■ Customary ■ Total
75.2
Unlawful Wounding Assault Common Assault occasioning Bodily
Harm
Source: General survey data
Figure 5: Disposals: Assault-related offences
Disposals: Assault-related offences
■ Magistrate ■ Customary ■ Total
E
Source: General survey data
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Burglary and Related Offences
According to Figure 6 burglaries, stealing from dwelling and house breaking
were the only offences in this group that occupied the magistrate courts. In
contrast customary courts mostly tried criminal trespass (69.8%) while the
rest belonged to the burglary, stealing from dwelling and house-breaking
sub-group.
Overall the most likely disposal for burglary-related offences were
withdrawals (21.2%) imprisonments and suspended prison terms (13.3%),
imprisonment (9.5%)( see Table 8). The odds were that anyone who was
convicted of burglary was most likely to suffer a punishment in which prison
featured in one form or another (that is full, suspended or as back up to a
fine). Altogether imprisonment featured in the majority of the punishments.
Thus disposals in which full imprisonment played a role were overall the
dominant disposals and exceeded even withdrawals. If we ignore
withdrawals for the time being, the other punishment apart from
imprisonment a person convicted of a burglary-related offence was more
likely to receive would include strokes. In customary courts offenders were
almost as likely to receive a fine (19.8%) as they were to receive strokes
(19%). The next most common disposals after these were withdrawals (13.8
%.). Withdrawals and imprisonment (full term and suspended) were by far
the most common disposals in respect of this group of offences in magistrate
at 24.5% and 19.2% respectively.
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Figure 6: Burglary and Related Offences
Burglary and Related Offences
■ Magistrate ■ Customary ■ Total
100
■ "
Burglary Stealing From Dwelling House
Breaking
Source: General survey data
Table 8: Disposals: Burglary-related Offences
Magistrate Customary Total
Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 5 1.9 22 19.0 27 7.2
Fine 1 0.4 23 19.8 24 6.4
Imprisonment 25 9.6 11 9.5 36 9.5
Compensation 0 0.0 2 1.7 2 0.5
Transferred 1 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.3
Reviewed 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.3
Withdrawn 64 24.5 16 13.8 80 21.2
Reconciliation 0 0.0 3 2.6 3 0.8
Acquitted and discharged 17 6.5 8 6.9 25 6.6
Cautioned/warned 1 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.3
Community service 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.3
Pending 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.3
Fine and imprisonment 1 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.3
Strokes and Imprisonment 21 8.0 4 3.4 25 6.6
Strokes and compensation 0 0.0 4 3.4 4 1.1
Strokes and fine 2 0.8 5 4.3 7 1.9
Fine and compensation 0 0.0 2 1.7 2 0.5
Stroke Compensation and
imprisonment 0 0.0 1 0.9 1 0.3








imprisonment 50 19.2 0 0.0 50 13.3
Strokes and probation 3 1.1 0 0.0 3 0.8
Imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment, strokes and
imprisonment 4 1.5 0 0.0 4 1.1
Missing 32 12.3 6 5.2 38 10.1
Other 16 6.1 6 5.2 22 5.8
Total 261 100.0 116 100.0 377 100.0
Source: General survey data
Theft related offences
As far as theft-related offences were concerned business in the magistrate
courts was almost evenly distributed between stealing stock at 37.1 % and
theft common at 34.3 % with stealing by servant coming third at 16.9 %( See
Figure 7). Meanwhile in the customary courts the main offence dealt theft
common (61.5 %) followed by stealing stock (20.4 %).
Figure 8 shows that in aggregate terms the most common disposals for theft-
related offences were imprisonment (12.4 %), withdrawals (11.4 %) and the
fine (11.3 %). However, disaggregated figures show divergences in the
patterns of the courts in relation to the elements under discussion in this
section. In customary courts the disposals were as follows, fine (13.4 %),
strokes (11.8 %) and the combination of fine and compensation (10.6 %.)
Disposal patterns of magistrate courts diverged from those of customary
courts. In the former, dominant disposals were withdrawals (19.1%),
acquittals (18.8%) and imprisonment (17.1 %). It is evident from foregoing
that overall non-sanctions were the pre-eminent disposals in magistrate
courts.
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Figure 7: Breakdown: Theft-Related Offences
Theft-Related Offences
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Figure 8: Disposals: Theft-Related Offences
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Malicious Damage to Property
According to Figure 9 malicious injury to property and arson were pretty
even in terms of the cases coming before magistrate courts at 52 % and 46%
respectively. By comparison customary courts concerned themselves mostly
with malicious injury to property (97.7%) and hardly tried any arson cases.
The fine and compensation combination was the dominant disposal (16.5%)
for offences relating to damage to property ( see Table 9). Withdrawals were
the next most frequent disposal (14.3%) for this group followed by the
punishment combinations involving strokes and compensation (13.8%) with
the rest of disposals used being rather less than these.
For magistrate courts the most common disposals were withdrawals (22 %),
imprisonment to full term and the combination of a prison term and
suspended prison terms which were on par at 20 % and acquittals (12 %). In
contrast the fine and compensation combination was the most common
disposal in customary courts at 21.3% followed by stroke and compensation
combination at 17.8% and withdrawals at 12.1 %.
Whereas withdrawals were the most common disposals in relation to MDP
for magistrate courts, it was only the third most common for customary
courts in/for this category of offences. In aggregate terms a person tried in a
magistrate court was most likely to face some kind of prison term if
convicted, whether suspended or full term. Taken together suspended and
full terms even exceeded withdrawals as the most likely disposals.
Customary courts tended to put emphasis on some sort of fine or
compensation or a combination of fine and/or compensation together with
some other punishment as the general punishment. However, it was also
clear that in comparative terms customary courts were more likely to order
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compensation than were magistrate courts, often together with some other
punishment. Furthermore imprisonment to full term played a minor role in
customary courts while suspended prison terms did not feature at all.
As far as punishments were concerned customary courts used a wide range
of punishment combinations for MDP. On the whole the most common
elements in most of the punishments imposed by the customary courts were
fine and compensation emphasizing restorative aspects in these category
offences. In contrast punishments by magistrate courts paid little or no
attention at all to the restorative aspects. Taken as a whole punishments
imposed by magistrates were at the serious end of the scale and end
combination punishments were not much used.
Figure 9: Breakdown: Malicious Damage to Property
Malicious Damage to Property
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Table 9: Disposals: Malicious Damage to Property
Magistrate Customary Total
Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 0 0.0 7 4.0 7 3.1
Fine 1 2.0 11 6.3 12 5.4
Imprisonment 10 20.0 7 4.0 17 7.6
Compensation 0 0.0 11 6.3 11 4.9
Reviewed 0 0.0 5 2.9 5 2.2
Withdrawn 11 22.0 21 12.1 32 14.3
Property restored 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Reconciliation 3 6.0 1 0.6 4 1.8
Acquitted and discharged 6 12.0 7 4.0 13 5.8
Community service 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Pending 0 0.0 3 1.7 3 1.3
Strokes and Imprisonment 1 2.0 0 0.0 1 0.4
Strokes & compensation 0 0.0 31 17.8 31 13.8
Strokes, Fine & Compensation 0 0.0 2 1.1 2 0.9
Strokes & fine 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Compensation & imprisonment 0 0.0 2 1.1 2 0.9
Fine & compensation 0 0.0 37 21.3 37 16.5
Fine & Compensation 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Fine, Compensation &
Imprisonment 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Strokes Compensation &
imprisonment 0 0.0 4 2.3 4 1.8
Imprisonment & Compensation 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Strokes & community service 0 0.0 1 0.6 1 0.4
Imprisonment& suspended
imprisonment 10 20.0 0 0.0 10 4.5
Imprisonment, suspended
imprisonment & compensation 1 2.0 0 0.0 1 0.4
Missing 6 12.0 9 5.2 15 6.7
Other 1 2.0 9 5.2 10 4.5
Total
50 100.0 174 100.0 224 100.0
Source: General survey data
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Nuisance and related offences
It is evident from the breakdown of figures in Table 10 that nuisance-related
offences were overwhelmingly tried before customary courts. Figure 10
shows that in the magistrate courts nuisance offences tended to be divided
between common nuisance (60%) and use of insulting language (40%). In
customary courts the pattern encompassed a wider range of offences in this
category: use of insulting language (60.4%), common nuisance 37.4%, breach
of peace 1.7% and idle and disorderly behaviour (0.6%).
Leading disposals for this category of offences were the fine (31.9%), strokes
(22.1%) and withdrawals (13.1%). However figures in Table below 10 show
that customary courts' disposal patterns were quite different from those of
magistrate courts. The fine was the leading disposal in customary courts at
32.1%, followed by strokes at 22.5% and withdrawals at 12.8%. It is
interesting to note that customary courts imposed the severest sanction
available to lower courts, namely imprisonment, in 1.3 % cases (12
individuals) involving nuisance-related offences. In contrast the main
disposals in magistrate courts were acquittals (40%), withdrawals (25%) and
the fine (20%).
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Figure 10: Breakdown Nuisance related offences
Nuisance related offences
■ Magistrate h Customary * Total
60.0 60.4 60.0
Breach of Peace Common Nuisance Idle and Disorderly Using Insulting
Person Language
Source: General survey data (NB: Riots not included in this instance)
TablelO: Disposals For Nuisance related offences
Magistrate Customary Total
Type of disposal N % N % N %
Strokes 0 0.0 202 22.5 202 22.1
Fine 4 20.0 288 32.1 292 31.9
Imprisonment 0 0.0 12 1.3 12 1.3
Transferred 0 0.0 8 0.9 8 0.9
Reviewed 0 0.0 6 0.7 6 0.7
Withdrawn 5 25.0 115 12.8 120 13.1
Reconciliation 0 0.0 16 1.8 16 1.7
Acquitted & discharged 8 40.0 54 6.0 62 6.8
Community service 0 0.0 8 0.9 8 0.9
Pending 0 0.0 9 1.0 9 1.0
Fine & imprisonment 0 0.0 2 0.2 2 0.2
Strokes & Imprisonment 0 0.0 4 0.4 4 0.4
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Strokes and compensation 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Strokes & fine 0 0.0 13 1.5 13 1.4
Compensation &imprisonment 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Strokes & compensation 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Case closed 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Fine & compensation 0 0.0 3 0.3 3 0.3
Fine & Community service 0 0.0 3 0.3 3 0.3
Imprisonment & Compensation 0 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.1
Imprisonment& suspended
imprisonment
1 5.0 0 0.0 1 0.1
Missing 1 5.0 36 4.0 37 4.0
Other 1 5.0 112 12.5 113 12.3
Total 20 100.0 896 100.0 916 100.0
Source: General survey data
Multiple Offences
The most common multiple offences tried in the magistrate courts were those
that combined shop-breaking and theft (35.5%) followed by those that
combined burglary and theft-related offences (12%)(Figurell). The pattern of
the customary courts was the opposite of that of magistrate courts in that the
combination of burglary and theft-related offences accounted for 48.5% of
multiple offences tried by customary courts while the combination involving
shop-breaking and theft common were a distance second.
In terms of disposals magistrate courts tended to dispose of multiple offences
by way of withdrawals (18.1%), imprisonment (16.3%), acquittals (10.5%) and
fines (7.5%) in that order. For customary courts the leading disposals were
withdrawals (13%), imprisonment (11.9%), the fine (7.2%) and acquittals
(6.4%.)
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Figure 11: Multiple Offences
Multiple Offences
■ Magistrate ■ Customary I Total
48.5
51.8
House Breaking Shop Breaking Theft Assault Common and




Source: General survey data
Figure 12: Disposal: multiple offences
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5.4.6 Overall Use of Penalties and Other Disposals
This part of the chapter presents statistics on the use of various penalties and
disposals by magistrate and customary courts in relation to different
offences.
Strokes
Figures show, that generally, assault-related offences tended to attract
strokes than most other offences. Thus, assault common on its own
accounted for 24.5% of all strokes awarded for any particular offence while
another assault-related offence ranked second at 16.8%. Theft common stood
at position three at 12.9 % while common nuisance in fourth accounted for
10.5%. Magistrate courts were most likely to deploy strokes in relation to the
combined offences of shop-breaking/theft common (18.8%),
burglary/stealing from dwelling/housebreaking (15.6%) followed by the
offence of theft (12.5%) and unlawful wounding (9.4%). The customary court
pattern was more consistent with the general pattern. Assault common
(25.4%) attracted strokes more than any other offence, followed by assault




n Magistrate Customary u Total
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Source: census survey data
Fine
Generally assault occasioning bodily harm (15%) was the offence most likely
to lead to a fine, followed by assault common (11.2%), use of insulting
language (10.8%) and driving motor vehicle whilst under the influence of
liquor or drugs (8.1%).
Figure 14 below presents statistics on the comparative use of the fine. From
the statistics it is apparent that, compared to customary courts, magistrate
courts rarely levied fines as punishment. Magistrate courts levied fines for
mostly for driving motor vehicle whilst under the influence of liquor or
drugs (25.5%) unlawful possession of drugs 15.8% and driving a vehicle
without licence (7.6%). In the customary courts fines were awarded for





Magistrate ■ Customary * Total
44.1
Source: General survey data
Compensation
According to Figure 15, in aggregate terms compensation was used by the
two types of courts mostly in cases involving theft (21.8%), failure to comply
with a maintenance order (20%) and malicious damage to property (20%). In
the magistrate courts it was used most heavily in maintenance cases (68.8%)
which were in any case about failure to pay maintenance and in cases
involving obtaining by false pretences (12.5%) but was otherwise not much
used to punish ordinary offences. Customary courts awarded compensation
mostly for theft common (30.8%), malicious damage to property (28.2%),
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Withdrawals
The use of withdrawals was spread thinly across a range of offences.
Nevertheless they were most common in relation to assaults (12.4%), assaults
occasioning bodily harm (9.9%) and failure to comply with maintenance
orders. In magistrate courts withdrawals occurred mostly in maintenance
cases (11.9%) and rape cases (9.6%). In comparison in the customary courts
withdrawals occurred for the most part in relation to assault common
(24.7%), assault occasioning bodily harm cases (18.4%), use of insulting




■ Magistrate ■ Customary ■ Total
72.0
Failure to Rape Using Assault Assault Theft Other
Comply with Insulting Common occasioning Common
Maintenance Language Bodily Harm
Order
Source: census survey data
Community Service
Community service was not a widely used disposal (40 cases only) and it
appeared only in the registers of customary courts but not in those of
magistrate courts (see Figure 17 below). Community service was usually not
imposed by the trial court itself but by review bodies usually as a substitute
for imprisonment.
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Figure 17: Percentage distribution of punishment (Community service) by
offence and type of court
Customary Court
22.5
Source: General survey data
Cautions
The caution was one of the least utilized of all disposals. As Table 11 below
shows it was used in only 25 instances over the period covered by the
survey. It was most heavily used in maintenance cases (24%). Customary
courts hardly used the caution at all as data show that it was employed only
once. Magistrate did not use it with any great frequency in relation to
ordinary offences but rather, perhaps unsurprisingly, used it most often in
cases involving failure to comply with a maintenance order.
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Offence Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
FCWMO 6 25.0 0 0.0 6 24.0
DFBWII 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
GFITPEPS 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
UPFA 2 8.3 0 0.0 2 8.0
DMVWL 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
FOVS 0 0.0 1 100.0 1 4.0
UPGT 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
ECL 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
AOBH 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0




vehicle 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
Robbery 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
False
declaration
of passport 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
Undefined
offence 3 12.5 0 0.0 3 12.0
Missing 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
OCBFP
&theft





dwelling 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 4.0
Total 24 100.0 1 100.0 25 100.0
Source: General survey data
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FCWMO: Failing to Comply With Maintenance Order; DFBWII: Departing
from Botswana Without Informing Immigration; GFITPEPS: Giving False
Information To Person Employed in Public Service; UPFA: Unlawful
Possession of Fire Arm; DMVWL: Driving Motor Vehicle Without License;
FOVS: Failure to Obey Valid Summons; UPGT :Unlawful Possession of Govt
Trophy; ECL :Escape from Lawful Custody; AOBH: Assault Occasioning
Bodily Harm; KAWIS: Killing Animal With Intent to Steal ;OCBFP:
Obtaining Credit By False Pretences.
Reconciliation
Table 12 shows that reconciliation was also not that widely used as a
disposal. It was the disposal of choice in 103 cases altogether, 55 of which
were tried in magistrate courts, and the rest in customary courts. Overall it
was used mostly by both types of courts in cases involving assault-related
offences namely assaults occasioning bodily harm(19.4%) and assault
common(14.6%).The next most frequent use was in relation to maintenance
cases(13.6%). However, though it must be said that there were differences in
the level of seriousness of cases involved if we compare the two types of
courts. In magistrate courts the assaults tended to be fairly serious (assault
occasioning bodily harm) compared to those in relation to which it was
deployed in the customary courts(assault common). Another notable
difference was that as far as magistrate courts were concerned, one group of
cases most likely to be resolved in this way were cases concerning failure to
comply with a maintenance order. Thus in comparative terms, customary
courts were more likely overall to resolve ordinary criminal cases through




Type of Offence N % N % N %
Motor Vehicle Theft 2 3.6 0 0.0 2 1.9
Failure to Comply with Maintenance
Order 14 25.5 0 0.0 14 13.6
Affray 0 0.0 2 4.2 2 1.9
Breach of Peace 0 0.0 1 2.1 1 1.0
Escape from Lawful Custody 0 0.0 1 2.1 1 1.0
Rape 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
Common Nuisance 0 0.0 3 6.3 3 2.9
Using Insulting Language 0 0.0 12 25.0 12 11.7
Threat to kill 2 3.6 0 0.0 2 1.9
Grievous Bodily Harm 2 3.6 0 0.0 2 1.9
Unlawful Wounding 3 5.5 2 4.2 5 4.9
Assault Common 2 3.6 13 27.1 15 14.6
Assault occasioning Bodily Harm 16 29.1 4 8.3 20 19.4
Theft Common 1 1.8 2 4.2 3 2.9
Stealing Stock 1 1.8 2 4.2 3 2.9
Stealing By Servant 2 3.6 0 0.0 2 1.9
Unlawful Use of Motor Vehicle 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
Criminal Trespass 0 0.0 3 6.3 3 2.9
Obtaining By False Pretences 0 0.0 1 2.1 1 1.0
Arson 2 3.6 0 0.0 2 1.9
Malicious Damage to Property 1 1.8 1 2.1 2 1.9
Forgery Unlawful Possession of Drugs 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm and
UnlawfulWounding 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
House Breaking Stealing From Dwelling
Theft Common Burglary 1 1.8 1 2.1 2 1.9
Malicious Damage to Property Assault
Common 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
Assault Common Burglary and Theft
Common 1 1.8 0 0.0 1 1.0
100.
Total 55 0 48 100.0 103 100.0
Source: General survey data
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Imprisonment
Figure 18 shows statistics on the use of imprisonment in customary and
magistrate courts encompassing all offences during the period 1991-2001. For
the latter the leading offence in terms of imprisonment figures was rape
(16.3%) followed by stock theft (8.7%) burglary-related offences (7%) and
theft common (5.1%). Corresponding figures for customary courts showed
that they sent offenders to prison mainly for stealing stock (22.8%) theft
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Suspended Prison Term
Unlawful wounding (9.5%), theft common(8.8%), burglary(7.1%) and
grievous bodily harm (5.1%) were the offences that attracted the most
frequent use of suspended prison sentences in magistrate courts(Figure 19).
By comparison in customary courts (Figure 20)offenders received a
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suspended prison term mainly for assault common (22.2%) assault
occasioning bodily harm (14.1 %) common nuisance (13.3%) use of insulting
language (11.5%) and theft common (11.5%) if we consider the top four
offences for which the suspended sentence was the punishment of choice.
Magistrate
Figure 19: Suspended Sentences -magistrate courts
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5.4.7 Patterns, Interpretation and Analysis
5.4.8 General Outcomes: H2
There were a number of significant differences between the courts
concerning disposals, sentencing patterns and the overall use of penalties.
The most common disposals as far as the magistrate courts were concerned
were withdrawal, acquittals, imprisonment and suspended prison terms in
that order. In the case of customary court the order was rather different. The
fine was by far the most common disposal in the latter followed by strokes
but withdrawals were amongst the top four or three disposals when selected
offences were considered separately. Other disposals were not used nearly as
frequently as those enumerated above. There was a large gap between the
courts regarding the proportion of cases that were acquitted or withdrawn.
For instance in magistrate courts acquittals for property offences and
offences against the person stood at 16.0 % and 12.5 % respectively. By
contrast, acquittal figures for these same categories of offences in the
customary courts were as low as 4.0 % and 3.4 % respectively. There were
27.4
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also major differences in the type of punishments that magistrates deployed
in respect of the selected offence groups. If we consider punishment as a
separate category (from non-punishments such as withdrawals, acquittals
and other disposals) a similarly interesting picture emerges. Imprisonment
and suspended prison term were the punishments that were most likely to be
imposed by magistrate courts for the two broad offence categories
mentioned. Customary courts by contrast tended to impose fines, strokes
and terms in prison in that order for the same general offences.
5.4.9 Disposals/Outcomes and Selected Triable-Either-Way Offence Group
Apart from the two very broad offence categories of property offences and
offence against the person, outcomes were broken down and analysed
further according to five common triable-either-way offences. Tables 10-19
summarise the outcomes for these offence groups. An analysis of data from
those tables reveals some interesting patterns in the outcome/disposals
patterns of magistrate and customary courts. Withdrawals were the most
common disposal overall for the selected offence groups. It featured among
the top three most common disposals for customary courts in respect of
burglary and related offences.
The fine dominated customary courts disposals across all offence groups.
Strokes and withdrawals were also amongst the top three disposals for
customary courts. The pattern of disposals in magistrate courts was
different from that of customary courts both in terms of the most common
disposals and regarding the type of disposals that tended to predominate
in relation to selected offence groups. Not only did withdrawal feature
amongst the top four most common disposal across all offence categories
but overall it was one of the top two disposals for OAPs and ORPs (see
Table 5). The other two most important disposals as far as magistrate courts
were concerned were acquittals and imprisonment. It is evident from the
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foregoing that overall non-sanctions were the pre-eminent disposals in
magistrate courts.
As we have observed above there were differences in acquittal/conviction
rates of the two types of courts. This is consistent with what literature led us
to expect (Baillie 1969; Kirby 1985; Boko 2000). It was expected that the
conviction rates of customary courts would generally be higher than
those of magistrate courts reflecting differences in attitudes, procedures
and values of the courts as well as training of presiding officers
(Republic of Botswana 1971(a); Kirby 1985; Boko 2000; WLSA 1999). It has
been suggested that perhaps customary courts are all too anxious to convict
offenders (see particularly Republic of Botswana 1971(a)) This may be
compounded by lack of training which may well mean customary courts
judges have greater propensity to accept prosecution's story than magistrates
who are trained lawyers (Kirby 1985; Boko 2000).
Patterns suggesting large differences in acquittal levels of customary and
magistrate courts would appear to be consistent with generally held views
about differences in the underlying value systems and standard of justice in
the customary and the general system (Kirby 1985; Boko 2000). There is a
commonly held belief amongst writers and observers that principles
governing trial procedures in customary courts especially in those areas of
procedure that fall outside the Customary (Procedure) Rules, are different
from those that apply in magistrate courts(Kirby 1985; Nsereko 1998;Boko
2000;Tshosa 2001). Procedures that apply in magistrate courts are more
elaborate. Traditionalists believe accused persons regularly escape conviction
on technical grounds. On the other hand some believe convictions are
relatively easy to secure in the customary courts (Kirby 1985; Boko 2000). A
view has grown in the general courts that the approach of customary
courts to procedure is fundamentally different from that of general courts
so much so that the High Court held in Merapelo v The State (1985 BLR
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2150) that when hearing an appeal from customary courts it was advisable
for magistrate courts to treat the matter as a re-hearing and not to rely on
the findings of those courts owing to difference in rules of evidence and
procedure and differences in record keeping standards. However if a
customary court fails to follow Customary Court (Procedure) Rules a
conviction may be set aside if the matter reaches the High Court.
Compared to customary courts, disposals in magistrate courts were
dominated by withdrawals and acquittals both of which are non-punishment
disposals. Deep philosophical differences and divergent notions of justice
could well be the explanation as some have suggested. Some differences
which may not be immediately obvious but could possibly explain
divergences in outcomes revolve around the issue of liability. As noted
earlier, case processing results relating to other stages of the trial process do
help us not only to build a more holistic picture about the two legal systems
but also to find out how patterns suggested by literature actually manifest. It
would appear that acquittals and withdrawals provide some of the most
striking differences between the two systems as far as general outcomes were
concerned.
5.4.10 Sentencing Outcomes: Triable Either-Way Offences: H2A
This study is concerned with the impact of the variations of discretion as
to combinations of punishment on sentencing outcomes of customary and
magistrate courts. In that context, it was critical as part of the general
background to questions asked under H3 - H4 which go towards
providing specific answers to the primary hypothesis to consider
sentencing patterns of customary and magistrate courts in relation to
triable-either-way offences, generally. While recognizing that the sentence
in each instance depends on the facts of each case, overall patterns
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peculiar to either type of court would suggest differences in approach to
punishing particular offences or offences generally.
5.4.11 Patterns, Interpretation and Analysis
We find that there were major differences in the type of punishments that
customary and magistrates' courts deployed in respect of the selected offence
groups. Imprisonment and suspended prison term were the punishments
that were most likely to be imposed by magistrate courts for the Property
Offences and Offences Against the Person. Customary courts by contrast
tended to impose fines, strokes and imprisonment in that order for the same
general offences. Customary courts were more likely than magistrate courts
to employ a combination of punishments for the same offences. Fines and
thrashings have remained, whether used alone or in combination with other
punishments, the dominant forms of punishment in the customary courts
for these type of offences since the colonial times (Tagart 1931; Schaperal938;
Leslie 1969).
5.4.12 Offence Group Specific Sentencing Patterns
Assaults - related Offences
The most common disposal for assault-related offences in magistrate courts
was withdrawal. Although there is no direct evidence to support this it is
possible that high withdrawal rates occur because a significant proportion of
assaults involve friends, acquaintances or neighbours of the victim who may
be inclined to withdraw the case especially if the offender shows remorse
or asks for forgiveness. Another factor likely to lead to withdrawal of cases
was if the parties involved knew each other. Figures for customary courts
show higher withdrawal rates for assault-related offences than for other
offence groups.
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However, compared to customary courts, for magistrate courts withdrawals
were by far the most common disposal and by a very wide margin. The
differences between the two types of courts may be attributable to
differences in procedures of the two courts as available evidence from court
registers suggested that a proportion of assault-related cases registered for
trial in magistrate courts were withdrawn for lack of evidence but no similar
instances were recorded for customary courts. This must, however, be
treated with caution because of differences and inconsistencies in recording
of reasons for withdrawal. While in many cases reasons for, and the party
instigating withdrawals were mentioned, that was not necessarily the case all
the time.
Theft-related
For this offence group the most common disposals were imprisonment
withdrawals and the fine. However, disaggregated figures show divergences
in the patterns of the courts in relation to the elements under discussion in
this section. The disposals in magistrate courts were dominated by non-
sanctions while in the customary courts sanctions dominated disposals.
There were basically two major sanctions of any importance that magistrate
courts imposed for theft-related offence groups, namely imprisonment to
full term and suspended prison term. However, as disposals, they ranked
third and fourth respectively after withdrawals and acquittals. In the
customary courts the leading disposals were fine, imprisonment and strokes.
There were also clearly some differences in the way the two courts employed
multiple punishments. The majority of multiple punishment combinations
used by the customary courts to punish theft-related offences were not used
by magistrate courts at all. There were also instances where some
punishment combinations found in the magistrate courts were absent from
customary courts.
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Malicious Damage to Property
Withdrawals were the most common disposal in magistrate courts in respect
of burglary-related offences. This should not be surprising as most of those
who are able to compensate owners of property they had damaged would
have been keen to avoid a criminal conviction. Of those sentenced to
imprisonment half received suspended sentence, while the other half were
expected to serve their terms in prison. The pattern represents a departure
from patterns observed in relation to other offences. It may be that the
damage involved in such cases was generally fairly serious therefore seen as
deserving of more punishment. Perhaps the element of malice is what
conditioned and shaped the response of the courts in such cases. Taken as a
whole, punishments imposed by magistrates for MDP offences were at the
serious end of the scale and somewhat different to the softer approaches they
seemed to take in relation to other offences.
In the customary courts the most common disposal for MDP cases was the
fine. As with other groups of offences customary courts used a wide range of
punishment combinations. On the whole the most common element in most
of the punishments imposed by the customary courts was the fine/
compensation combination emphasizing the importance of restoration. The
other common multiple punishment combination imposed by customary
courts was strokes and compensation. The emphasis in the two types of
punishments would seem to be restoration of the property of the complaint.
The multiple punishments seemed to be calculated to punish the offender
and to replace or restore property to its owner. Customary courts would be
inclined to see malicious damage to property as a form of low social
disorder, something they would be anxious to stamp out, hence the use of
corporal punishment, the cure generally prescribed for such offences. On the
other hand the predominance of the fine may be also be caused by the
involvement of females in this crime. As whipping of females and males
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over the age of 40 years is not allowed, the fine is one of the options available
to the courts. The third most common disposal was withdrawals. The level
of withdrawals was high by customary courts standards. This may be as a
result of the parties' involved wanting to settle the matter out of court.
In contrast punishments by magistrate courts paid little or no attention at all
to the restorative aspects. This may have as much to do with the attitude of
the general courts as with the procedures which encourages civil action to
obtain compensation. Customary courts have the advantage that they can
impose fine and compensation at the same time. In the case of magistrate
courts the procedures to be followed for award of compensation require that
a formal application must be made in order for compensation to take place
(Section 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act).
Customary courts were more likely to order compensation than were
magistrate courts. Even though on its own, compensation was not used very
much, the frequency with which it was used in combination with other
punishments by customary courts suggests that they are perhaps more
anxious to satisfy the victim in property offences than magistrate courts.
Burglary and Related Offences
The most likely disposals for burglary-related offences on the whole were
withdrawals, suspended prison terms and imprisonment in that order. The
probability that anyone who was convicted of burglary would suffer a
punishment in which prison featured in one form or another was therefore
fairly high. Taken together disposals in which full imprisonment played a
role, were overall the dominant disposals, and exceeded even withdrawals. If
we ignore withdrawals for the time being, the other punishment apart from
imprisonment that a person convicted of a burglary-related offence would be
more likely to receive would include strokes.
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The common disposal in magistrate courts in respect of this group of
offences was withdrawal. The next highest disposal was suspended prison
term. However, there was a break with the patterns seen in respect of other
offences in that the acquittal rates were very low. This would seem to
confirm the view that evidence in burglary cases is clear and charges are
more robust than in other offence categories. Magistrates were more likely to
have a court case withdrawn than customary courts where the most likely
disposals to punishments were suspended prison term, strokes together with
imprisonment or just imprisonment on its own, in that order.
Nuisance-Related Offences
In respect of this offence category, customary courts imposed all conceivable
types of punishment ranging from the mildest to the most severe courts.
They also deployed a wide range of multiple punishments in respect of this
particular offence group even though such cases did not constitute a large
cluster.
In sharp contrast in magistrate courts the majority of nuisance cases were
acquitted or withdrawn. Magistrate courts did not register any multiple
punishments at all for this offence group. Use of combination punishments
not only set customary courts apart from magistrate courts, but it also
underscores the relative severity of punishment meted out by the former for
these offences. This is probably indicative of the overall philosophy and
orientation of the two types of courts.
A number of factors may explain the differences. Figures show that
customary courts tried almost fifty times as many nuisance-related offences
as magistrate courts. Nuisance-related offences together with minor assaults
formed the bulk of cases tried before customary courts, and therefore the
core of their business in criminal matters. Channelling of different offences
to one or the other court of the two types of courts and the pre-occupation
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of customary courts with social disorder offences may explain differences
in both the distribution and punishment of nuisance-related offences.
Whereas magistrate courts might regard nuisance-related offences as minor
and therefore generally peripheral to their business, customary courts
clearly take a different view. Weak evidence and high level of acquittals in
magistrate courts are probably some of the factors that encourage the police
to take this type of cases to customary courts instead of the former. It is also
possible that more of this type of cases may be being reported to the
customary courts particularly because most nuisance cases tend to involve
neighbours and relatives. Interestingly nuisance-related cases attracted an
unusually large number of requests for transfers if one recalls that the
average number of transfers per year was no more than half a dozen.
Compared to other offence types/groups it resulted in relatively high
number of sentences being modified upon review presumably because they
were considered too harsh.
5.4.13 Overall Utilization of Different Sanctions
Imprisonment
For magistrate courts imprisonment was the dominant form of punishment
even though it was not, as we have seen, the dominant disposal. In the case
of customary courts: imprisonment was the third most important type of
punishment that they were likely to impose for the Property Offences and
Offences Against the Person. Flowever, customary courts were more likely
to send offenders to prison for Offences Against the Person than they were
for the Property Offences.
A magistrate court was twice as likely to sentence an offender to prison as
customary courts. However, magistrate courts used imprisonment most
frequently to punish the more serious offences. None of the most common
minor offences including social disorder offences featured amongst the top
168
four offences punished in this way by magistrate courts. It is interesting to
note that three of the top four offences most likely to be punished in this
way were triable-either way offences, some of which, like unlawful
wounding for example, would be in the middle to top ranks in their own
offence group. These offences were stealing stock, unlawful wounding and
the multiple offences of shop breaking and theft. In comparison customary
courts used a custodial sentence most frequently for stock theft, theft
common, assault occasioning bodily harm and killing animal with intent to
steal, in that order. The one feature that the customary courts pattern had
in common with that of magistrate courts was that stock theft was amongst
the top four offences most likely to be punished by imprisonment in either
type of court. The only difference was that for the customary courts it was
ranked number one while in magistrate courts it occupied the second
position. It is interesting to note that two offences relating to stock were
amongst the top four offences that tended to attract the punishment of
imprisonment in customary courts. It will be recalled that stock theft is one of
two offences for which customary courts have been granted extraordinary
jurisdiction, the other being drug-related offences. Theft common, a
relatively minor offence, was among the top four offences that tended to
be punished by imprisonment in the customary courts whereas it did not
feature anywhere near the top for magistrate courts.
Imprisonment is available for all offences including low grade offence as the
primary punishment, as a substitute/ alternative or part of multiple
punishments. Thus there are no non-imprisonable offences as such. Among
offences triable-either-way stock theft and drug related offences attracted the
longest sentences. Ordinarily, these offences lie outside the jurisdiction of
customary courts their powers being limit them to terms of up to 12 months
at most. However, they have been granted extra-ordinary jurisdiction in
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respect of these offences both which carry mandatory prison terms of 5
years (60 months) and 10 years (120 months) respectively.
When considering imprisonment we must not forget the large variations in
conviction rates of the two types of courts. A number of studies have
shown that most of those sent to prison are sent by customary
courts(Otlhogile: 1993: 530; Love and Love 1996, 41) yet according to our
data magistrate courts are more likely to send offenders to prison than
customary courts.
However this may be explained by the fact that on a country-wide basis
customary courts handle a far greater volume of criminal cases than the
general courts. The reach of the former extends even to small rural
settlements. By contrast magistrate courts are the lowest ranked general
courts found in peri-urban centres and larger settlements. It must also be
remembered that customary courts not only have high conviction rates but
are more likely to try minor offences for which they may impose prison
terms or suspended prison terms. In terms of the ethos of general courts,
they would avoid sending offenders to prison. As we have seen magistrate
courts will use other punishments to avoid sending offenders to prison.
Imprisonment is the second most serious and severe form of punishment in
Botswana after capital punishment. For the average offender, it is the most
intrusive and restrictive of punishment. It is for this reason that it is
considered as punishment of last resort in many countries and therefore
reserved for the most persistent and/or serious offenders. It is perhaps for
this reason that most offenders are anxious to avoid it. During my field work
I found that most offenders would specifically ask not to be sent to prison
when asked to mitigate. This was also confirmed by the results of the second
stage analysis looking at impact of legal and non-legal variables.
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The general courts (State v Sethunya BLR 486) try where possible, not to send
first offenders to prison. Imprisonment was also often used in combination
with other punishments such as fines, compensation, strokes. As a
secondary form of punishment it serves one of two functions. Firstly, where
it was used in combination with fines and compensation it was usually
deployed as back up in case the offender defaulted on payment of the sum
levied. Second, in other cases it was used mainly as a deterrent to the
offender not to engage in the behaviour complained of for the duration of the
suspended sentence. A suspended prison term on its own serves the same
function.
But as we have seen imprisonment, deployed on its own, remains the
dominant punishment in magistrate courts. There are a variety of possible
reasons why imprisonment is the dominant punishment in this type of court
when compared to customary courts. Firstly, it may be that because the
range of punishments available to magistrate courts is limited by the fact that
they do not have as much discretion to vary the punishment and punishment
combinations as the customary courts. Second, as we have seen, even
though magistrate courts deal with similar kinds of offences as customary
courts, they tend to be those towards the serious end of the scale thus more
likely to attract imprisonment.
While on the one hand customary courts were generally less likely than
magistrate courts to sentence offenders to imprisonment, they were on
the other hand more likely to do so for less serious offences than the latter.
Not only did customary courts try most of the cases involving minor
offences like common nuisance and use of insulting language, but they were
often prepared to award prison terms for these together with some other
punishment(s).
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Imprisonment is a relatively new form of punishment to customary court
having only been introduced as an option in their menu of punishments as
recently as 1934 (Schapera 1938). Perhaps a rough equivalent of
imprisonment under customary law would be banishment from the tribal
territory. Following the 1934 reforms tribal authorities could only banish a
person with the permission of the High Commissioner (Schapera 1938). It
would therefore appear that imprisonment has now been accepted as part of
the menu of punishment available to customary courts. This is borne out by
its relatively extensive usage of imprisonment as a punishment by this type
of court. It is perhaps the willingness of customary courts to punish
minor offences in this way which has probably led to the perception that
customary courts are more prison-minded than magistrate courts (Baillie
1969).
This view has been probably been reinforced by statistics indicating that the
majority of prison inmates were sent there by customary courts (Otlhogile:
1993: 530; Love and Love 1996, 41). However, it must not be forgotten that
not only are customary courts far numerous than the general courts but they
also handle more cases annually than the latter.
Suspended Prison Term
The use of a suspended prison term in magistrate courts shows a somewhat
different pattern to the use of full custodial sentences. Of the top four
sentences most likely to attract the sentence of imprisonment only
unlawful wounding featured amongst the top four most likely to be
punished by way of a suspended sentence. Offences for which an offender
was most likely to receive a suspended sentence in a magistrate court were
theft common, unlawful wounding, burglary and grievous bodily harm.
Customary courts were most likely to award a suspended sentence in
respect of the following offences assault common, assault occasioning bodily
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harm, common nuisance, use of insulting language and theft common.
Assault occasioning bodily harm also featured among the top four offences
punished in this way by magistrate courts. However, the difference between
the use of suspended sentence in the two courts was that very low level
offences such as common nuisance and use of insulting language featured
amongst the top four offences to be punished in this manner by customary
courts.
The types of suspended sentences that customary and magistrate courts
imposed varied. Magistrate courts may suspend a sentence wholly or
partially. There are two types of suspended sentences that a customary court
can impose. It may after convicting the offender postpone the passing of
sentence for a period of not more than three years on certain condition(s). If,
after expiration of that period the offender has not breached the conditions of
recognizance the court may discharge him without imposing any sentence. If
the court is minded to impose a different form of suspended sentence it may
pass wholly or partially suspended sentences subject to certain conditions for
a period of not more than three years. The partially suspended sentence is
meant to encourage reform as well as to deter (Julia Seleka v The State High
Court Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 1978 (unreported)). The suspension may
thus be made conditional upon the convicted person desisting from or
promising not to commit a similar offence during a specified period. It may
also be used as a threat to encourage offenders to obey some other order of
the court e.g. maintenance orders. It has been used where court thought it
might cause unnecessary suffering to send a breadwinner to prison. It is also
deployed where the court feels that imprisonment would be too harsh or
unwarranted in the circumstances but still feels the offence is serious enough
to warrant the threat of imprisonment.
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Customary courts tended to use suspended sentences more sparingly than
magistrate courts. Reasons for this are not easy to determine but it was
suggested in Tlhokomelo and another v State BLR272 that customary courts had
no powers to suspend sentences and that the suspended sentence was not
part of the traditional repertoire for dealing with case. Otlhogile (1993) has
suggested that such a view is misleading because failure of law to
incorporate it in the CCA did not necessarily imply that it was not part of
Tswana repertoire. However anthropologists who have written (Roberts, van
Niekerk, Kuper, and Schapera) on Tswana law are silent on the subject.
Perhaps that in itself is an indication that it was not widely used, in which
case current patterns suggesting limited use may well reflect traditional
patterns. However, what is not in dispute is that suspended imprisonment
was unknown to customary law since imprisonment itself was only
introduced to the customary courts in thel930s. However, it is difficult to
come to a firm view regarding other forms of suspended sentence.
Strokes /Lashing/corporal punishment
Thrashing ranked second amongst punishments most likely to be meted out
by customary courts. Magistrate courts were 22 times less likely than
customary courts to order that offenders be punished by thrashing. The
magnitude of difference in the levels of use of strokes perhaps illustrates
differences in attitudes between the young professionally trained magistracy
and the more deeply traditional chiefs. Most magistrate being relatively
young and liberal in outlook represent and may well hold views regarding
corporal punishment that are at odds with those held by chiefs and other
traditionalists. That may explain to a certain extent why they might be less
likely to impose a sentence of thrashing.
Across all the years considered social order offences tended to attract
corporal punishment more than other categories of offences. These are cases
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where thrashing was the only punishment imposed by the court. Social
disorder offences as defined here include common nuisance, use of insulting
language, assault common and assault occasioning bodily harm. Outside this
category the offences that also attracted such punishment in any significant
amounts are Theft and Escaping from Lawful Custody.
The next level of high use of strokes involved cases where it was used
together with a suspended prison term. The pattern remains the same insofar
as cases involving social order offences are the focus punishments involving
corporal punishment. Social disorder offences particularly, assault
occasioning actual bodily harm was more likely to attract corporal
punishment.
Corporal punishment is probably the most controversial punishment in
Botswana. To the extent that it involves infliction of physical violence, it
offends the sensibilities of a small but vociferous segment of the middle class
which has been campaigning incessantly against thrashing (Shumba and
Moorad 2000, Tafa 2002).Yet there is an abiding belief in Botswana especially
amongst older generations, including tribal authorities that thrashing is a
good crime control tool and the best cure for delinquency amongst the youth.
Any movement in the direction of removing corporal punishment or
restricting the use of corporal punishment always faces fierce opposition
particularly when levels of crime appear to be rising. The latest amendment
to the law extends the use of thrashing to cover a much wider range of
offences than before (Section 17(2) Customary Court (Amendment) Act,
2004).
Under customary law the use of thrashing as punishment cut across offence
categories (Schapera 1938). Schapera has observed that under Tswana law
and custom thrashing was reserved for all sorts of offences and was the
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substitute of first choice where an offender sentenced to a fine was unable to
pay. When the Customary Court Act was amended in 1972 to bring
punishments in customary courts more in line with those in the Penal Code
the use of strokes was restricted in terms of the range of offences that could
be punished in that manner (Brewer 1972). However the use of corporal
punishment as an instrument of correction, punishment and control
especially of the young has been widely recognized as important to
traditional communities across the country (Leslie 1969). The wishes of
customary courts to bear down low level disorder and youth offending has
been facilitated by the willingness of the police to enter into an informal
agreement over to the customary courts rather than the magistrate so that
they can be dealt with expeditiously as one police officer put it to me in an
interview. Two chiefs interviewed for this study regretted the prohibition
against use of this form of punishment on girls and restrictions regarding
its use on the very young. The popularity of corporal punishment as an
instrument for controlling the young is therefore both popular and deeply
embedded in the culture of Botswana (Tagart 1931; Schapera 1938; Leslie
1969). For instance one writer has observed that Batswana use strokes as
'pedagogical device, to discipline youngsters' (Bouman 1984) while another
noted in the 1960s that the use of strokes on young persons was widely
practised not only because alternatives were not good enough 'but also
because the rigorous treatment of juveniles has strong cultural support'
(Leslie 1969:184).
However, the most recent amendment to the Customary Court Act has
turned the clock back somewhat. All ordinary offences triable in customary
courts are now potentially punishable with thrashing. Prior to the
aforementioned amendment, offences that could be punished with corporal
punishment included a number of offences which form much of the staple of
customary trials: Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm, Burglary, Stock Theft
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and Offences Contrary to the Stock Theft Act (Schedule No under Customary
Court (Amendment) Act 1997).
The Fine and Compensation
The fine was the dominant disposal overall, it was the most heavily used in
punishment in customary courts particularly in relation to Offences Against
the Person. However, even in respect of Property offences it was the third
most important disposals after withdrawals and imprisonment. Compared to
customary courts, magistrates used the fine rather less.
Not only was the fine used very widely on its own in the customary courts,
but it was also commonly used in combination with other punishments.
Some of the combinations in which it was deployed together with another
punishment were found only in customary courts. Whereas in magistrate
courts for assault-related offences it was imposed together with a full or
suspended prison term while in customary courts it went together with
other combinations for the same offences. Thus, in customary courts it
served an important function as one of the punishments that could be
combined with others to come up an array of possible punishments available
to customary courts.
The predominance of the fine as the punishment of choice in customary
courts means that it has overtaken restitution/compensation because during
the colonial period it was ranked second to the latter (see Schapera 1938).
However, both these patterns differ from that observed by Bouman
(1984:148) at Mahalapye, which suggested predominance of penal sanctions
and a complete reversal of patterns found by Schapera and others after him.
Why it has supplanted restitution as the punishment of choice in the
customary courts is not easy to explain but expansion of the cash economy
and changes in the law regarding when they may be imposed may explain its
wide appeal.
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A number of factors may account for the fine being more popular or more
frequently utilized there than in the magistrate courts. Firstly, unlike
magistrate courts which must adhere to the punishments specified under the
offence-creating sections of the Penal Code or the general section on
punishments customary courts may punish any offence with a fine.
Secondly, the predominance of offences in this study such as assaults and
related offences which under the traditional Tswana system tended to attract
fines was bound to tell. Thirdly a fine is perhaps a natural choice for
customary courts where it would have been used interchangeably with
some other punishment such as thrashing. Fines and strokes were the most
common punishments meted out by the courts (Schaperal938: 48). Fines and
most compensation took the form of livestock. But Schapera (1938) observes
that money fines were beginning to appear. Fines were made to the court.
However, where the court deemed it appropriate to do so, it ordered
restitution and compensation.
Under customary law if an offender could not pay a fine, corporal
punishment was imposed instead but then all offenders, including women,
were liable to be planished by whipping though such punishment was rarely
visited upon the very old and the very young (Schapera 1938:49). Presently
the law prohibits thrashing of all women or any males over the age of 40 and
that means the fine remains the only option available to the sentencing judge
in respect of these groups if it appears that a community sentence or a prison
term (suspended or otherwise) would not be the appropriate punishment to
impose. It is easy to see customary courts resorting to fines because of the
relationship that has always existed between fines and strokes/thrashing.
Much the same offences that attracted corporal punishment also attracted
fines. These were mainly social order offences particularly assault
occasioning bodily harm and assault common. Outside the social disorder
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category the offence that tends to attract fines is failure to obey valid
summons. Unlawful possession of dagga attracted some of the highest fines.
As the reader will have noticed, chiefs have been given greater sentencing
powers in respect of drugs and drug-related offence. Together with stock-
related offences drug and drug-related offences are regarded as the most
serious offences that customary courts are allowed to handle. This factor
alone most probably accounts for the high fines for these offences.
Reconciliation
Reconciliation was one of the less common disposals. It was the disposal of
choice in 103 cases altogether, 55 of which were tried in magistrate courts
and the rest in customary courts. It was mostly deployed in cases involving
assault-related offences. However, it must be said that there were differences
in the level of seriousness of cases involved if we compare the two types of
courts. Assaults coming before magistrate courts tended to be fairly serious
compared to those tried in the customary courts. Another notable difference
was that as far as magistrate courts were concerned one group of cases most
likely to be resolved in this way were cases concerning failure to comply
with a maintenance order. Thus in comparative terms, customary courts
were more likely overall to resolve ordinary criminal cases through
reconciliation than magistrate courts.
Differences in procedures governing the trial process in customary and
magistrate courts may be critical in determining the extent to which the
two types of courts may be prepared to reconcile defendants with
complainants. Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
allows magistrate courts to promote reconciliation, in certain types of cases,
provided the prosecutor consents. However they are restricted in doing so to
"proceedings for assaults or any other offence of a personal and private
nature not aggravated in degree" (S.321 CP&E). Once the parties have
settled the matter through compensation, or upon some other terms
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endorsed by the court, the case could then be withdrawn. The accused is
given a caution and is for practical purposes treated as acquitted (see State v
Tazvengwa 1981 BLR 264). There is no corresponding rule governing
reconciliation in the customary courts. However under the traditional set up
assaults and other minor wrongs were regarded more or less as civil
wrongs and therefore amenable to the kind of settlement proposed under
S.321 of Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. Furthermore, under
customary law cases that did not involve injury to the parties concerned
were generally dealt with by way of informal proceedings (Schapera 1984:
258). Since in terms of the distribution of offences by volume in this study,
customary courts tended to try more assaults and other minor offences, it
should not be surprising that more cases in these courts were settled in
that way than in magistrate courts.
However, raw figures do not reflect the true extent of efforts invested by
customary courts in reconciliation outside of those recorded as have been
resolving in that way in the court register. The outcomes of these processes
may or may not be reflected on the court records depending at what stage
they occur. Mediation/negotiation sometimes occurs before the trial or even
before the charge is laid. Obviously where complainant decides not to lay
any charge the dispute is likely to go unrecorded. If the charge is recorded
and the case proceeds to conviction stage any efforts to intervene will not
show on the register or report of the proceedings. It is only when the
withdrawal occurs during the proceedings that it will be recorded and even
then, reasons for withdrawal may not be stated or consistently stated as
being the result of intervention by the court or a result of negotiation
between the disputing parties of their own accord. Reconciliation may occur
after the case has been concluded. This will not be reflected in the record of
the case. This qualification aside, it does seem that a decline in negotiation,
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mediation and reconciliation was always going to happen given the dynamic
introduced by the common law offence framework.
Even though the role of the family in criminal matters is much reduced
compared to the post de-escalation of significance and reconciliation of the
disputing parties is evident in customary court records. There were many
instances where a case would be withdrawn because the dispute 'was sent
back to the family/parents/elders'. Sometimes it is expressed in English
'sent home for reconciliation'. The expressions are 'kgang e buseditswe kzva
livapeng' (the matter has been sent back home/family) and 'kgang e buseditswe
kwa batsading' (the matter has been sent back to parents/family/elders). One
should not be misled by the expression the matter has been sent back to the
parents into assuming that the parties involved were necessarily young
persons or minor. So the parties involved are usually adults with legal
capacity (that is not to say that cases involving young people or minors will
not be sent home). In the Ramatsei v. State Mochudi Customary CRB No.
150/2001 the prosecutor asked the court to allow him to withdraw the case
"the complainant says he is no longer interested in pursuing the matter
through the courts because (they) have agreed that the matter will be settled
before the parents at home, and in this regard I would ask the complaint to
tell this court his feelings regarding the withdrawal of the case".
5.4.14 Findings
Finding 5B1: There were large differences between the courts regarding
general outcome/disposals patterns, sentencing patterns and the overall use
of penalties as postulated under hypotheses H2 and H2A.
Finding 5B2: Patterns in magistrate courts showed predominance of non-
punishment disposals such as withdrawals and acquittals while in the
customary courts punishment-related disposals were dominant.
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5.4.15 Conclusion
There were a number of striking differences between the courts concerning
disposals, sentencing patterns and the overall use of penalties. However,
there were also similarities in the general patterns of the courts regarding
both the most common non-punishment disposal and the most common
penalties. Overall patterns show that the divergences in disposals and
sentencing patterns of the two types of court were more telling than the




In this section I present results on the comparative use of multiple
punishments and non-multiple or single punishments by customary and
magistrate courts generally, and in relation to selected offences. Regarding
selected offences, I focus on the frequency of use, the number and
combinations of punishments deployed against these offences.
5.5.1 Hypothesis H3-H4:
Directional hypothesis 3 and (H3 and H4) were intended to address the
central question around the primary hypothesis by seeking to answer a
number of related sub-questions namely (a) what kind of multiple
punishments did customary and magistrate courts award? The aim was
to find out whether or to what extent multiple punishments awarded by
the courts varied as postulated (b) and if they did, whether there was any
relationship between differences in kind of punishment the two courts
awarded and variations in the discretion as to punishment combinations as
postulated in main hypothesis, (c) further, whether customary courts
would tend to punish more severely than magistrate courts leading to
unjustified disparities, (d) and, whether, if , legal and non-legal factors
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were taken into account we would still find that customary courts punished
more severely or not.
Hypothesis 3: Customary courts are more likely than magistrate courts to use
multiple punishments to punish a single offence.
Hypothesis 3A: Where customary courts use multiple punishments to punish
a single offence the punishments are generally likely to differ in severity
when weighted and compared with those imposed for the same offence by
magistrate courts.
Hypothesis 4: Where the punishment imposed for the same offence is of the
same type, the severity of punishment is likely to vary according to type
of court regardless of whether or not the offender and offence characteristics
are similar.
5.5.2 Presentation of Results
Overall Use ofMultiple Punishments: 1991-2001
The table below shows that in general, taking both triable-either-way
offences and non-triable-either-way offences as a whole magistrate courts
and customary courts were no more or less likely to deploy single or
multiple punishments than the other. Single punishments dominated
outcomes at 82.3% and 83% respectively for magistrate and customary
courts.
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Table 13: Distribution of single and multiple punishments by court type:
General
Magistrate Customary
Type of disposal N % N %
Single punishment 2596 82.3 3839 83.0
Multiple punishments 558 17.7 785 17.0
Total 3154 100.0 4624 100.0
Chi-square 0.67 Sig. 0.41
Type of offence* N % N %
Single offence 3084 90.3 5194 93.4
Multiple offences 330 9.7 365 6.6
Total 3414 100.0 5559 100.0
Chi-square 28.45 Sig. 0.000
*
The Chi-square statistic is
significant at the 0.05 level.
Source: Developed from analysis of census survey data
Use of Multiple Punishments: 1996-2000 Mochudi Supplementary data
Data from the supplementary study conducted at Mochudi offers a different
picture from that presented by the general census survey data presented
above. The supplementary data offers a slightly different perspective in that
it shows the degree of use of multiple punishments as against non-multiple
punishments by type of court in relation to specific selected offences. Table
13 shows that in magistrate courts the use of non-multiple punishments was
much higher (94%) than the use of non-multiple punishments (6%). The
pattern in customary courts was rather different. The multiple punishments
exceeded (51% overall) non-multiple punishments slightly (49%). It is also
interesting to note that whereas the customary courts deployed up to three
punishments together to punish a single offence in 2.7% of cases that came
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before them, magistrate courts did not deploy more than two punishments
when they did use multiple punishments.
Table 14: Supplementary Survey: Distribution of multiple and non-multiple
punishments by court type
Court Type of court Total
Magistrate Customary





3 0(0%) 5(2.7%) 5
Total 136(100%) 183(100%) 319
Source: Supplementary Survey Data Analysis
5.5.3 Measuring Severity of Multiple Punishments
Measuring severity
In order to facilitate measurement of severity punishments were given
weightings according to the rankings assigned. Different types of
punishments were each given a score value which represents its severity
relative to other punishments. The values ranged from 1-5. The higher the
score value assigned, the more severe the punishment. Ranking of the
punishments was based on a rough sense of the degree of unpleasantness
that each type of punishments induces (von Hirsch 1990; 1992).
Punishments were assigned weights or values as follows:
Caution = l(score of 1)






When comparing punishments imposed by the two courts we must remain
alive to the possibility that the two may be working to different agendas as
already intimated in earlier sections of this chapter. The approach to
punishment would therefore be expected to be mediated by courts' specific
factors. Culture and lifestyle also come into play (von Hirsch 2004). However
this should not in and of itself prevent us from measuring severity from an
objective point of view.
Based on literature, courts might be placed along a continuum as follows:
a) Western model
b) Botswana's General Courts possibly a mixture of liberal western
model and Tswana model but more inclined towards the western
model (mixed)
c) Botswana's Customary Courts more emphatically Tswana (but also
mixed )
The western punishment model (with the possible exception of the United
States of America) is generally more liberal than other models in that certain
that the death penalty has been abolished and minor social disorder offences
are not imprisonable(see von Hirsch and Ashworth 2004).
Relating Punishment Severity to Offence Seriousness
According to von Hirsch (2004:185), while opinion surveys involving
members of the public suggest that it is possible for ordinary people to reach
a consensus regarding the comparative seriousness of offences, it is much
more difficult to define clearly from a theoretical point of view what offence
gravity means. He argues between the two elements that go to the gravity
of the offence, namely culpability of the offender and harmfulness of the
conduct, it often easier to determine the former dimension because
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substantive law provides some guidance whereas in the case of the latter
there is usually no guidance at all.
Having said that, von Hirsch and Jareborg (1991) have developed a general
framework for scaling crime based on the impact of different offences on the
welfare of the victim ('living standards'). In terms of this model, living
standards can be evaluated in terms of three levels: (a) subsistence (b)
minimal wellbeing (c) "adequate" well being (von Hirsch 2004: 187). The
model is concerned with impairment of the means or capability to achieve a
certain quality of life. The majority of what Hirsch terms 'victimizing
offences' can be assessed on the basis of the extent to which they affect the
following aspects of life : (a) physical integrity (b)material support and
amenity (c) freedom from humiliation and (d) privacy (von Hirsch 2004:
187). The model such as it is allows for variation scaling of offences
according to culture. But important question arise: What culture? Whose
culture? For instance in the case of customary law whose customary law
would form the normative basis for the ranking of offences? It has been
suggested that there are many versions of customary law including lawyers'
customary law, traditionalists' customary law and living law (Molokomme
1995 see also Sanders 1987). Because of the difficulties involved in the
formulation of a model from scratch based on the values proposed by von
Hirsch and Jareborg (1991), in the present study we relied on differences in
the possible maximum prison term and/or other punishments that an
offence attracts, to rank the offences. Virtually all offences were
imprisonable at the time the study was conducted.
Public opinion has proved to be as much a reliable guide to gauging severity
of punishment as it has been in the measurement of offence gravity.
Researchers working in the area of offence seriousness generally base their
models on the Selling-Wolfing offence severity scale (Myers and Talarico
1987). The Selling-Wolfing offence severity scale is widely used in the United
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States of America and is constructed using data on community attitudes
towards particular offences. Other approaches to scaling of severity values
include self-constructed scales where different values are assigned to
different types of punishments on sliding scale based on the researcher's
own assessment of such punishments (Shoham 1959, Tiffany et al 1975 ) or
a scale based on post-facto evaluations of judicial performance (McDavid
and Stipak 1981/82).
The Selling-Wolfing scale could not be utilized in this study for a number of
reasons. First, score values used in that kind of scale may not necessarily
translate into the same values in the Botswana context. Second, no data on
community judgements about crime severity exists in Botswana that could
be used to construct a scale based on the principles underlying the Selling-
Wolfing scale, which could in turn , be used to contrive severity scores.
Instead we constructed a scale with severity score values for different
penalties ranging from one to five. Others have used similar scales though
with different value ranges from my own (e.g. Shoham 1959). In terms of the
scale used in this study, the different values must be added up to obtain the
overall score for multiple punishments (see preceding section). We did not
believe that the model based on post facto evaluations of judicial
performance would have been suitable because of the cross-system nature of
the present research.
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Table 15: Multiple Punishments and Severity
ASSAULT - RELATED OFFENCES
PUNISHMENT COURT SCORES
Customary Court
Fine & Community Service 5
Fine & Compensation 6
Strokes & Fine 7
Fine, Community Service & Compensation 12
Stroke, Imprisonment & Compensation 12
Magistrate Court
Suspended prison term & Compensation 8
Suspended prison term & fine 8
Suspended prison term & stroke 9
Source: Extracted from general census data
Table 15 shows that the severity scores for assault-related tried in
customary courts ranged between 6 and 12 and those for cases processed in
magistrate courts the range was relatively narrow with the lower-end score
at 8 and the upper end score of 9. Customary courts also used six different
combinations of multiple punishments to punish this group of offences
whereas in comparison magistrate courts deployed half the number of
combination used by the former.
189
Table 16:
MALICIOUS DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
PUNISHMENT COURT SCORES
Customary Court
Strokes, compensation & suspended prison term 12
Strokes & suspended prison term 9
Imprisonment & compensation 9
Stroke, imprisonment & compensation 13
Fine, compensation & imprisonment 12
Fine & compensation 6
Strokes, fine & compensation 10
Strokes & compensation 7
Magistrate Court
Compensation & suspended prison term 8
Strokes & imprisonment 10
Source: Extracted from general census data
With respect to malicious damage to property the lowest and highest
severity score values for customary courts were 6 and 13 respectively. For
magistrate courts the only two multiple punishments recorded and their
values were 8 at the lower-end and 10 at the top end. Customary courts used
eight different combinations of multiple punishments. In contrast only two






Strokes & imprisonment 10
Strokes & fine 7
Strokes, fine & compensation 10
Compensation & imprisonment 9
Strokes &compensation 7
Fine &compensation 6
Fine, compensation & Imprisonment 12
Fine, Community Service & Compensation 8
Stroke, Compensation & Imprisonment 12
Stroke, fine & compensation 10
Imprisonment & Compensation 9
Strokes, Imprisonment & Compensation 13
Fine and Suspended Imprisonment 8
Compensation & Suspended Imprisonment 8
Compensation & Strokes 7
Strokes, Compensation & Suspended term 12
Magistrate Court
Fine & Suspended Prison Term 8
Compensation & Suspended Prison 8
Source: Extracted from general census data
The score range for theft-related offences in the customary courts was 6 to 13
while the magistrate courts' score was simply 8 in every instance.
Combinations of punishments deployed in customary courts were as many
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as sixteen while those used by magistrate courts for this offence group were





Strokes, Compensation^ Suspended Prison
term
12
Strokes & Compensation 7
Strokes & Imprisonment 10
Magistrate Court
Strokes & Imprisonment 10
Source: Extracted from general census data
Burglary-related offence tried in customary courts tended to attract multiple
punishments with severity scores ranging from 7-12 and of different
combinations. Those cases tried in magistrate courts attracted only one type
of combination punishment which registered a score of 10.
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Compensation & Imprisonment 9
Fine & Compensation 6
Fine and Compensation 5
Strokes & fine 7
Strokes & Imprisonment 10
Fine and Imprisonment 9
Imprisonment & Compensation 9
Compensation & Suspended Prison term 8
Source: Extracted from general census data
Only customary courts deployed multiple punishments of any description in
relation to nuisance-related offences. The severity scores for this offence
category ranged from 5 to 10.
NB: The combinations of punishments represented in table 14 to 18 were
exclusive to each court type. The only exception was the strokes and
imprisonment combination under burglary. Where the patterns showed that
the courts deployed the same type of combinations of punishments as the
other for a particular offence group, those combinations were excluded from
the tables save for the case of burglary-related offences. Very few
combinations were common to both courts.
5.5.4 Effects of Legal and Non-Legal Variables on Sentencing
In this section we take comparison of punishments imposed by magistrate
and customary courts to another level. While we have thus far considered
how customary and magistrate courts punish similar offences, we have not
considered how they punish these where offenders involved had broadly
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similar in terms characteristics and background. To do that we need to look
at the case factors involved. We need not look at all case factors as the range
of these could be potentially enormous. In this study I have restricted these
factors to a number of factors I have termed 'legal and non-legal variables'
following Martin and Simpson (Martin and Simpson 1997/1998; see also
Ashworth 1983).
Defining legal and non-legal variables
One of the central themes and founding assumptions of this study is the idea
that cases can be and are classifiable into categories 'similar' or 'different'. It
may be asked what criteria has been used to determine the boundaries or
parameters of each case or class of cases so as to make it different or similar
to the mother group or the opposite group as the case may be. It is important
to warn the reader that I have selected the criteria for differentiation on the
basis of those elements or variables that are;
(a) Common to all cases e.g. age.
(b) Reasonably discrete and therefore measurable
(c) Known to or believed to be good predictors of sentencing outcomes
The following elements have been identified for the purposes of this study as
the criteria for determining and measuring similarities or differences
between cases or classes of cases.
(a) Legal variables: this consists of variables that constitute a particular
offence category and those elements of non-demographic nature
(Martin and Simpson 1997/98,) that must be considered at sentencing
stage as a matter of law. The latter category encompasses such
elements as prior conviction, mitigating or aggravating factors. The
former refers to offence type. Aggravating factors could easily form
part of the definition or grading of the offence. Aggravating factors
may be considered separately from the offence. This may vary
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between jurisdictions (see above). I have adopted and modified a
classification system by Martin and Simpson (1997/98). The definition
provided above is my own.
(b) Non-legal variables: these include those variables that Ashworth
describes as 'demographic features of sentence' (Ashworth: 1983: 47).
However, our class of selected variables under this label is less
extensive than Ashworth's. In the context of this study the
demographic variables considered are; age, employment status and
sex. It is strictly speaking unwise to assume a water tight separation
between legal and non-legal variables because some of the latter may
be included in the factors to be considered at sentencing in terms of
the law (i.e. it may be mandatory to take them into account).
The boundaries of legal and non-legal variables are by no means clear in
every context and jurisdictions. It is important to remember that in some
jurisdiction in the United States of America the courts ignore certain factors.
Effects of Legal and Non-legal Variables on Sentencing: Legal variables
Figure 21 and Table 20 summarize and compare the effects of the various
statistical variables described in this section as legal and non-legal variables
on imprisonment. Using binary logistic regression where our dependent
variable is prison term (thus length of imprisonment) and our independent
variables are legal variables (such as previous conviction, mitigation, and
aggravation and the non-legal variables which include sex of the offender,
age, and employment status. The type of court was used as a selection
variable and the variable on plea was dropped since it was constant.
However, we established in our preliminary analysis that the number of
cases with a prison term of more than six (6) months for the customary courts
was very small; whilst for the magistrate courts the number of cases with a
prison term of less than six (6) months was not sufficient to make any
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meaningful analysis. Since some of the cases were not classified due to either
missing values in the independent variables or categorical variables.
Therefore, estimation could not be performed due to the fact that there were
no cases. Figure 21 below presents a distribution of cases with a prison
sentence for us to illustrate the inadequacies in the data set.
Figure 21: Length of prison terms: customary and magistrate courts
< 6 months 6 months and over
Length of prison sentence
Unfortunately, the other data sets did not provide information on the
dependent and independent variables of interest (as indicated earlier). I
however used this data to ascertain whether type of court had any
directional influence on the type of sentencing. A bivariate analysis was
undertaken using binary logistic regression on the following sentencing
outcomes as dependent variables: imprisonment, strokes and fine. In this
regard, the independent variable is the type of court. The results show that
the magistrate court is twice as likely as the customary court to impose a
prison term and this was significant with a p value <0.001. The data were
also analyzed to find out whether the magistrate court is more or likely to
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award strokes for a given offence, the results show that the magistrate court
is 22 times less likely than a customary court to award strokes. This was
significant with a p value <0.001. While on fines, the data shows that the
magistrate court is 1.5 less likely to impose fines the customary court. The
statistics was significant with a p value < 0.001 (also see Table 20 below).























5.5.5 Patterns, Interpretation and Analysis
Hypothesis 3: When the general use of multiple punishments was considered
for all offences, the level of use was found to be roughly similar. However, if
we consider triable-either way offences from the supplementary study we
see that patterns indicate generally higher use of multiple punishments in
customary than in magistrate courts. There was universal use of multiple
punishments in customary courts even though there were large variations in
levels of use according to offence group.
Each of the two types of court generally tended to use multiple punishments
combinations peculiar only to itself that is, not used by the other. Only a few
combinations were similar. Customary court combinations were quite varied
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whereas those of magistrate courts tended to be limited mostly to a
suspended prison plus some other punishment. Furthermore while
magistrate court combinations rarely exceeded two punishments, those of
customary courts often included up to three different punishments. So,
customary courts used a wider range of multiple punishments, across all
categories of selected triable-either-way offences namely assault-related
offences, malicious damage to property, theft-related offences, burglary and
related offences and nuisance-related offences than magistrate courts. They
also used these punishments more extensively in relation to each specific
offence group than the latter. In other words, not only were customary courts
more likely to impose multiple punishments for all the named offence
groups but they were also likely to do so more often.
Magistrate courts tended to use multiple/combined punishments very
sparingly. Conversely magistrate courts relied heavily on deployment of
one or other type of penalty on its own to punish single or non-multiple
offences in the selected offence categories. The highest level of use of
combined or multiple punishments by magistrate courts was registered
against burglary and related offences. Magistrate courts did not deploy
multiple punishments at all against nuisance-related offences though it
must be said that the number of nuisance-related offences tried in
these courts were so small as to be insignificant.
There was no offence for which customary courts did not deploy multiple
punishments. However the level of use of multiple punishments varied
enormously among the selected offences offence groups. The lowest levels of
use were recorded for nuisance-related offences and assault-related
offences. MDP had the highest level of use multiple of punishments of any
offence group.
198
Hypothesis 3A Customary courts had the highest severity scores for all of the
offence groups. The highest score in customary courts for most categories
except for nuisance-related offences was 12 or above. In contrast for
magistrate courts the highest score was 10, even then for only two out of five
offence categories. If we take into account that only effective punishment
or punishment that takes effect immediately then we find that the multiple
punishment score of magistrate courts is much lower for all offences than
is reflected by the severity scores. This is because a suspended prison term
unlike all the other punishments is only activated if the offender is convicted
of a similar offence within a given period. In the case of common nuisance-
related offences magistrate courts did not deploy multiple punishments at
all.
Even though there was not a great deal of difference in the mean scores
of the two courts for the four offence categories for which the courts
imposed multiple punishments, too much significance should not be
attached to mean scores because the differences in the number of multiple
punishment combinations imposed by customary courts was far numerous
than that of those awarded by magistrate courts which numbered two on
average. For instance, in the case of theft-related offences the customary
courts used a total of sixteen different punishment combinations while
magistrate courts deployed only two combination types.
Customary courts recorded the highest punishment scores across all the five
of offence categories under discussion. The largest difference between the
maximum score values of the two courts in respect of any offence group
was 5 points, which was registered in relation to theft-related offences.
Assaults and malicious damage to property registered a 3 points difference
in score while the smallest difference in scores was 2 points registered in
respect of burglary and related offences. Unlike customary courts,
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magistrate courts did not deploy multiple punishments in relation to
nuisance-related offences. However, the deployment of the severest
punishment, imprisonment, together with other punishments means
customary courts punish this offence group more severely relative to
magistrate courts. But, in terms of mean scores there was not a lot that
separated the two courts. The mean scores of customary courts were higher
than those of magistrate courts in respect of theft-related offences and
malicious damage to property while the situation was reversed in the case
of assault-related offences and burglary-related offences. The differences in
the mean scores of the courts for the four offence groups where multiple
punishments had been awarded ranged between 0.3 and 0 .75. The smallest
difference and biggest scores were for assault-related offences and malicious
damage to property respectively.
Hypothesis 4: Even though it was originally my intention to measure and
compare the effects of legal and non-legal variables on all primary offence
types, this was ultimately not possible due to thinness of data on strokes,
fines and compensation. This was not altogether surprising given that the
distribution of these punishments was highly skewed. In addition, the period
covered by supplementary data was rather short: 1996-2000. Looking at the
figures we find that magistrates ordered only a limited number of strokes
(10) as compared to customary courts which ordered (91) over this period. A
similar problem arose in respect of fines and compensation. In respect of the
latter magistrate courts imposed a fine in only three cases where customary
courts used it in 48 cases. As regards compensation, magistrate courts did
not order compensation at all during the period in question but customary
courts awarded it in ten cases. This made it difficult to use logistic regression




Finding5Cl: Customary and magistrate courts tended to deploy multiple
punishments' differently in relation to triable either-way offences
Finding5C2: Customary courts had the highest severity scores across all the
offences considered.
Finding 5C3: Outcomes of customary courts were less predictable than those
of magistrate courts.
5.5.7 Conclusion
The study found that the assumption that customary courts would be
more likely than magistrate courts to use multiple punishment to punish a
single offence(H3) was only partially true. When all offences tried by the
two courts were considered, the propensity to award multiple punishments
was about the same. However, when only triable-either way offences were
considered, customary courts it was clear that customary courts tended to
deploy multiple punishments more frequently than magistrate courts in
relation to those offences. When they deployed multiple punishments,
customary courts punished more severely than magistrate courts as
hypothesized under hypothesis 3A (H3), thus the results confirmed the
hypothesis. In regard to hypothesis 4 (H4), it was found that the data was too
thin to be used in a meaningful way.
5.6 General Conclusion
This chapter has presented and analysed the results of the census survey,
supplementary survey and derivative data in relation to the distribution of
offences, common disposals, uses of various punishments, quanta of




6.0 COURT OBSERVATIONS: DATA PRESENTATION AND
ANALYSIS
This Chapter provides a sketch of various dimensions of the trial process in
customary and magistrate courts, including factors that are critical in
shaping the dynamics of trials in these courts. More specifically it focuses on
those dimensions of the trial process which I considered might provide some
insight into why there are similarities and differences in outcomes of case(s)
coming before customary and magistrate courts. As such, results from the
court observations illustrate certain features typical of customary and
magistrate courts, though no claim is being made here that the cases
observed were representative of cases handled by the two types of courts in
any but limited way.
6.1 Rationale for Court Observations
According to Sarantakos (1998: 207), "literally, observation means a method
of data collection that employs vision as its main means of data collection."
In the present study court observations were intended to provide us with
insights into court settings: interaction, rules, rituals, process values and the
outcomes of cases. In that regard the court observations were meant to be
both exploratory and to enhance the researcher's knowledge and
understanding of the workings of the two systems. Secondarily, they were
intended to provide yet another perspective on the nature of, and
relationship between, court processes and outcomes in order to complement
census survey and interview data. Furthermore, court observations provided
the researcher with the opportunity to pick up new thematic threads for the
interviews, part of the inquiry as well as to fine tune and refocus questions
for the interviews.
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6.2 The Aims of the Court Observations
The overall objective of the court observations was to provide a snapshot of
different dimensions of the trial process and their relationship to case
outcomes. This part of the study sought both to describe and compare the
trial process in customary and magistrate courts along a number of
dimensions, namely organization, processes, and rules. The present study
had to straddle these elements. Literature shows that approaches to anyone
of these elements on its own are quite diverse (Carlen 1976, Conley and
O'Barr 1990, Bogosh 1999). The initial plan to use hypothetical cases and an
interaction schedule to capture some aspects of court hearings had to be
abandoned because they imposed unnecessary constraints on the ability of
the researcher to gather other information about the trial process.
6.3 The Focus of Court Observations
The primary focus of the observation was on the processes leading to and
types of resolutions that the courts arrived at in the cases that were studied. I
was initially uncertain which dimensions and aspects of these processes to
privilege over others. This is what led me to toy around with the interaction
schedule in an effort to capture the dynamics of interaction in the different
court settings. The idea was later dropped as it proved to be impractical. I
therefore went back to studying the rituals of the courts and trying to relate
them to the substance and outcomes of cases. In that broad sense this part of
the investigation revolved around how presiding officers in customary and
magistrate courts conducted criminal cases as well as their general approach
to criminal cases of various kinds.
6.4 Data Collection and Data Analysis
The court observation period, combining the pilot and study ran from June
2001 to February 2002.
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(a) Data Collection
Cases that were observed in magistrate courts were selected based on weekly
schedules put out by the court staff. A major problem in the magistrate
courts was that schedules were not entirely reliable because of the frequent
postponement of cases. To minimize the impact of this problem on progress
of the research and to avoid making needless trips to the sites, which were
some considerable distance from the main city where I was based, I kept in
close contact with court clerks. As a matter of convention customary courts
did not release any schedule of cases to be tried in advance as cases were
often dealt with on the day they were registered or early the following
morning. I therefore decided that the best strategy was to check on a daily
basis with court clerks to find out what types of cases would be coming
before the court on any given day. But often I had to simply present myself at
the court premises and then wait for the appropriate type of case to come
along.
Data was collected using manual and electronic means in form of note-taking
and audio-tape respectively. I kept a daily diary of court processes and any
unusual occurrences in and/or around the court. This information would in
turn inform further observations or other dimensions of the research process
such as the interviews. The case of State v Bogatsu and others is one such
example of observational data used in this way. An interactions schedule
was developed for use as an observation instrument but was later dropped
because it distracted from other activities taking place in the courtroom.
(b) Data Analysis
Electronically captured data was first transcribed, and in the case data from
customary courts, translated from Tswana to English, and then broken down
according to thematic threads. Hand recorded material was also summarized
according to themes. The overall purpose of the exercise was to provide a
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description and analysis of rules, practices, processes of the two types of
courts and their outcomes based on observational data.
6.5 Types of Cases Selected and Rationale for their Selection
Cases for observation were those that fell within the bracket of those triable-
either way offences described elsewhere in this thesis as assault and theft-
related offences. The main reason for selecting these offence groups was that
I considered that unlike other groups of offences they were quite common
and encompassed fairly serious to middle ranking offences that were likely
to come before both customary and magistrate courts in sufficient numbers
to enable reasonable comparisons to be made. However during the actual
study we found that delays in the processing of cases in magistrate courts
made it difficult to observe enough triable-either-way assault-related
offences to make comparisons so I decided to include Grievous Bodily Harm
which is not triable in customary courts. Below is a table of observed cases.
6.6 Observed Cases
Table 21:
Case No /Name Court Offence Disposal
Criminal Case (CR)No 123/01
S v Aupa Sekobye
CC ABH 6 months wholly suspended + 5
strokes
CR No MU 62 R. Bogatsu & 7
others
MAG ABH Charge dismissed in terms of
S32(l) of the Penal Code
S v Lucky Sekgopi CC ABH 8 months imprisonment wholly
suspended+ 5 strokes
CRNol20/01 S v Morgan. H
Molefe
CC ABH Withdrawn by Complainant
CR No 119/01 Abdulraman
Sello




CC ABH 8months imprisonment,
6months suspended +5 strokes
CR No 65/01 S v Molefe
Bajupi Dikutu
CC AC 8 months imprisonment
(reviewed)
S v Gloria Pilane (2001) MAG UW Acquitted
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S V Hans Molefe (2001) MAG UW 12 months imprisonment
wholly suspended
CR No MU 265/2001 MAG AITGBH Acquitted
CR MU184/01 S v Thabo Phiri MAG GBH 24 months suspened+P200 fine
MU175 /01 State v Onkabetse
Kabelo Mogopodi
MAG AITGBH Conclusion unknown
CRB 184/01 State v Thabo
Phiri
MAG GBH 24 months imprisonment
suspended & P200 fine
State v Moeng Moeng (2001) CC UIL 5 strokes
State v Kabo Motshegwe CC CN 4 months imprisonment wholly
Suspended and 4 strokes
CR Case No 116/01 Beauty
Phokedi
CC ST 12 months suspended. State
appealed because sentence
wrong in law
State v Modise CC CT Case withdrawn. Elders to settle
matter










MAG S 2 years imprisonment land half
suspended and 5 strokes
(Lucky) lyear imprisonment
suspended and 5 strokes
(Bajuta)
Keys: ABH: Assault Occasioning Bodily Harm; AC: Assault Common;
AITGBH: Acts Intended To Cause Grievous Bodily Harm; CC: Customary
Court; CN: Common Nuisance; GBH: Grievous Bodily Harm HBT: House
Breaking and Theft; MAG: Magistrate S: Stealing; ST: Stock Theft; UW:
UnlawfulWounding; UIL: Use of Insulting Language.
6.7 Description of court settings
(a) Urban & Rural Customary Courts
Trials in the chiefs' courts at Kanye and Mochudi took place under a Leobo, a
thatched, gazebo-like structure which has replaced the traditional roofless
wooden semi-circular fence-like structure that used to serve the same
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purpose in the Kgotla of the past. Leobo is a general purpose structure which
is essentially designed to provide shade for the head of the Kgotla, senior
members of the traditional leadership and important guests. The basic semi-
secular seating pattern remains the same for all types of gatherings including
court sessions. In terms of this seating arrangement, the Presiding Officer,
and Rememberancers (see Schaperal938) who nowadays are simply referred
to as members, if they are in attendance, form the outer-boundaries of the
semi-circle. Inside the semi-circle the defendant and the complainant would
be seated next to each other facing the Presiding Officer and the Members.
Sitting directly opposite would be the Court Clerk and the Prosecutor.
Behind these two groups would be seated members of the public also in a
semi-circular pattern. Any witnesses called would share the bench inside the
two semi-circular formations with the defendant and the complainant. At
Kanye where there was participation by members, they were free to come
and go as they pleased so that in one session as many as seven could show
up and in another as few as three might be present. Sometimes there might
be none at all as was always the case at Mochudi and Lobatse. The public at
all the three customary court sites seemed to be much less enthused by
criminal cases compared with civil cases judging by the numbers attending
court cases. Generally many more relatives of disputants attended civil cases
than did criminal cases. In the case of the latter relatives would sometimes
be absent altogether. It was mainly old men in their late fifties and upwards
who tended to go to the Kgotla to listen to cases. Women were more likely to
attend if there was a civil matter coming before the court.
The set up at the urban customary court in the town of Lobatse could not
have been more different from that of customary court at Kanye and
Mochudi. The presiding officers' office doubled up as a trial court.
According to the organization of the court the presiding officer would sit
behind an office-size mahogany table which he shared with the Prosecuting
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Officer and the Court Clerk who would sit facing each at opposite ends of the
table. The complainant and the defendant shared a bench immediately in
front of the table. There would normally be only one bench for members of
the public at the back of the room. In any case there was hardly enough room
to accommodate more than one bench. A few office chairs would be hauled
in from of other offices when more members of the public than usual showed
up to listen to a case. More often than not these were friends or relatives of
the disputants. There were no remembrancers (members) in this court. Not
surprisingly public participation in the proceedings was minimal.
(b) Magistrate Courts
The layout of the magistrate court at Lobatse, Kanye and Mochudi was
roughly similar in its dimensions as well as in terms of the allocation and use
of space among various court officials and the public. The magistrate had
her/his own private space which was linked directly to his/her office
(chambers). The magistrate would take her/his sit on a chair with a tall-back
behind a heavy wooden table on a raised platform at the front of the
courtroom. A few paces from her/his table next to the witness box would be
the Interpreter. Directly in front of the Magistrate but a good distance away
would be a table for Prosecutors and Defence lawyers if there happened to be
a defended case among the cases set for trial on the day. To the right or left
of the Magistrate but a fair distance away would be the dock for Defendants
(there might be a bench next to it to accommodate more accused persons).
At Kanye, in between the magistrate about two to three arm lengths away
from the dock occasionally would be seated the Court Orderly. The rest of
the room behind the Prosecutors would be filled with benches for use by the
general public. These benches were often empty to half-full depending on the
nature or number of cases being processed on a given day. The audience in
these courts was predominantly young to middle-aged.
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Looking at the various aspects of the design of magistrate courts, it seemed
obvious that they were planned with a purpose in mind, in that, the set up
structured interaction and probably also contributed significantly to the
atmosphere of formality pervaded in these courts. The height and position of
the magistrate meant that s/he commanded the attention of everyone in the
courtroom.
6.8 Rules and Patterns of Rule Use and Interpretation
Procedural rules governing the trial process up to and including conviction
and sentence in customary and magistrate courts were broadly similar, at
least in form and outline. The version in operation in customary courts
appeared at first glance to be a simpler and abbreviated version of those in
the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act which governs trials in the general
courts. However, it soon became clear during court observations that there
were some significant divergences in the application of rules and in the
general practice of these types of court.
Amongst the most important of these were that (i) some key areas of
procedure in the customary court trial process were regulated by customary
law, (ii) rule density and complexity varied by type of court even where the
primary rules were similar. These were amongst factors which according to
observational data were potentially consequential for conviction/acquittal
rates, withdrawals and reconciliation. There were also indications that
usage, meaning and interpretation of similar rules, differed by court. I found
that customary courts sometimes applied the rules borrowed from Criminal
Procedure and Evidence Act (CP&E) in areas that were not covered by




Case processing times varied enormously between the two courts from a few
hours to weeks or months. In customary courts, cases rarely went beyond a
day or two whereas in magistrate courts it was unusual to have a case
disposed of in less than two weeks. The pattern in the magistrate courts was
that contested cases usually took more than two weeks and defended cases
took even longer.
In magistrate courts, contested cases took three days on average to conclude
once it was clear that the defendant was not going to engage a lawyer. On the
whole, cases usually took longer in magistrate courts primarily because
most accused persons would generally indicate that they wanted to be
given time to look for a lawyer even though very few engaged lawyers in
the end. Delays could occur at any stage from the time a matter was listed
through the time it was committed for trial, before commencement of trial,
during trial stage up to the time when it would be finalized. The delays were
often made worse by postponements due to clashes in the diaries of the
magistrate, defence lawyer or the prosecution and/or the non-availability of
witnesses at critical moments in the trial.
Legal Representation
All accused persons appearing before magistrate courts were advised of the
right to engage a lawyer as required. Magistrates were provided with some
written guidance on how exactly to render advice on legal representation.
Most defendants asked to be given time to do so only to continue later on
without a legal representative. In contrast, customary courts did not advise
accused persons that if they wanted to be represented by a lawyer they could
apply to the Customary Courts Commissioner to have their case transferred
to a magistrate. It appeared that customary courts were not entirely happy
with the idea of transferring cases and were prepared to do all they could to
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frustrate efforts to do so. In any event an application did not necessarily
guarantee that a transfer would be allowed and where it was denied or
allowed no reasons were supplied for the decision. Transfers are provided
for under S. 36 of the Customary Court Act.
Other Rituals and procedures
(a) Rituals
There were very few rituals involved in the customary courts proceedings.
The general attitude was one of well ordered and respectful informality
generally associated with the Kgotla. However, the customary court at Kanye
seemed to mimic the magistrate courts in a number of areas in terms of its
rituals than the customary court at Mochudi or Lobatse. For instance, the
presiding officers would sometimes come to the area where trials were held
slightly later than everybody else in the manner of judges in the general
court and expect everyone to stand up till he was seated.
Perhaps the most important difference between Customary and magistrate
courts as far as rituals were concerned centred on the question of the oath,
especially its role and significance in matters of evidence. In the general court
oral evidence is given under oath (see S. 219 and 220 CP&E). However, an
accused person has the right to make an unworn statement on his/her own
behalf (S. 218 CP&E) but such evidence is given less weight than a sworn
statement.
Another noteworthy element in the proceedings of the two types of courts
was that the use of books and other written matter was much more
pronounced in magistrate courts than in customary courts. In the magistrate
courts I observed at least two instances where the presiding magistrate asked
both the defence and the prosecution to make written submissions,
something I was told never happened in customary courts.
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(b) Technical Issues
One of the major differences in the way the courts operated was that
defendants appearing before a magistrate without a legal representative had
technically complex issues explained to them, and where appropriate, they
were advised as to the technical defences that might be available to them.
Defendants appearing before customary courts were not accorded the same
privilege.
(c) Statement offacts and Pleading
It appeared that there was a considerable confusion in the customary courts
concerning explanation of charges to the accused person and taking of the
plea. At Kanye I observed that after the prosecutor had read the charge to the
defendant s/he would then be asked whether s/he agreed with the
statement and if s/he answers 'yes' the defendant was assumed to have
pleaded guilty. The court usually loathed to entertain any further protest
from the defendant. This was in sharp contrast to what obtains in magistrate
courts where the defendant is asked whether s/he understand the statement
of offence/facts and then asked how he pleads. The two are asked as two
separate questions. In magistrate courts emphasis was on the fact that a
guilty plea had to be unequivocal.
(d) Procedural model: adversarial or inquisitorial or mixed?
Proceedings in the customary courts tended to follow a pattern that was in
some respects similar to the inquisitorial pattern while magistrate courts
followed the adversarial model associated with the Common Law tradition.
For instance, in customary courts the judge played a far larger role in
questioning the litigants than magistrates were given to doing. The inquiring
judge is associated more with Continental tradition than it is with the Anglo-
American model (see for example Van Koppen and Penrod 2003) At the
same time, the process in the customary courts displayed features that tend
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to be associated with the latter probably due in large part to the fact that
Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules are derived from that model.
(i) Format Preference
It seemed from my observations that the preferred format for rendering
evidence in customary courts was the story format. The complainant, who
was usually treated as the first state witness, was allowed to narrate his/her
story with little interruption after which the defendant was allowed to cross-
examine him/her. At some point the defendant would then give his/her
own version of events in a similar fashion. By comparison, in magistrate
courts a relatively large part of the story was constructed through question-
answer format.
(ii) The Verdict: Telling a Good Story versus Proving Elements of the Offence
In all the cases observed in customary courts it appeared that to arrive at a
decision the court relied primarily on the plausibility of stories/narratives
provided by the disputants rather than on whether or not the prosecution
succeeded in proving elements of the offence. The story would be followed
by a relatively short question and answer session to clarify points in the story
or establish inconsistencies. The same pattern would be repeated when the
time came for the defendant to tell his/her side of the story. The narrative
pattern is closely aligned to the traditional mode that in many instances
begins with contestation over the nature of the wrong (see Roberts 1972,
Comaroff and Roberts 1981).
Apart from believability of the defendant and the complainant's stories, it
appeared that the general conduct and character of disputants influenced the
decision to convict or to acquit the accused person. It seemed that as far as
customary courts were concerned, the general conduct went to the character
of the person and therefore the likelihood of her/him having conducted
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her/himself in ways alleged by the other party or the police. Similarly, if an
individual belonged to a group whose conduct was generally or specifically
disapproved of by the community or the traditional leadership such as
young persons or unemployed young persons, that might well count
against her/him. These rather than specific elements of the offence were the
factors that customary courts considered.
I observed that when a customary court decided to convict, the formulation
would take the following general form "this court having listened to and
considered the believability of your story (defendant) and that of the
complainant/prosecution and/or having considered your general
character/honesty as a person, finds you guilty of committing such and such
an offence contrary to section such and such of the Penal Code as alleged by
the prosecution." This formulation is consistent with the weight that stories
tended to be given by customary court decisions.
By contrast, while believability or soundness of the story, and in certain
limited instances, the character of the defendant or complainant played an
important part in the conviction or acquittal of an accused person in
magistrate courts, the critical factor was whether elements of the offence
charged had been proved. Typically, when delivering her/his judgment the
magistrate would outline elements of the offence that the prosecution would
have been expected to prove to persuade the court to convict. Sometimes it
happened that some elements of the offence would only be clearly or more
fully articulated or even extended in case law rather than in the offence-
creating statute in which case the defence lawyer and magistrate would
make copious reference to case law in order to establish whether the
defendant actually committed an offence in the eyes of the law. The case of
State v Lucky Letshiviti and Bajuta Kesenyeditswe (MU217/01), observed at
Mochudi illustrates this general pattern.
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In that case the accused persons were accused of stealing tyres which they, in
their turn, claimed they had found abandoned in an open space in their
ward. In delivering its judgement the court started by establishing the
meaning of theft in the relevant section of the Penal Code which in this case
was S. 264: "it is stealing if a person fraudulently and without claim of right
takes anything capable of being stolen or fraudulently converts to the use of
any person other than the general or specific owner thereof, to take anything
capable of being stolen".
The court went on to explain what fraud meant in the context of the offence
charged which in this case was found under S. 264 of the Penal Code which
further provides that:
"A person who takes or converts anything capable of being stolen is
deemed to do so fraudulently if he does so with any of the following
intents, that is to say ...an intent to permanently deprive the general
or special owner of the thing of it".
According to the court, "the actus reus of the offence is the taking and the
mens rea is fulfilled if the following conditions are fulfilled: if the taking is (a)
without the consent of the owner (b) without claim of right and, (c)
fraudulently".
Telling a good story is an important part of a criminal case (Pennington and
Hastie 1992, Finkel 2001), the difference between systems often lies in the
rules and the assumptions supporting those rules (Wagenaar et al 1993,
Jackson 1988). These also have influences on how the stories are actually told.
However, the mental element and the act doctrine are central to the Anglo-
American system (Sebba 1980, Sistarel989; Shears and Stephensonl996).
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Burden of Proof
The most common pattern in customary courts was characterised by the
gradual shift of the burden of proof/persuasion on to the defendant so
that towards the conclusion of the case it would appear that it was not
longer the prosecution who needed to prove their case but rather the
Defendant who had proof his innocence. This is probably as a result of
the general approach of customary courts to evidence ( see Kirby 1985;
Baillie 1969; Kuperl969) and of Rule 19(h) of customary procedure rules
which encourages the court to convict, not based on elements of the
offence being proved by the prosecution, but rather based on the failure of
the defendant to give an adequate explanation or evidence to defeat the
prosecution's story.
Role of Victim
The role of the victim in customary court is rather larger than is ordinarily
allocated to such persons in the general system. The victim is not regarded as
merely a complainant and witness for the prosecution. The way
reconciliation and withdrawal were handled in the customary courts gave
the impression that the court believed essentially that the complainant
was the ultimate 'owner' of the dispute encapsulated in the often used
phrase "mong wa kgang" (owner of dispute) Customary Court (Procedure).
Rules appear to encourage this view in that rule 19(a) allows the complainant
or his relatives to assume the role of the prosecutor if there is no official
prosecutor.
Mediation and Reconciliation
Customary court judges made valiant efforts to mediate or reconcile
disputing parties regardless of the stage of trial process. No similar efforts
were observed in the magistrate courts. Customary court judges were more
likely to intervene in disputes involving neighbours, friends or relatives.
216
They were particularly keen to intervene in cases where they believed that
the offence charged masked dispute relational issues. Complainants in such
cases would often confirm that their real objective was admonishment
(,kgalemo) of the errant party and they would often withdraw the case arguing
'I am not here to start a dispute, I just want the chief to mediate/ admonish)
(ga ke atla go seka ke batla kgosi a re agisanye /a kgaleme). The use of litigation to
resolve relational issues is a noted aspect of Tswana uses of dispute (Roberts
1972, Comaroff and Roberts 1981).
6.9 Formalism, conflict and Accommodation: An illustrative case
The case below illustrates contradictions that occur when legal formalism
forces customary and general systems to confront their differences in
philosophical approach to disputes (Mochudi Magistrate Court Criminal
Case No. 62/01 the State v Richard Bogatsu and others).
The State v Richard Bogatsu and others
The case was tried at Mochudi Magistrate on the insistence of the
complainant; after the traditional authorities made clear they thought the
matter should be dealt with rather differently from the way the complainant
was proposing.
The accused persons were charged with unlawful assault on the complainant
occasioning bodily harm, after they had, in keeping with Bakgatla custom,
punished the complaint for absenting himself from his brother's funeral.
According to the indictment the accused persons used fists and a whip to
inflict harm on the complainant. They denied the charge of unlawful assault.
The accused persons were part of a gang of able-bodied men from
Mathubudukwane village, known as Diphiri, who would normally be
expected to volunteer for the task of digging the grave whenever someone in
the village was due to be buried. Diphiri literally means hyenas. There are
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no professional gravediggers in villages so able-bodied males are expected to
volunteer for the task.
The accused were part of a larger Diphiri gang that refused to participate in
the digging of the grave because the complainant and his younger brother
had absconded. Diphiri were particularly upset because it appeared that the
complainant and his younger brother did not participate in other funerals in
the village.
The complainant's father and uncle persuaded Diphiri to dig the grave and
promised that the complainant and his younger brother would be dealt with
after the funeral. When the funeral was over the Diphiri were asked to find
the two brothers and bring them before the elders where, the accused
persons would, as was the custom, administer the punishment.
The assault with fists occurred when the complaint resisted attempts to take
him to the family compound to be punished. According to Diphiri he became
abusive and threatened them with a knife. He however disputed this
including any suggestion that he did not participate in the funeral. He
claimed that sticks and stones were used to subdue him .The use of the whip
took place at the complainant's family compound before elders as
punishment for defaulting the funeral.
Amongst witnesses for the defence were the complainant's father who had
allegedly authorised the punishment, the local headman and the Acting
paramount chief of Bakgatla both of whom were involved in the case at one
point or another in an effort to reconcile the disputing parties. The
complainant's father testified as to authorisation of punishment in the extant
case and the latter testified as to the existence of the alleged custom,
permitting Diphiri to punish defaulters.
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When the matter was first reported to the police they referred the case to the
customary courts where it was hoped the matter would be settled amicably.
The complainant felt authorities were trying to deny him the right to have
the matter determined by a court of law. Thus the matter was taken to the
magistrate court for trial. There was an attempt by the family to frame the
dispute as being about duty and relationships. The complainant saw it in
narrow terms of a criminal offence, that is, as assault. Thus the manner in
which the dispute should be framed was contested from the beginning. The
Diphiri case brings out the tension between social practices, if not customary
law and state law as well as the clash between group interests (i.e. family,
community) and individual rights. In that regard it lies in the fault line
between liberal legality and the indigenous legal form.
(i) Genesis ofDispute
It appears the immediate cause of the dispute was the failure of the Powane
brothers to avail themselves for grave-digging and, more seriously, missing
the burial of their deceased brother. However the source of the dispute was
related but much broader: the complaint from the rest of the community
including close relatives of the two brothers was that the latter had not been
attending funerals in the village. The first defendant cast the complaint in
these very broad terms:
"The complainant's parents asked to dig the grave and indicated
thereafter the complainant would be called and asked to explain
why he did not participate in other villagers' funerals. It was not
his first time to default."
It appears that Diphiri decided that the only way to put an end to the
behaviour of the complainant and his brother was to put pressure on the
family by refusing to co-operate with them in the digging of the grave. It was
common course that the complainant only came back from Gaborone where
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he worked as a security guard on the Friday before the burial the following
day. The villagers would have considered his late arrival on the scene
reprehensible in itself because Gaborone is less than a hundred kilometres
from his home village. His decision to come back so late in the week would
have meant that he had not taken part in the activities that would have taken
place during the course of the week. Indeed several of the defendants
accused him of not taking part in the slaughtering and skinning of a beast
that was to be consumed at the funeral.
(ii) Escalation ofdispute and attempts at resolution
When Diphiri had decided to withdraw their labour because of the
behaviour of the two brothers the complainant's father was called to the
grave site and appraised of the situation. He was, able, together with, the two
brother's uncle, to prevail upon Diphiri to discharge their function. He
promised Diphiri that the two brothers would be called to explain their
behaviour to Diphiri after the burial.
After the funeral Diphiri raised their previous complaint with the Mpowane
brother's father who then proceeded to the complainant's compound to look
for his sons. The brothers refused to go back to the family compound with
him where Diphiri and elders from the community were waiting for them to
come and account for their behaviour. Their father then sent Diphiri to go
and collect his sons but they had already left the complainant's compound.
They were found drinking in a bar in another part of the village. The
complainant apparently received some injuries to his face when Diphiri tried
to subdue him in order to take him and his brother to the family compound.
His younger brother did not try to resist and as a result did not suffer any
injuries.
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The brothers were handed over to their parents and after some kind of
discussion it was decided that the brothers would receive two strokes each.
Diphiri were asked to choose someone amongst them to administer the
strokes and they chose accused number one to do that. According to the
defendants the complainant's father told them that if they were approached
by the police concerning punishment of the two brothers they should refer
the police to him as he was prepared to take responsibility for ordering that
his sons be punished. The complainant went to the police to report that he
had been assaulted and punished by the defendants. The police issued the
complainant with a medical report form to take to the nearest clinic or
hospital so that details of his injuries could be properly recorded by a
medical officer. So the two strokes together with injuries received during the
incident prior to that became the subject of the court case that was to follow.
It appears that when the matter was reported to the police they wanted to
seek clarification from the headman regarding the custom that allegedly
allowed Diphiri to punish defaulters. Upon hearing this, the headman called
the complainant's father to the Kgotla to explain what had happened and his
story was broadly similar to that given by the defendants during the trial. He
confirmed, as he was to do again at the trial, that he had sanctioned the
punishment of his sons.
When the police suggested that from the point of the law an assault had
occurred the headman suggested the case should be brought to the Kgotla
for trial before him. However he was adamant that under customary law
Diphiri were justified in punishing the two brothers. There was an attempt to
mediate between the parties which the police seemed anxious not to
undermine but that did not go down well with the complainant who saw it
as an attempt to frustrate his search for justice. Nevertheless the complainant
and the defendants together went to see the Acting Paramount Chief to get
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clear guidance on the issue of the custom. The latter confirmed that Bakgatla
custom allows Diphiri to summarily punish those who default from grave-
digging. The complainant was still not satisfied so he asked the police to
take his case to a magistrate court instead. This essentially meant that the
matter entered a new frame: it was no longer about the complainant's
behaviour but the allegedly unlawful conduct of Diphiri.
Interpretation of Dispute: The Chiefs' Perspective(Interview)
Question: What is the proper way of dealing with cases like Diphiri?
'The Setswana way does not recommend hasty formalisation of disputes
through the Kgotla (Customary Court). Often the matter is first discussed at
family level - because really a case like this is a family dispute- a matter for
the family. This is quiet clearly a family matter. I believe at the Kgotla the
case would be closely examined to see who is in the wrong and the Kgotla
would take a dim view of anyone who spends his time in bars while ignoring
his duty to the dead. In my view this is not a matter which the courts ought
to entertain'.
The only point the chief's representative could concede was, ' Diphiri
exceeded their authority by using sticks and stones when the complainant
offered some resistance when they tried to take him back to his father's
compound, but properly administered punishment would have been within
the scope of customary law'.
Question: What do you think of such cases?
They are legitimate as far as I am concerned. Punishment of someone who
has erred in the eyes of the villagers is intended to redeem him as a human
being. In the case you are referring to it was the complainant who had lost a
relative but he seemed unconcerned. Whilst the rest of the village gathered
at his parents compound to pay their last respects and help with
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preparations for the funeral he thought he would rather spend his time in the
bar drinking. He was being called to order here.
Question: But wouldn't you say the action taken by the villagers was illegal?
Answer: 'Yes received law says it is but in terms of customary law it is not.
Setswana law does accommodate such things. I think Setswana law and
received law should be properly aligned to avoid such conflicts'.
Question: How can these laws be aligned?
Answer: 'That is difficult a question -1 think what probably could be done- is
for the other courts- the government courts- and customary courts to set up a
forum where laws could be examined to see how they could be harmonised.
If possible there should be a gentlemen's agreement for each type not to
interfere with the other's way of doing things. In that way when the
community has dealt with an errant individual according to Setswana
custom/law like in the case we have been talking about then there wouldn't
be any problems'.
NB: The Diphiri tradition is no longer alive in the main village (Mochudi) but
it has been maintained in the outlying villages.
Magistrate (Interview)
Question: How sensitive are the general courts to the values of the local
community?
Answer: 'The law does not exist in a vacuum. The societal aspect of it should
not be forgotten. But also if our customs and traditions are repugnant to or
inconsistent with the national law - the constitution- they cannot be
enforced'.
223
Looking at the Diphiri case, the problem we had is that it is a cultural
practice, which is supposed to be observed, and the Complainant in this case
did not observe the practice and the villagers proceeded to mete out their
own form of justice on him. It was not authorised by an appropriate
authority - a competent authority like a headman having duly sat and
ordered how it has to be carried out in a more humane way as it were. In this
case it was like they took the law into their own hands.
He had erred according to customary law but the way it was now carried out
was repugnant to the Constitution, which says that a person should not be
subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment.
There was no supervision as to how corporal punishment was to be carried
out - he had erred yes but it was supposed to be carried out in a proper
manner. Our condemnation was with regard to the way it was handled
because even the Paramount Chief came and said yes, it is part of our
custom. But it was to be presided over by a competent authority to say, "You
have erred and this how we are going to deal with your case". The Diphiri
wanted to mete out on their own -it might lead to disastrous consequences -
death of a person, serious injury to a person- because the infliction of
punishment is not supervised by anyone - there must be someone to say we
should stop here like they do in cases in the customary court. If they just do it
on their own - it is not supervised - it should not be done by the alleged
complainant or those who feel that he has violated the custom - that was our
point of departure.
Accused Persons Perspective (Court Interactions)
Accused Number 3:
"Is not our practice and custom that if someone does not co-operate with the
community he is supposed to be whipped? If somebody refuses to be one of
the gravediggers the punishment for that person is lashing".
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Prosecutor: "When somebody has defaulted from digging who authorises the
lashing?"
Accused No. 3:"The gravediggers are the ones who can make such a decision
on the defaulter. However in this case the complainant's father gave them
permission".
Prosecutor: "Do you know that to assault someone is an offence?"
Accused No. 3: "When you assault someone it is a crime but if the person
concerned is a gravedigger it is not an offence".
Prosecutor: "Where does the lashing of the defaulter on the digging take
place?"
Accused No. 3: "Wherever the gravediggers find it fit to do so whether it is at
the cemetery or at home".
Views of Headman (Courtroom Interaction)
"I was not at the funeral and I cannot exactly state to the court what actually
transpired. What I remember is that the accused persons at one stage came to
my office with a certain Mr Mpokong on the complaint that Mpokong had
been assaulted. They explained to me how he came to be assaulted.
In response I explained to Mpokong that it is in fact true it is our cultural
practice that if a man fails to be part of those who went to dig a grave, which
are commonly known as Diphiri they have to be whipped".
Context of Dispute
Before I go on to consider specific aspects of the dispute process as they
relate to the present case I would like to comment on aspects of the social
context which make matters at the heart of the case so important.
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State v Bogatsu and others revolved around social relationships and the duties
and obligations that attach to such relationships. The conflicts leading to the
present case centred on the apparent failure of the Powane brothers to attend
funerals in the village. It was the default from their brother's funeral that
evidently brought matters to a head. When Diphiri resolved not to co-operate
with the family in the digging of the grave the Powane brothers' father found
that the only course of action open to him at that point was the promise to
have his sons punished after the funeral was over. The sons were clearly not
young persons still under the care of their parents but rather adults, at least
one of whom, notably the complainant had a compound of his own. He was
aged 24 years of age at the time of the trial. Thus we see the family acting in
concert with Diphiri to enforce conformity with norms.
Attendance of and participation in the burial of a departed relative is
something Batswana take extremely seriously. As is the case with a marriage,
a funeral provides the opportunity for the affirmation of ties among family
and kin by mere presence as well as through the performance of assigned
roles and rituals associated with death. The rest of the village, or ward in the
case of large villages, is expected to come to the compound for prayers every
evening until the eve of the burial day when an all-night wake is held.
Preparations for the funeral usually take anything between a week and two
weeks and the family spares no expenses to feed the crowds that come to pay
their respects to the dead person. Depending on the circumstances of the
family concerned, one or two beasts and several goats may be slaughtered in
the period leading to and including the day of the burial.
Because of the range and scale of activities involved, able-bodied men and
women from the community at large are expected to help out and they are
generally guided by members of the family as to how they may assist.
Digging of the grave is one of the activities that require the participation of
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villagers at large. How the team responsible for digging is organised varies
somewhat between communities but some communities like the community
in the present case still follow the old pattern where young men are, on the
pain of punishment, expected to participate. It is even more serious therefore
for any member of the affected family to default from grave-digging because
it will be perceived by many people as undermining social relations and
social cohesion in the sense that it threatens established patterns of co¬
operation and reciprocity of support in the village. So breach of norms such
as that which occurred in present case sets the stage for further escalation or
de-escalation of the conflict until a point of resolution is reached.
Analysis: Formalism and customary court processes
The case of The State v Bogatsu and others discussed above illustrates how
legal formalism has transformed the Tswana dispute process. The possibility
of contestation over the construction of the dispute which has always been an
integral part of the dispute process in customary courts has been excluded by
the requirement that the conduct complained of must constitute an offence
under written law. Customary law allowed both disputants, not just the
complainant, to frame the dispute especially where there was disagreement
over the exact nature of the dispute (Comaroff and Roberts 1981, Roberts
1972). In other words disputants could negotiate to decide what exactly the
dispute was about.
Under current arrangements it is required that if a complainant wants to
initiate a criminal proceeding the complainant must report the matter to a
court clerk or a police officer who must satisfy him/herself amongst other
things that the conduct complained of constitutes an offence under the law.
Thus the agent to whom the matter is reported becomes the arbiter on the
nature and boundaries of the dispute. The assumption underlying this model
is that the nature of the dispute must be determined before the proceedings
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start. This model of dispute processing is based on the legal formalist
approach of the common law courts but all courts including customary
courts are expected to follow it. However, before the 'unification' of
substantive criminal law the general scheme of the dispute process in
customary courts offered various entry points into and options in the
construction of the dispute. Contestations over the framing of the dispute are
excluded by the written law test and formalisation of the laying of charges.
This issue has from time to time caused a great deal of friction between
indigenous and received courts as well as between the traditional leadership
and politicians. Customary courts and disputants often find that the formal
process excludes and undermines to a great extent negotiability of disputes
in the broad sense of the term. Thus in the eyes of customary courts the
substance of certain disputes is considered malleable and negotiable so that
it is conceivable for a dispute that began its life as a criminal suit to the cross
boundary altogether to be determined more or less as a civil dispute.
The first problem is that the dispute framework within which both
customary and magistrate courts are expected to operate (described above) is
based on legal formalist approach of the common law courts. While it is
technically correct as an account of what should happen and what probably
happens in the majority of cases it neglects the process of dispute
construction. The formal process excludes and undermines to a great extent
negotiability of disputes in this broad sense.
Secondly, the problem is that the model appears to assume that crimes that
are similar at a formal level (indictment) in the sense described in the
opening statement of this introduction are normatively similar on every level
save for the influence of evidence and procedure rules. Is it justified to
assume that if apparently similar offences were tried in customary and
magistrate courts they would be uniformly similar at normative level
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(principles and meaning-structure) across offences, the influence of
procedure on substantive law, notwithstanding?
6.10 Findings
Finding6A: Compared to customary court judges, magistrates engaged
complainants and defendants in the reconciliation process, whether formal or
informal, rather far less than the former.
Finding 6B: Compared to magistrate courts, customary courts did not appear
to concern themselves with elements of the offence except in an indirect way
through the stories told to the court by the defendant and the prosecution.
Not only did customary courts appear not base their convictions on an
analysis of the elements of the offence but they also did not refer to any case
law explaining the meaning of or principles underpinning their decisions.
6.11 Summary
As far as processes are concerned, a number of differences between the two
legal systems that could potentially affect outcomes emerged. These included
procedural and rule-related differences such as whether defendants were
allowed to engage a lawyer and whether they were advised by the court as to
the availability of technical defences. Lawyers were allowed to represent
their clients in magistrate courts and those who did not have a legal counsel
were advised by the court as to availability of technical defences while those
tried before customary courts did not have access to both.
There was also a large difference in the case processing of the two types of
courts. Magistrate courts almost invariably took longer to process cases than
customary courts. There were also some interesting and significant
differences in the way the protagonists in these courts presented their
evidence and how the court arrived at a verdict. With respect to presentation
the structure of presentation in magistrate courts was predominantly
question-answer whereas in the customary court it was the story format that
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dominated. As regards proof, customary courts tended to rely heavily on
believability of complainant's/defendant's story while magistrate courts
wanted elements of the offence proved before they return a guilty verdict.
Another important difference in the way the courts dealt with cases generally
was that customary courts judges went to great lengths to try and mediate
between the disputing parties, and where possible reconcile the parties. They
were prepared to do this before commencement of trial, during the trial or
after the trial particularly where they felt that the charge the defendant was
being tried on was not the 'real' issue. The case of Richard Bogatsu and
others v State most graphically illustrates the difficulties engendered by legal
formalism both in terms of framing disputes and their negotiability.
6.12 Conclusion
This chapter has presented and examined data from interviews with court
staff and from court observations in customary and magistrate courts at three
different sites. Interviews were intended to provide an insight into the
organizational dynamics of the courts from the perspective of the agents
who drive the court process, namely court staff while court observation
provided information on rules, court processed and rituals that possibly
impact on outcomes of cases that are processes by the courts.
230
CHAPTER SEVEN
7.0 INTERVIEW: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
In this chapter I present and discuss qualitative data from the study collected
using interviews. The chapter summarizes and discusses the background of
court personnel as well as processes and organizational dynamics of the
courts as seen from the perspective of the subjects. The precise issues
considered in the chapter were selected based on pre-defined indicative
themes and themes that emerged during interviews as the most intensely or
extensively discussed.
7.1 The Role of Interviews
Consistent with the Concurrent Nested Strategy (CNS) as described in the
methodology chapter, the interviews served to complement quantitative data
by giving us an insight into issues surrounding criminal trials in customary
and magistrate courts from the perspective of key court personnel. As Kvale
put it, the qualitative interview "attempts to understand the world from the
subject's point of view, to unfold the meaning of peoples' experiences, to
uncover their lived world prior to scientific explanations" (Kvale 1996:1).
In this study the interviews were intended to solicit the subjects' views
regarding court processes generally, including personal and organizational
factors that form the context for the exercise of decision-making powers
by customary and magistrate court judges. More specifically, the exercise
entailed delving into the background, training and role perception of
presiding officers and other key court personnel. As it became clear that the
problems surrounding technical skills and other competences were
considered by the subjects to be the most serious challenge facing the courts,
the interviews focused more on the views and impressions of these officers
regarding their own, and other key personnel's effectiveness in performing
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their assigned functions in criminal trials. The significance of another theme,
namely the relationship between customary courts and higher bodies
responsible for appeals or reviews became apparent during early interviews.
As such it became imperative to interview officers in the review and
appeal structures so as to hear their views regarding the nature of the
relationship between these bodies and customary courts to the extent that
such a relationship had a bearing on the outcome of cases. Accordingly a
Member of Customary Court of Appeal and Assistant Customary Courts
Commissioner were incorporated into the list of potential interviewees.
7.2 Selection of Respondents
Selection of subjects for interview was based on convenience/purposive
sampling. In the present study it meant using as subjects some of the officers
that I met during court observations. In that way convenience sampling was
judged to be less time consuming and less costly than other approaches
especially that interviews had to be done concurrently with the census
survey and court observations. This obviated the need to find additional sites
purely for sampling purposes. So the interviews were conducted at the main
site, namely Mochudi, and the two pilot sites of Kanye and Lobatse. Only
two interviews were conducted outside these three areas. Those interviews
involved the two individuals working in higher bodies responsible for
review of and appeals from customary court cases who were interviewed in
Gaborone, the capital city, where they were based.
The following court personnel were interviewed for purposes of this section:
Court Clerk(2) , Court Recorder(l), Interpreters(1) Local Police(2), Botswana
Police(2), Assistant Customary Courts Commissioner(l), Member of
Customary Court of Appeal(l), Customary Court Presiding Officers(3) and
Magistrates(3). The above list does not necessarily include all officers in
the various cadres who worked at the three sites at the time of the study.
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All the officers selected had, with the exception of the Court Recorder, the
Assistant Customary Courts Commissioner and Member of the Court of
Appeal, been involved in at least some of the cases that the researcher
actually observed during the course of the study.
7.3 The Interview Process
Interview data was captured using an audio-tape and by means of hand¬
written notes. A semi-structured interview instrument with indicative
themes and questions was used as a guide. The semi-structured nature of the
interviews allowed us, as the discussion that follows shows, to pursue new
themes as they emerged whether as a result of probing or as a result of
events which I believed provided an opportunity for greater insights into the
normative practices of the two types of court such as the case of State v
Bogatsu and others.
7.4 Data Analysis and Presentation
Various materials from interviews are presented using three different
formats in this section. First, material relating to biographical profiles is
presented on its own in tabular form in order to provide a general picture
concerning the experience, skills and level of education of key court
personnel. As the sections that follow indicate, these areas emerged as
dominant themes in both courts. Second, case studies are used to provide an
in-depth view of the experiences and perspectives of selected individuals
regarding various themes/issues. Third, to conclude analysis of interview
material, a summary based on general interview data covering various
themes contained in the indicative interview instrument including themes
that emerged during the course of the study or interview, is presented.
7.5 Data Analysis Procedures
The approach adopted in this part of the study for purposes of data analysis
blends different strategies. As a rule researchers tend to approach analysis of
qualitative data in one of two ways. They either employ a specific approach,
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for instance grounded theory or prefer an approach that combines elements
from a variety of approaches (Thomas 2003). Those who prefer the latter
route generally avoid giving a label to their approach. This study follows the
latter approach. I did this primarily for two reasons. First, the study
generated a large amount of qualitative data owing to the use of more
than one method to capture interview data though it must be said that it is
not unusual for qualitative methods to produce dense data. Still, analyzing
the data provided a significant challenge due to the amount of information
generated. Second, the semi-unstructured nature of the interviews meant that
themes multiplied or diverged from indicative thematic guidelines as the
interviews developed. Thus I considered that data would be more usefully
dealt with by borrowing from different approaches without committing to
a specific label.
In practical terms it meant the analysis process started with data reduction
(Miles and Huberman 1984:24, Miles and Huberman 1994:10) and
thematizing (Kvale 1996:83) both of which involved a series of steps
including the following:
1) Summarizing information relating to different questions and themes
so as to determine the direction and thrust suggested by each thematic
thread.
2) Transcribing the taped version of the interviews for detailed analysis
to enable the researcher to pick out new or promising threads.
3) In the case of interviews with customary court personnel, transcribing
was followed by translation of interview material from Tswana into
English.
4) Selection of excerpts that succinctly captured themes or views of
respondents regarding a particular theme/issue.
5) Selection and evaluation of material for case studies.
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7.6 Guideline/Indicative Themes
A number of indicative themes for interviews were developed at proposal
stage to guide the research process based on literature review (Chapter
Three) and the researcher's own knowledge of the two systems. As might be
expected, at that stage the researcher's knowledge of some aspects of the trial
process in magistrate and customary courts was not yet fully formed. Certain
indicative questions turned out to be too vague and general to be of much
use and so had to be discarded. Questions relating to urban courts became
redundant as well following a decision to exclude urban sites from the study.
Early interviews led to a review of questions and a change of focus in
subsequent interviews (see Miles and Huberman 1994). In terms of the
original instrument, the interviews covered the following themes:
i) Biography:
This part of the instrument was concerned with demographic information
and the general profile of the subjects as it related to their work in the
criminal justice system and beyond as well as their perceptions regarding
these.
ii) Role Perception:
Questions under this heading were intended to provide an insight into the
interviewees' appreciation of their own role in the trial process.
iii) Range ofPower:
The aim here was to obtain information regarding the extent of the
sentencing powers individual presiding officers of the courts covered.
iv) Views on the Interface between Customary and General Courts
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The aim of the questions under this heading was to find out about the
general relationship between the courts as well as the attitude of key
court personnel of one type of court to the other.
v) General Views on the Criminal Justice System:
Under this section the subjects were given the opportunity to make more
wide ranging comments about punishment and the criminal justice system
generally.
It was hoped that taken together the above themes would enable us to begin
to appreciate how the two systems diverged or converged, if not at the level
of normative practice then at least in terms of normative views of key court
personnel.
7.7 Emerging Themes
Even though the indicative themes outlined above and specific questions
falling under those themes guided the interview process (see Silverman 2000,
Jorosi 2004), they developed in ways I had not anticipated during the actual
interviews. The semi-structured nature of the interview instrument allowed
the direction of the interviews to be influenced by events that were observed
or that occurred during the course of the study. Sometimes these new ideas
developed into independent themes. As indicated in the preceding sections,
some sub-themes fell away during analysis as some of the questions proved
not to be relevant or useful. This in turn necessitated a review of themes as
data analysis proceeded.
Thus ultimate importance of any particular theme was determined to a
considerable degree by information obtained from early interviews which
pointed us in the direction of critical issues. New themes and ideas were
picked up or pursued depending on their relevance to the goals of the
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study and as well as on the intensity and depth of interest displayed by the
subjects in relation to those particular issues or themes. I found that there
were differences between the two types of courts as regards the degree of
emphasis on or predominance of particular themes and issues over others.
7.7.1 Other Salient Themes
The most important unusual or unique event out of which developed several
thematic threads was the case of State v Bogatsu and others. However, because
the case appeared to highlight some of the areas of difficulty brought about
by 'unification' of criminal law, the judges of the two courts at Mochudi were
asked for their opinions regarding the case. Several features made the case
unique. First, it followed a classic pattern of the Tswana disputes in cases
revolving around familial relationships as described by Comaroff and
Roberts (1981 chapters 3,4 and7) in Rules and Processes in that there was a
major disagreement regarding whether the dispute was about family
relations or alleged assault. Second, it brought to the fore a welter of issues
that define and characterize the relationship between the two systems on
the one hand, and between these legal systems and the local
communities they serve on the other. More abstractly, it highlights the
tensions in the relationship between legal cultures and social cultures as well
as issues of value conflict between the two legal systems arising from legal
formalism.
7.8 Case Studies
The case studies were intended to provide focused narratives and analyses of
various themes based on perspectives of selected individuals. As a research
method the case study may take different forms and according to Yin
(1993:xi), it is the appropriate method to adopt "when an investigator
desires to (a) define topics broadly and not narrowly, (b) cover contextual
conditions and not just the phenomenon of the study , and (c) rely on
multiple not singular sources of evidence." It may be surmised from the
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stated aim of the case studies outlined in the opening statement of the
present section that in this inquiry the primary emphasis was on (b).
Because of limitations of space, the case studies under consideration in this
section cover only two individuals, namely the presiding officers interviewed
at the main research site, one from the customary court and the other from
the magistrate courts. However, there was not much to separate one
customary court judge or magistrate from another as far as their views
regarding substantive issues were concerned. Material from the case studies
was incorporated into the summary based on all interviews presented in
closing section of this part of the study.
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ASCCM 59 Certificate in Law llyears Court Interpreter,
Court clerk
None
CCAPM 72 1 12 years Retired civil
servant
None
Keys: POM: Presiding Officer Magistrate; POC: Presiding Officer
(Customary); BP: Botswana Police; LP: Local Police; CCLC: Court Clerk
(Customary); INT: Interpreter; ASCCM: Assistant Customary Courts
Commissioner; CCAPM: Customary Court of Appeal (Member).
Overall most officers had not undergone technical training to a recognized
professional level even in their own field. If we exclude presiding officers,
prosecutors were the most likely to have received broadly relevant training
though whether the training was adequate or not is a different matter. A few
officers had received training of some sort at workshops and other
forums, even that type of training was designed by or for their own
department. These training exercises tended to be short. Even so, quite a
number of court staff had not received training of any description at all.
Amongst presiding officers, only magistrates had undergone training to a
professional level. The customary court president who had received any
training at all had received only rudimentary training. All the three presiding
officers had worked as civil servants at one point or another in their lives.
While the other two indicated had not received any training, the presiding
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officer at the Mochudi said he had received general training for his role as a
presiding officer.
Case Study I: Presiding Officer Magistrate I (POMI)
Biographical Narrative
POMI, was an expatriate lawyer from one of the neighbouring countries who
was working as a magistrate at the time of the interview. He was the most
senior magistrate based at Mochudi at the time of the study. POMI worked
along side another junior expatriate lawyer, POM2, whom he was inducting
into the job. POMII had evidently been sent to Mochudi to replace another
magistrate who had been sent to another district on transfer. At the time of
the interview, POMI had been working as a magistrate for 12 years and
was only a few days from his 35th birthday. He had previously worked as a
magisterial assistant. POMI indicated that he held a Bachelor of Law
(honours) and a Bachelor of Law.
Role of Magistrate in Undefended Cases
According to POMI, a magistrate has an onerous obligation to explain to
the accused person special defences that may be available to the accused
and also explain to him/her procedures as the person may be
overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the court in cases where the accused
person has not engaged a defence lawyer. He explained:
"Some are just illiterate so the court has to go out of its way to
ensure that the accused person gets a fair trial. Of course when the
accused is represented the court takes it that the lawyer will do a
competent job because he is a professional".
Training and performance of key court personnel
POMI believed that the performance of both prosecution and interpreters
was well below what might be expected for magistrate courts because they
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were not trained to a professional level in the requisite areas. He reserved the
harshest criticism for prosecutors whom he suggested regularly failed
victims of crime and must be withdrawn from magistrate courts at the
earliest opportunity. According to POMI the weaknesses of police
prosecutors were often exposed in defended cases and often there was
nothing the court could do to help:
"Although the court is not like an umpire in a game of tennis
it cannot be seen to be directing him to how he should go
along with his case-how he should proceed- even if you can
see that the case is going down the drain. There are certain
instances where the court can do that but where it goes to lack of
training then it's something else."
POMI said police prosecutors including senior officers sometimes failed at
even very basic prosecutorial functions such as applying for exhibits
especially documents to be admitted into evidence.
In POMI's view interpreters lacked appropriate training thus comprising the
quality of justice in magistrate courts:
"Any poor interpretation on the part of the interpreter might cause
an otherwise guilty person to go scot free or even an innocent
person to be convicted. There has to be accurate and proper
translation of the proceedings by the court interpreter. The duty of the
interpreter is to accurately and honestly translate the proceedings so
that the accused person, the witnesses and the court can follow what
is happening".
State v Bogatsu and others (The Diphiri Case)
As it happened POMI was the presiding officer in the Diphiri case, so I asked
him to comment on some aspects of this unique case as soon as it was
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concluded. The case was important in that it illustrated sharply some of the
normative concerns in Botswana's dual legal system at the heart of this
study. A little background is necessary here.
The case started as an informal family/community matter concerning two
brothers who were thrashed on the orders of their father because they did
not attend funerals in the village, including that of their own sibling. The
villagers had decided not to assist the family to dig the grave for their
relative until the dispute with the family had been resolved. They only
agreed to co-operate after the father promised them that his sons would be
dealt with according to custom after their brother had been laid to rest. After
the funeral the grave-diggers (Diphiri) were instructed to bring the two
brothers to the family compound to be punished. The family decided that
they should be given strokes as punishment. The grave-diggers were asked
to administer the strokes. One of the brothers believed that the punishment
was illegal so tried to lodge a complaint of assault against the grave-diggers
at the local customary court. But the presiding officer there refused to
entertain the matter arguing that it was Kgatla tradition to punish men who
failed to attend funerals in that way. He referred the disputants to the Chief's
court but that the court took the same view as the lower court so refused to
try the case as a criminal matter. It was subsequently tried before a
magistrate court. Both the two types of courts and parties on the different
sides of the disputes could not agree whether the dispute should be regarded
as a family matter falling outside the purview of criminal law or as a matter
involving criminal wrongdoing.
Apparently aware of the social implications of the case the magistrate court
stopped short of a conviction, as it is allowed to do in cases where it
considers it may not be expedient to go all the way (See S32(l) PC). Asked
why the court did not proceed to conviction POMI said that the court had to
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be sensitive to social aspects of cases as the law does not exist in a vacuum.
He noted that at the same time if customs and traditions of a community are
repugnant or inconsistent with national law they can not be enforced. In his
view the problem in the Diphiri case was that the defendants had not been
authorized by the appropriate authority like a headman having duly sat and
ordered how punishment was to be carried out in a humane way. However,
he also believed that the complainant had erred in failing to observe a
cultural practice that was intended for the greater good.
Case Study 2: Presiding Officer Customary I(POCI)
Biographical Narrative
POCI became a presiding officer in 1990 after retiring from the civil service.
At the time of the interview he was in his 60s and had been a judge in
the chief's court for eleven years. As part of the preparation for his role
as judge he had attended a 3week course, which as far as he was
concerned, was completely inadequate preparation for the role.
Training and performance of key court personnel
POCI saw poor performance of some customary court judges and police
prosecutors as one of the critical issues facing customary courts today. In the
case of the former he suggested that there was direct relationship between
performance and training. According to him an induction course such as the
one he had undergone himself lasting three weeks was far from adequate
considering the responsibility that presiding officers must shoulder.
Accordingly it was important to train court clerks as well to ensure that
they would be in a position to rescue unskilled and ineffectual presiding
officers:
"\ think they must be taught about cases -even if it is a short
course -to learn about cases to be able to guide presiding officers
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if they seem to be in danger of going off track. That would
really help."
POCI also believed that it was essential to train court clerks if only to
motivate them to work harder.
As far as police prosecutors were concerned POCI suggested that the
problem was not simply that the officers were poorly trained but rather that
they were invariably junior officers whom he felt were more likely than
senior officers who prosecuted in magistrate courts, not to be properly
trained. POCI asserted that officers assigned to customary courts simply did
not know how to conduct cases which indicated that their training probably
lacked depth.
Punishment ofWomen and Young Persons
POCI had some fairly strong views regarding the exemption of females and
certain sections of the youth persons from corporal punishment. In his view
not only did these restrictions interfere with the traditional way of doing
things but they blunted the effect of punishment to a point where it had
lost meaning and was no longer a deterrent to errant youths. POCI
suggested that the process of dealing with young offenders was faulty from
the start. According to him, under existing arrangements those aged 17 or
under were not really subject to a trial in the proper sense of the word since
they had to be tried in the presence of a Social Worker and other
considerations came into play when it came to sentencing: " for instance,
where a young offender might have been sentenced to corporal punishment
or a term in prison were S/he an adult, S/he would instead be returned
into the care of a SocialWorker."
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In POCI's view this way of dealing with young offenders was at odds with
Tswana culture as it makes it difficult to use corporal punishment in the
traditional manner:
"We have a problem with this approach. According to our culture we
consider that corporal punishment helps build the character of young
people."
POCI believed that the effect of the prohibitions or restrictions on the use of
corporal punishment on young persons under the age of 18 and females
generally (SI7 (2) CCA), was that these groups engaged in anti-social and
criminal conduct in the knowledge that corporal punishment did not apply
to them and in the case of the former, knew their parents would pay any fine
that the court might impose as punishment on their behalf. He further noted
that when gender intersected with age, as was the case with respect to girls,
the menu of penalties available to the judges became even narrower:
"When it comes to sentencing you might find she is underage, and
as result the choice of penalties available to court is even more
limited so you are not able to impose punishment you consider
appropriate for that case. You cannot, for instance, sentence her to
thrashing, even if that would, in your view, have been the
appropriate remedy because the law does not allow it. All you can
do is sentence her to a fine, and if she defaults she goes to prison.
But the department of prisons has been complaining time and
again that prisons are full which means the only available
penalties are the fine and corporal punishment. But the law
prohibits the infliction of corporal punishment on girls and
women."
POCI said he did not believe that girls should be exempted from corporal
punishment as they had the propensity to get involved in crime especially
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theft-related crime, just like the boys, sometimes even breaking into
people's houses on their own or together with boys. However, he observed
as a general point that since moving to Mochudi he had come to believe that
the most common theft-related offence committed by girls was shoplifting.
According to him, existing restrictions made it difficult to use punishment to
mould the character of young girls to the same extent that the courts were
able to do with boys over the age of 17. He thought that a combination of a
suspended prison term and thrashing was being used with some success on
boys. However, he still felt that the approach of customary courts to the
problem of wayward youths was comprised by the dominant law "as a result
sometimes you find you are really just doing what the law says."
But POCI believed that these were not the only factors that made it difficult
to find the correct penalty or arrive at the correct balance of punishments to
fit individual cases. According to him, there were other factors, the most
serious of which was overcrowding in the prisons. He said overcrowding
meant that the courts had to resort to strokes/thrashing more often in order
to ease pressure on the prison system. Incidentally the Penal code has been
recently amended to allow more extensive use of corporal punishment as a
substitute for imprisonment (Penal code (Amendment) Bill 2004).
POCI observed that when all these problems were taken together the effect
was that there was no real difference between the way the general courts and
customary courts dealt with offences. However, he indicated that he would
like to see customary courts being given more leeway to punish offenders,
especially young offenders, according to their own philosophy.
Withdrawals and Reconciliation
POCI said that withdrawals and reconciliation were to be expected especially
that disputes often involved people who were closely related in one way or
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another. In his view customary courts were generally sensitive to this as they
often allowed disputing parties to settle matters at home where possible. He
observed that:
"Disputes sometimes develop within the family and one of them
may, in the heat of the moment run off to lodge a complaint which
then becomes a court case. It often happens that they reconcile
before formal adjudication takes place and ask that the case be
withdrawn because they have or believe they will resolve the
dispute at home".
On the other hand he observed that pressure to dispose of cases quickly
meant that presiding officers had little time to find out about issues
surrounding individual complaints as they might have done in the past and
as a result it might appear to the casual observer that they did not generally
do enough to push complainants and defendants to settle disputes outside
court. He said, however, that he believed that it was always better to find less
acrimonious ways to settle disputes than through court cases especially
where the misunderstanding involved family, friends or neighbours.
Customary Courts and Appeals/ Review Bodies
POCI was categorical in his view that the reviews conducted by the District
Commissioner (DC) did not anyway benefit customary courts, if anything
they were, in his opinion, a hindrance to the work of traditional leaders.
Section 38 of the CCA invests District Commissioners (subsumed under
the category of Administrative Officer), in their capacity as magistrates,
with revisory powers over customary courts decisions. POM said that, in
his view, DCs had little understanding of customary courts' decisions since
handling cases was not their primary function. He gave the following
example to drive the point home:
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"There was a case recently involving a young man who used
insulting language against his mother and even man-handled her.
But the DC freed him so the DC's reviews are for us not
satisfactory."
POCI further argued that in any event DCs had no legal training. He said he
believed that magistrates should review cases from customary courts
otherwise cases should be sent to the Customary Court of Appeal as that
would be more acceptable to customary courts.
State v Bogatsu and others (The Diphiri Case)
It was POCI's belief that the Diphiri case demonstrated clearly that there was
a misalignment between customary law and received law in some areas
which needed to be addressed urgently. I asked POCI to comment on the
Diphiri case to get his views on cases of this nature generally and if he was
aware of the specifics of the case to discuss the implications of its various
aspects for the customary system. As is it turned out he was aware of the
case as the headmen of the village where the case originated had referred the
disputants to the chief's court when he found it too difficult for him to
resolve. As one of the senior tribal leaders based at the chief's court he had
been consulted by the regent about the case.
POCI saw Diphiri as part of a wider failure of criminal law to adequately
address the problem of disorderly or unbecoming conduct among the youth,
generally. He said he did not believe the accused persons had acted
unlawfully in terms of Tswana law but only in terms of received law.
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7.10 Summary: Interviews
The Most Important Issue Confronting Customary and Magistrate Courts
was Training
Training was considered by all interviewees to be the most critical issue
facing customary and magistrate courts. The relationship between poor,
inadequate or inappropriate training and performance of key court
personnel emerged not only as the most recurring theme but also the most
intensely discussed topic in the interviews with the subjects. Thus it became
the dominant theme in the interview part of the study.
There was a general consensus among those interviewed that certain key
personnel concerned with the trial stage in the criminal process lacked
appropriate training (see Republic of Botswana 1971(a), Kirby 1985, Boko
2000). These officers were, in order of importance, customary court presiding
officers, prosecutors, court interpreters and court clerks. In the context of the
trial process these are individuals whose competences and skills, are not only
vital to how a trial is conducted but may also, depending on the combination
of circumstances, shape the outcome of the case albeit to varying degrees.
There was a belief, shared by all, that both magistrate and customary courts,
more particularly the latter, were severely affected by the strain of having to
rely, in vital areas, on untrained personnel or personnel with less than
adequate training in criminal law and related subjects to drive the trial
process. This was regarded as having a damaging effect on the criminal
justice system as a whole. The prevailing state affairs was considered by all
as both unsatisfactory and a source of concern. In other words there was a
general acknowledgement and concern that practices of the courts fell short
of normative standards in certain important respects and in certain
important areas because of lack of properly trained staff (see Bouman 1984).
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Training was therefore regarded as both an urgently required short term
measure and a long term solution. However, most thought that it was
important to re-train staff currently in post to arrest the problem and
improve performance. It perhaps underscores the severity of the problem
from the perspective of the interviewees that they regarded training first
and foremost, as a remedial measure.
For most key personnel, with the possible exception of court clerks and court
interpreters, some exposure to criminal law was considered by all those
interviewed to be essential.
(1) Presiding Officers
(a) Magistrates
Of all the cadres of court staff who were the focus of this segment of the
study, magistrates were the only group which were not the subject of
any complaints. None of the court personnel interviewed had any
complaints about the skills levels, competences, training, or performance of
magistrates. This is not surprising as the magistracy is made up of
professionally trained lawyers. The magistrates interviewed in this study
were no exception. The impression I got from a survey of both opinion and
fact, was that only magistrates received adequate relevant training for their
role in criminal trials, and ironically, they were also the only group that
attended workshops and seminars on a regular basis as part of on-going
training.
(b) Customary court Presidents
Customary court judges were universally identified as the weakest link as far
as the delivery of justice in the lower courts was concerned. Not only did the
interviewees believe that customary court judges had lower general and
technical skills than other key court personnel but they also thought that
the implications of this for justice were far more serious than would be
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the case in respect of other court staff. They observed that since customary
courts were manned entirely by laypersons/ the scope for error was much
larger there than in magistrate courts where the presiding officers were
professional lawyers, a view confirmed by a number of writers (Kirby 1985,
WLSA 1999, Boko 2000). Thus, there was a perception amongst
respondents, that whatever shortcomings there might be among other key
personnel, they were more tolerable than those of presiding officers. This
may explain why most of the interviewees were more anxious that
customary court judges should receive training as a matter of urgency.
The three customary court judges interviewed in this study agreed that the
technical competences of presiding officers were generally low. The
interviewees blamed inadequate training in criminal law and adjudication-
related functions for the problem. They were convinced that lack of proper
training or adequate training was a major handicap for customary court
presidents, and that, it almost certainly affects the way cases are conducted
in those courts. All the three judges felt that existing induction courses were
too short and that refresher courses and workshops were either non-existent
or too irregular. It appeared that the subjects had, through their personal
experiences as Presiding Officers, come to the conclusion that criminal trials
are complex affairs that require a high level of technical skills and
competences which the existing training programme could not deliver.
The Assistant Customary Courts Commissioner and the Member of the
Customary Court of Appeal confirmed the views of court clerks, prosecutors
and customary court judges themselves regarding the technical abilities of
the latter. According to the two officers, the most common problems they
came across when reviewing cases from customary courts included some
basic problems namely (i) evidence and procedure: according to them
procedures laid down in the Customary Court Act were often not followed
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by judges, (ii) Elements of a fair trial were not observed (Kirby 1985, Boko
2000), (iii) failure to spot errors in the indictment. A common example given
was that sometimes the judges would fail to spot that the charge sheet did
not disclose the offence charged as required by rule 15 of the Customary
Courts (Procedure) Rules, (iv) jurisdiction: presiding officers sometimes
exceeded their jurisdiction.
As much as the interviewees agreed on the necessity and desirability of
training customary court presiding officers, the underlying reasons for, as
well as the nature and extent of the training envisaged, varied somewhat.
Most notably, presiding officers themselves put primary emphasis on the
acquisition of certain task-related skills and competences while others
thought training of a professional or semi-professional nature was essential.
While the presiding officers identified the problem as purely technical, other
interviewees believed it was deeper than that since in many cases it involved
the lack of literacy skills.
Thus, according to the other interviewees, the problem of customary court
judges went beyond that of inadequate training in essential legal skills in that
sometimes the judges lacked general skills or basic education. General skills
in this context would include those skills ordinarily acquired through
education such as the ability to read and comprehend a variety of official
documents rather than simple literacy. Even though lack of general skills did
not necessarily apply to the three customary court judges interviewed in this
study, it was generally accepted that some presiding officers in the outlying
villages were either not literate or had low literacy skills. This essentially
means that such officers cannot be given legal training to improve their
performance.
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The problem lies with rules governing the recruitment and retention of
customary court judges. As a rule those appointed to serve as traditional
leaders of whatever rank in tribal courts are of royal blood. Only presiding
officers of urban courts are exempted from this rule. As a result of the
hereditary principle, sometimes illiterate individuals are appointed to the
position of presiding officer simply because according to custom they are
entitled to take over at that point. It seems the question whether these
individuals have the necessary general skills to execute the function of
presiding officer is not considered. The other problem seems to be that
traditional leaders who also serve as presiding officers do not appear to have
a retirement age. These two factors would seem to have the effect of
inhibiting attempts to raise skills levels of customary court judges through
training.
(2) Police Prosecutors
Botswana Police (BP), the national police force, were responsible for
prosecutions in cases that come before magistrate courts, a function which
they performed on behalf of the Attorney General (S13 (1) CP&A). They also
conducted prosecutions in customary courts. Local Police (LP), on the other
hand were restricted to prosecutions in the customary courts. The Local
Police force was based at the tribal court complex or urban court complex as
the case may be.
All key court personnel in both courts, including prosecutors, believed the
latter did not generally perform to expected standards. As in the case of
customary court presiding officers, lack of training or inadequate training
was identified as the source of the problem. Customary court presiding
officers believed that both BP and LP prosecutors lacked the necessary depth
to carry out their functions effectively but they also thought that better
training could remedy the problem. Magistrates expressed similar concerns
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about the performance of prosecutors from Botswana Police. But the remedy
proposed by the magistrates was far more radical than that suggested by
customary court judges. Magistrates wanted the police prosecutors to be
withdrawn from magistrate courts and to be replaced by trained officers
seconded from the Attorney General's Chambers. They believed that the
police were either reluctant to hire qualified lawyers to handle prosecutions
or were simply not prepared to train police prosecutors up to a professional
level. Magistrates were particularly concerned about the imbalance that
tended to occur in defended cases as untrained or poorly trained police
prosecutors had to engage trained lawyers.
Both the Local Police and Botswana Police prosecutors interviewed
believed that the police prosecutors did not receive adequate training.
The BP officer had undergone training in prosecution at the police
college but he felt it was not enough especially that it did not equip the
police to square up to defence lawyers. The LP officer had a certificate in law
from the University of Botswana, an evidently rare occurrence in the LP.
According to his supervisor he was only one of two LP officers in the whole
district who had held such a qualification, and even so, the district was
regarded with envy by other districts.
Even though the two police officers agreed with the other key personnel
that training received by the police in prosecution was a major constraint
as far as the performance of prosecutors in court was concerned, they
believed there were other compounding factors. They suggested that
development of highly skilled police prosecutors was inhibited by the
multiple functions these prosecutors had to perform as officers and also by
a lack of a dedicated prosecution unit within the two forces.
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(3) Court Clerks
Unless otherwise stated, in this section the term court clerk refers to
customary court clerks. Court clerks based in magistrate courts were not
directly involved in criminal trial, except occasionally as substitutes for
interpreters. Their functions are primarily administrative, revolving mostly
around filing (see Order III Magistrate Courts Act). Unlike customary court
judges, magistrates took notes for themselves during the trial.
Training of court clerks was considered important not simply because it was
necessary for them as officers of the court to have some kind of training, but
rather because low levels of general and technical skills amongst presiding
officers made it imperative for the former to have some understanding of
procedure and substantive law. There was an expectation among chiefs,
prosecutors and court clerks that the latter should as a matter of course guide
chiefs if they should require assistance regarding procedure or some aspect
of substantive law during the course of a trial. As one clerk put it: 'As the
Court Clerk I am expected to advise the presiding officer whenever he makes
mistakes regarding the applicable rule in court case and so on.' So it seems court
clerks were cast in the difficult role of unofficial advisors to chiefs on
how to conduct cases and were also expected to make up for the lack of
skills in the latter. However, this became not merely an expectation but an
imperative where the presiding officer happened to be illiterate or semi-
literate as was reported to be the case in the outlying villages and smaller
settlements. Given that the court clerks were not trained in law, if they found
themselves working alongside an unskilled, inexperienced and/or illiterate
presiding officer, this could easily result in recurrence of errors. As observed
earlier customary courts have a reputation for committing errors during trial
(Baillie 1969, Kirby 1985, Boko 2000).
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(4) Court Interpreters
Like court clerks, prosecutors and customary court judges, court interpreters
were adjudged to be performing below expected levels of competence as a
result of lack of training. The role of a court interpreter is to translate what
is being said in court from English into Setswana and vice-versa for the
benefit of the accused person, witnesses or the court. Currently of the
two types of courts, only magistrate courts use interpreters largely because
the language of these courts is English (S5MCA). Court clerks step into the
role of interpreters when the latter are not available for whatever reason.
There was no indication that after being recruited from the ranks of
secondary school graduates, court interpreters underwent any training at
all . Magistrates complained that court interpreters had particular difficulty
translating Setswana to English. According to the magistrates, this could
potentially lead to a miscarriage of justice, especially where the presiding
officer was a foreigner, as was often the case.
Withdrawals, Reconciliation and Compensation
Presiding officers of both courts were asked questions pertaining to these
issues as literature suggested that they might be philosophical or value-based
differences around these issues (Comaroff and Roberts 1981). The
magistrates said withdrawal was the prerogative of the prosecution.
According to them withdrawals normally occurred if there was insufficient
evidence to proceed with the case or when witnesses or the accused
persons absconded or where defence insisted that the case be finalized. In
contrast, customary court judges said withdrawals usually happened
whenever the complainant and the accused person(s) decided to reconcile or
not to proceed with the case any longer. As far as reconciliation was
concerned customary court judges were more proactive than magistrates
who said it was mostly the prosecution that took the initiative to reconcile
the disputing parties, usually at the instigation of the complainant.
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Customary court judges said where appropriate they engaged disputing
parties before, during or after the conclusion of the case but magistrates did
not report doing the same. A similar situation obtained with respect to
compensation. Whereas customary court judges said they made
compensation awards as a matter of course where they deemed them
appropriate, magistrates said they awarded it only upon application by the
victim (see State v Mothobi (Practice Note)1985 BLR19) and even then in clear
cut cases, otherwise they preferred that compensation be pursued in the
civil courts. Differences between courts in relation to reconciliation,
withdrawals and compensation were evidently reinforced by rules
governing the trial process in either court.
Community Values and Criminal Law
Presiding officers were asked to say what they considered should be the
guiding principle for judges in cases where there was an apparent conflict
between the moral values of the local community and criminal law. While
agreeing that criminal law did not always accommodate the values of local
communities, magistrates maintained, that they were bound to operate
within the four corners of the law and that any flexibility on the part of the
court in a given instance must be within the framework of the written
law. Customary court presiding officers were more ambivalent, suggesting
instead that perhaps some way should be found of re-aligning
customary law with received law whenever there was a clash of values or
aims. In that regard customary court judges believed there were major
differences between the two legal systems regarding punishment in
general. They believed in particular that the existing punishment regime did
not build the character of young persons as would have been the case under
customary law.
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Courts and Host Communities
It became apparent during interviews that judges of the two types of
courts saw the relationship between the courts and the communities they
served rather differently. All the customary court judges, without
exception, thought their courts represented community views in ways that
magistrate courts could not hope to match. Thus they saw themselves as
custodians of community values. In contrast, while not claiming any great
intimacy with the host communities, magistrate court judges nevertheless
saw themselves as serving the 'public. It is interesting to note that while
chiefs spoke of 'the community or tribe', magistrates spoke of 'the public.' In
Tswana 'Community/tribe' and 'public' translate as 'morafe' and 'sechaba'
respectively, which retains the subtle but important distinction as
reflected in the Informal Justice Movement discourse (Abel 1982).
This seems to be a commonly held view amongst traditional leaders in
relation to received courts generally, (see for instance, the House of Chiefs
debate on the Stock Theft (Amendment) Bill 1997). This view is supported
by some (eg Otlhogile 1993,) and celebrated by yet others (see Gulbrandsen
1996 for instance). A difference in the vocabulary employed by the presiding
officers of the two types of courts possibly suggests differences in posture
towards the host community. Customary courts claimed ownership by
community and therefore, by implication, claimed greater legitimacy than
magistrate courts. The language used by magistrates speaks to more
bureaucratised notions of justice.
Both these views ring true but what remains contentious, however, is
whether they reflect reality as it is on the ground or overstate it. It is not
too difficult from an objective point of view to see why customary court
judges would regard themselves and their courts as the 'true'
representatives of their communities or tribes' values relative to magistrates
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and other received courts. Let's take the chief's court as an example. The
Chief's court occupies such a manifestly unique position in the life of the
community that it is difficult to argue that it does not in general terms reflect
the spirit and values of the community it serves.
Quite apart from the fact that the chiefs' courts were the seat of polities that
predated the present nation-state, they still perform much the same juridico-
administrative functions with which they have traditionally been associated.
The Chiefs' court is the place where people report deaths of relatives,
conduct the sale of cattle, have letters to claim insurance written or signed for
them and above all, it is the place where the community meets to discuss
issues affecting the village and/or the tribe as whole. The phrase 'chief's
court' does not quite capture the essence of what in Setswana is called the
'Kgotla'. The former conveys a rather restrictive and incomplete meaning of
the place and its symbolic value. It is for this reason that some writers prefer
'Kgotla' to court (e.g. Gulbrandsen 1996). Given the foregoing, customary
court judges were probably justified to a certain extent in portraying
themselves not only as repositories of community values but also as being
responsible to those communities in ways peculiar only to traditional
structures. It was as much a claim to unique access to the community as it
was a claim to a unique location in the institutional complex serving the
community whether pre-existing or state-generated. It remains a debatable
point whether an idealised and monolithic notion of community values
presented by the subjects does not in fact only represent dominant sections of
the community. Literature tends to suggest that customary law and by
implication customary values are fluid and contestable (Roberts 1972,
Comaroff and Roberts 1977;1981)
This may explain why chiefs in particular believe that they bring into the
administration of justice authority that attaches to traditional leaders and a
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way of connecting with the local community that is different from that of
magistrate courts and other state institutions. As leaders of their
tribes/communities they or their representatives hold regular meetings to
discuss with and consult communities about issues of concern. Crime, being
a chronic social problem, is almost invariably discussed at these community
meetings. The Kgotla as a community forum may, as it is entitled to do, set
its own crime control agenda in collaboration with or independent of other
government structures. It is not surprising therefore that chiefs regard
themselves as the guarantors of social order in their communities, and are
sometimes even prepared, with the backing of their tribes, to use methods,
which the government may strongly disapprove of to suppress and control
crime. This has been most evident in respect of youth crime.
In comparison magistrate courts do not interact with communities in the
same way and their functions are largely restricted to issues of justice in the
narrow sense of the term. They are not able to mobilize or tap into
community sentiment in the same way as customary courts. Nor are they
able to set the crime agenda outside the narrow context of the cases that
come before their courts. To that extent the customary court judges were not
entirely wrong to characterize magistrate courts as somewhat detached from
the communities they serve.
At the same time in characterizing magistrate courts as 'government courts'
the customary court judges appeared to be implying that by comparison
customary courts have not really been captured by the state. But customary
courts are part of the state system. Not only is the customary legal system
constituted by and in terms of state-generated laws but it is also linked to the
received system structurally and in terms of its operations. Furthermore,
notwithstanding differences in the recruitment and training of customary
court judges and magistrates, both are, in the final analysis, civil servants
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(Griffiths. A 1996). This view, though still fiercely contested by Chiefs, was
affirmed by the High Court in State v Seepapitso IV (1972) BLR43. In that case
the High Court ruled that in his role as presiding officer of the customary
court, the chief is no more than a public servant. So the distinctiveness
customary courts does not lie, as suggested by the customary courts judges,
in their being outside the state system as such, but perhaps rather more in
underlying values and philosophical outlook of these institutions.
Punishment of Youthful Offenders and Women
Apart from training, the most recurrent theme in interviews with customary
court judges was youth disorder, offending and punishment. They believed
that the legal formalism (e.g. S20 Customary Court Act and S10(8)
Constitution of Botswana) and provisions in the law relating to the handling
of cases involving young persons made it difficult for them to stamp out of
general social disorder. In particular they were concerned that the existing
legal regime interfered with traditional Tswana approach to bringing up
children because it restricted the use of thrashing as an instrument of
discipline. The judges expressed similar sentiments regarding punishment of
women.
Customary Courts and Higher Bodies
The three customary court judges interviewed were strongly opposed to
having cases from customary courts reviewed by the Customary Courts
Commissioner (CCC) and particularly the District Commissioners (DCs).
They instead indicated that they preferred to have that function performed
by Customary Court of Appeal or by magistrates. The common theme in
the answers proffered by the subjects when pressed to explain their
apparent hostility towards the CCC and DCs was that these two offices did
not understand ways of the customary courts. They believed that the CCC
and DCs interfered excessively with sentences passed by customary courts.
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According to these customary courts POs, the efforts traditional leaders used
to curb crime were often frustrated by the higher bodies as they tended
always to reduce sentences passed by the trial court. The subjects regarded
the Customary Court of Appeal and Magistrate Courts as good alternatives
to the CCC and the DCs. It must be said that reasons for the resentment
of the CCC and DCs are more deep-rooted than the explanations given
by the subjects might suggest. There is a history of conflict between chiefs
and administrators at the parent ministry and at district level. In the eyes
of traditional leaders the CCC and DCs are reminders and manifestations of
what they most dislike about their relationship with government at
ministerial and local level (see Proctor 1968, Gillettl975, and Grantl980).
Most of the powers that the chiefs lost before and after independence went
to the various organs of the Ministry of Local Government. The latter is also
the supervising Ministry for the Department of Tribal Administration whose
mandate is to oversee the running of customary courts. The DCs are also
answerable to the same ministry. They have overall responsibility for the
administration in the districts to which they are assigned.
Having said that, some of the differences in the attitude of the POs towards
the CCC and DCs as compared to the Customary Court of Appeal and
Magistrate Courts could indeed be plausibly explained in terms of the
perceived extent of interference in and involvement of these bodies with
customary court processes. The extent of interference itself varied according
to the statutory functions of these entities viz-avis customary courts. The role
of the Customary Court of Appeal and magistrate courts was largely revisory
(S4 and 5 CCA before 2001amendment). In contrast the CCC and the DC's
role combined revisory and supervisory functions. Thus the CCC and DCs
were more deeply involved in operations of customary courts in general
than the Customary Court of Appeal and Magistrate Courts.
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7.11 Findings
Finding 7A: Inadequate training or lack of training of key court personnel
was the single most important concern among staff of both customary and
magistrate courts interviewed in this study.
Finding7B: Court staff from both types of court considered that inadequate
training or lack of training affected the quality of justice delivered by the
lower courts. However, they believed customary courts were more likely to
be adversely affected by this than magistrate courts since presiding
officers in the former were more likely than those in the latter to lack
general competences and the necessary professional training to effectively
and correctly handle criminal cases.
Finding 7C: Customary court judges were unhappy with prohibitions against
the use of corporal punishment on certain sections of the youth and females
generally.
7.12 Conclusion
When considered against all other themes, training emerged as the dominant
theme in this part of the study. It was considered by all to be the most
critical issue confronting the courts and was adjudged to have the most
severe impact in the customary courts where, according to the subjects, the
most important officer of the court, the presiding officer, often either lacked
training or had received inadequate training. In comparison presiding
officers in the magistrate courts were fully trained professional lawyers. The
general profile of key court personnel of both courts confirms some of
differences in the level of training mentioned by court staff. The skills and
training deficit has implications for the quality of justice rendered by these
courts. By inference, the risk of wrongful conviction was higher in customary
courts than in magistrate courts. On the other hand poor prosecutorial skills
among the police meant that in the magistrate courts the scales tipped in
favour of accused persons, especially in defended cases.
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Looking at the whole spectrum of themes emerging from data analysis it
was also clear that there were some differences regarding the meaning
and importance of indicative themes to the two courts. As far as customary
courts were concerned the dominant themes were, training and background
of staff, punishment of women and young offenders /reconciliation and
withdrawals, the structural relationship between customary courts and
review bodies and as well as the relationship between the courts and the
host community. The following emerged as the dominant themes in
magistrate courts, training and background of key personnel, reconciliation
and withdrawals and the relationship between the two courts and the host
community. The themes not only brought out differences in the attitude of
the two types of courts regarding a variety of issues but also serve to
highlight to some degree, differences in the focal concerns of the two courts
suggesting in essence, that they probably consider themselves answerable to
different interpretive communities in matters of justice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8.0 SUMMARY, ANALYSIS AND GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the Chapters Five, Six and Seven we presented the results and findings of
the study respectively. This chapter summarizes the major findings of the
study and considers whether the primary hypothesis has been confirmed or
not. But for the most part it discusses factors, both immediate and a remote,
which form part of the explanation and general context of patterns of
punishment in the customary and magistrate courts. The closing sections of
the chapter look at other aspects of the study, including the implications of
the research for Botswana and other post-colonial societies, further research
and implications for policy. The Summary section highlights the most
important findings in light of the thesis of the study. In other words the
Summary section briefly considers to what extent when taken individually
and/or together the findings confirm or disconfirm the primary hypothesis.
The discussion sections do not repeat analysis already undertaken in the
preceding three chapters, but incorporate only critical elements from those
chapters to illuminate the discussion of various issues as they relate to the
primary hypothesis. The last section discusses the wider meaning of the
findings of the study in the context of research on plural legal orders.
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of differences in the
structure of discretion of judges of magistrate and customary courts in
relation to use of multiple punishments and whether the exercise of these
powers was likely to lead to unjustifiable disparities in the punishment of
offences. The thesis was predicated on the assumption that both the variation
in discretion as to combination of punishments and the inherent value-based
differences in customary and magistrate courts were likely to result in
significantly different sentencing outcomes for similar offences.
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The general or primary hypothesis stated: Differences in the structure of the
sentencing discretion of judges of customary and magistrate courts as
regards the types and combinations of punishments they may impose in
respect of any offence triable in either type of court is likely to result in the
imposition of unjustifiably dissimilar punishments for similar offences.
As a first step I sought to establish whether there were any general patterns
as regards the distribution of offences by type of court. Second, I wanted to
determine whether there were any variations in the outcome/sentencing
patterns of these courts for offences triable-either-way, generally. Evidence of
philosophical differences in approach to punishment could only be
obtained indirectly through surrogate measures such as distribution of
cases and general punishment patterns hence non-directional hypotheses
H1-H2A. Finally, and most importantly, having disposed of these questions
I turned to the central question: whether differences in discretion resulted in
unjustified disparities. Using an assortment of quantitative techniques I
compared and measured the effects of an identified variation in the
discretionary powers of magistrate and customary court judges on
sentencing disparities in cases involving multiple punishments. I then
examined how the two courts punished offences and offenders with similar
characteristics.
The major findings from that effort are recapitulated in this chapter.
However, I do not rehearse all aspects of the findings in detail nor do I
consider in a comprehensive way possible explanations for those findings as
I have discussed those aspects extensively in the previous chapter. In this
chapter I also discuss the significance of the study in light of the findings
and make recommendations for further research. I only consider in detail
findings that relate more directly to the primary hypothesis rather than those
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pertaining to aspects of other hypotheses that served a surrogate or
supporting role. Those were discussed in the preceding chapter.
8.2 Conclusion of the Study: Primary Hypothesis
This study concludes that taken as whole, findings relating to directional and
non-directional hypotheses provide substantial support for, and to a great
extent, confirm, the primary hypothesis of the study. Put another way, the
study found that there were significant disparities in the use of multiple
punishments by the two courts some of which could be attributed to
differences in the discretion as to combination of punishments. Some of the
differences in the deployment of multiple penalties appeared to be a function
of deep-seated value differences and other factors rather than the variation in
discretion as such. Customary courts tended to punish more severely than
magistrate courts across all offence categories wherever they chose to deploy
multiple punishments. It was difficult to find factors that might justify the
magnitude of differences in the punishments imposed by the two courts for
similar categories of offences.
Having said that, it must be noted that due to thinness of data, itself
attributable in part to sharp differences in the use of penalties by the two
types of courts, it was not possible to determine conclusively whether
customary and magistrate courts would punish similarly situated
offenders who have committed similar offences differently. However, the
results on the whole showed that the two types of courts generally tended to
punish offences differently so that the most frequently deployed/utilized
punishment(s) in respect of any given offence group often differed in kind if
not in terms of the most preferred penalty for that offence.
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8.3 Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions
Major Finding 1 Analysis shows that there was a general relationship
between variation in the discretion of courts as to combination of
punishments, and the type and relative severity of the multiple
punishments deployed by the two types of courts as postulated in
primary hypothesis. Each of the two types of courts generally tended to use
multiple punishments combinations peculiar only to itself that is, not used by
the other. Only few combinations were shared. Some of the disparities
arising from the use of multiple punishments can be linked to differences
in discretion as to use of multiple punishments in that some of the
combinations permissible under the law for customary courts would not
have been permissible for magistrate courts. However, some of the
combinations appeared to be more a product of the attitude of the
courts rather than strictly a result of the variation in the discretion of the
courts as such because theoretically it should have been possible for either
court to impose some of the punishments applied by the other court but
they nevertheless did not do so. Thus, in regard to the relationship between
the structure of discretion and deployment of multiple punishments the
primary hypothesis was substantially if only partially supported in so far as
it assumed that the variations in the use ofmultiple punishments might be
explained solely in terms of differences in the discretion of the courts.
Major Finding 2: It was found that in some cases the deployment or non-
deployment of certain combinations of punishments had little or nothing to
do with the availability of those combinations as a possible choice.
Major Finding 3: The study found that taking things at the broad level of
similar offence types customary courts punished more severely than
magistrate courts and that this was the case across all offences considered.
Customary courts tended to apply multiple punishments with greater
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frequency and in more varied forms than magistrate courts. In other words,
not only were customary courts more likely to impose multiple punishments
for assault-related offences, malicious damage to property, theft-related
offences, burglary and related offences and nuisance-related offences, but
they were also likely to do so more often using a wider range of
combinations.
Major Finding 4: Whereas customary courts deployed quite varied
combinations of punishments, those deployed by magistrate courts tended to
be limited mostly to a suspended prison term plus some other punishment.
Furthermore, while combinations used by magistrate courts never exceeded
two punishments and those of customary courts often included up to three
different punishments; in one instance combinations of punishments
deployed by customary courts in relation to one particular offence were as
many as sixteen while those deployed by magistrate courts for this offence
group were no more than two.
Major Finding 5: While patterns varied according to offence type, divergences
were evident in relation to severity and the extent to which a particular type
of court was likely to use a particular type of a combination of punishments
to punish any given category of offences. Even though we were not able to
take this comparison to another level to establish whether the use and
severity of punishment(s) awarded varied for similarly situated offenders
(Hypothesis 4) because of data limitations, it was clear that punishments
varied enormously for offences of a similar type. Differences in types of
punishment applied generally, including in cases where multiple
punishments were not deployed though it must be said in such cases
differentials as measured in terms of mean scores were small. It was,
therefore the use of multiple punishments which tended to increase severity
differentials.
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Major Finding 6: Customary courts were more likely to deploy multiple
punishments with respect to triable-either-way offences than were magistrate
courts.
Major Finding 7: If classification of offences as triable-either way or not was
disregarded, magistrate courts were overall just as likely to deploy multiple
punishments as were customary courts though as a rule they did so for
higher level offences than the latter. The first part of the finding contradicts
and disconfirms directional hypothesis H3.
Major finding 8: With respect to triable-either way offences, customary courts
were more likely than magistrate courts to use different combinations of
punishments to enhance punishment, perhaps reflecting a commitment to
particular ways of punishing particular offences and/or a desire to make up
for the perceived deficit in the substantive sentencing powers. In contrast
magistrate courts tended to use combination punishments to avoid imposing
a more serious or severe sentence such as imprisonment, for instance.
Major Finding 9: The result of the overall patterns of multiple punishments
was that customary courts punished more severely than magistrate courts
when deploying multiple punishments. They commanded the highest
severity scores across all offence groups. Typically the highest score in
customary courts for most offence categories save for nuisance-related
offences was 12 or above. In contrast for magistrate courts the highest score
was 10, even then for only two out of five offence categories. The largest
difference between the maximum score values of the two courts in respect of
any offence group was 5 points, which was registered in relation to theft-
related offences. The differences in the score values suggest unwarranted
differences between the courts in the punishment of similar offences.
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However, without information on offender characteristics this must be
regarded with some caution.
The results of the study concerning multiple punishments have implications
for the current debate on comparative justice as perceived disparities in the
sentences awarded by customary and received courts are at the heart of that
debate. The question is not whether there should be any
similarities/differences in the way customary and received courts punish
offenders as the system was deliberately designed to accommodate both.
Rather the question is one of degree. In other words it is the magnitude of
difference that matters, both from the standpoint of principled sentencing,
and public perception. The findings of this study suggest a relationship
between the kind of multiple punishments the courts deployed and
differences in the structure of discretion allowed by the courts in relation
to the kinds of punishment combinations they may deploy. In terms of the
current arrangements customary courts have wider powers than general
courts in terms of the combinations of punishments they may impose for any
given offence. This was clearly borne out by a variety and range of multiple
punishments that the former imposed for the same offence group.
8.4 Summary
The results of the study show that the major hypothesis concerning the
effects of variation in discretion of judges as to punishments they may
impose is substantially supported as indicated by MF1-MF9. It will be
recalled that the primary hypothesis of the study was that: Differences in the
structure of the sentencing discretion of judges of customary and magistrate
courts as regards the types and combinations of punishments they may
impose in respect of any offence triable in either type of court is likely to
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result in the imposition of unjustifiably dissimilar punishments for similar
offences.
This study has shown that the relatively unstructured discretion of
customary courts regarding choice as to combination of punishments tended
to result in those courts punishing convicted offenders for triable-either-way
offences more severely than magistrate courts did (Findings 5C2 , MF5 and
MF6) as postulated under the primary hypothesis and supporting
hypothesis Ff3 and H4.
For any given triable-either-way offence, customary courts invariably
imposed multiple punishments in a greater proportion of cases than
magistrate courts (MF2). Customary courts also tended to use multiple
penalties more than magistrate courts did in relation to triable-either-way
offences (MF6). However, it must be remembered that general
undifferentiated offence data from the census survey presented an entirely
different picture from that suggested by supplementary data from Mochudi
as far as the use ofmultiple punishments by the two courts was concerned. It
showed that magistrate courts were just as likely to impose multiple
punishments as were customary courts (MF7). There are two plausible
explanations for this seeming contradiction between the general data and the
supplementary data regarding the use of multiple punishments by
magistrate and customary courts. Since general census data for magistrate
courts did not discriminate between triable-either-way and non-triable-either
way offences while that of customary courts did not include these for reasons
of jurisdiction, it may have caused the apparent use of multiple penalties by
the former to appear to be on par with that of the latter. The probability that
this was indeed the case is high since non-triable-either-way offences were
generally of a more serious nature than triable-either-way offences hence
more likely to attract multiple penalties thus pushing up the apparent use of
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such penalties in magistrate courts to a level comparable with that of
customary courts, generally. Another possible explanation is that perhaps
Mochudi supplementary data on its own is too small to use to draw wider
conclusions about the use of multiple punishments since it covered only a
limited number (albeit most common) of triable-either-way offence groups
and over a span of four years only. However, the results from supplementary
study still carry a great deal of weight on their own because coverage of
selected offences for that period was 100%.
The results of the study also showed that cases tried before customary
courts were subject to a wider and more varied range of multiple
punishments than those coming before magistrates (MF3). In addition,
cases with the highest severity scores across all offence groups were
invariably from customary courts (5C2). This was the case despite the fact
that for any given offence group customary courts handled offences in the
lower band of that group while magistrate courts generally handled
moderately serious to serious offences within same offence group (5A2).
It was evident that the two types of courts generally used multiple
punishments for different purposes (MF8). In the case of customary courts it
appeared that multiple punishments were used mostly to enhance
punishment whereas in magistrate courts they appeared to be used mostly to
avoid the imposition of a more severe penalty, especially long prison terms
(MF8).
Even though differences in the way customary and magistrate courts
deployed multiple punishments appeared to be related substantially to
variation in the discretion as to choice of punishments, some differences in
the use of or non-use of some combination punishments seemed to be
unrelated to non-availability of choices in relation to the particular type of
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court as regards those punishments (MF2). As a result, we found that even in
cases where particular combinations of punishments could have been
deployed, they were not. Yet, as it happened the other type of court would
often choose that very combination. So there was a divergence in the patterns
of use of some punishments combinations even where there need not have
been any given similarities in availability of choice with respect to choice of
combinations. To that extent, it seemed that other factors other than variation
in the structure of discretion were at play. These factors probably included
value-related reasons or orientation. It will be recalled that the main
underlying assumption of this study was that value-related differences
would tend to express themselves where the rules allow one or both types
of court greater discretion to punish offences as they wish (see Chapter One
and Chapter Four generally). Thus these divergences were consistent with
the basic assumption of the study to the extent that they generally followed
patterns that would be expected in relation to the two types of courts.
But the picture was in fact much more complex than might have been
predicted. It was evident that multiple punishments imposed by customary
courts in respect of particular offences did not necessarily follow the
customary pattern as far as the mix and use of different penalties was
concerned. At the same time the new mix of multiple penalties deployed by
customary courts built on the traditional patterns in that they tended to
include what would have been the preferred penalty for particular
offences under customary law.
The results of this study show that not only does availability of new
punishments to customary courts increase the hybridization of punishment
but it also involves to a large extent the superimposition of new punishments
on traditional ones. Traditional uses were also more evident in those cases
where non-multiple or single punishments were deployed. It is clear that
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where the law gave customary courts flexibility they used traditional
penalties to punish even though, generally, relative to multiple punishments
single punishments constituted a minority of cases. Overall, uses of different
penalties by the customary courts were consistent traditional patterns though
changing.
Thus even as punishments have changed they have remained the same on
some level in that where multiple punishments have been awarded the
traditional punishment may more often than not be used in combination
with others. As a result we see both the persistence of customary ways of
dealing with certain wrongs and the perverse effects of incorporating new
punishments into the traditional menu: harsher punishment.
It is also interesting that given the overall picture that is emerging regarding
the use of multiple punishments, as far as the use of each of the different
penalties/punishments on their own or singly was concerned, magistrate
courts were significantly more likely (p value < 0.001) than customary courts
to use the most severe of penalties, namely imprisonment. At the same time,
magistrate courts were significantly less likely to award the strokes (p value
< 0.001) and fine (p value < 0.001) compared to customary courts.
The paradox regarding the results of the study was that despite customary
courts being comparatively more punitive when deploying multiple
punishments, customary court judges were apparently more likely than
magistrates to mediate between and attempt to reconcile disputing parties at
any stage in the dispute process. This appears to confirm the view that it is
fundamentally part of the ethos of customary courts to want to reconcile
disputing parties (Griffiths. A 1983, Comaroff and Roberts 1981, Schapera
1938). Furthermore, customary court judges made a greater effort to look
behind the offence to get to the 'real' issue or to pursue substantive justice.
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8.5 Explaining Differences between the way Customary and Magistrate
Courts Used Multiple Punishments
8.5.1 Differences in the structure of Discretion
Choice as to punishment
Differences in the structuring of discretion as to punishment explain to a
large extent patterns indicating greater propensity of customary courts to
deploy multiple punishments in respect of triable-either-way offences than
magistrate courts and resultant harsher punishment of similar offences (see
Figure 1 and Appendix C). This is consistent with sentencing research
evaluations and reviews which have shown that unstructured discretion
tends to result in greater inconsistency and disparities than in situations
where discretion is structured (Spohn 2002, Ashworth 1992(a&b), Tonry
1988;1996). Given the flexibility allowed customary courts in relation to the
punishment menu, a great deal of inconsistency could be expected from
customary courts and was indeed shown by range of punishments deployed
(see Findings 5C3 and MF3) and in general terms. The extent and range of
multiple punishments that customary courts in this study imposed for
triable-either way offences means that it would be difficult to predict the sort
of punishment that a person is likely to suffer for committing an assault,
for instance. In comparison the patterns in the magistrate courts were not
too difficult to predict in cases involving multiple punishments. In
magistrate courts the dominant multiple punishment was the imprisonment
/suspended prison term combination. However, it was also clear that
differences in discretion as to choice of punishment could not account for all
the differences in the patterns of punishment of the courts because
magistrate courts often did not deploy even allowable punishments
combinations in the same way as the customary courts.
Conversely, customary courts used their sentencing powers rather
differently from magistrate courts. For instance, even though their powers to
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substitute or add corporal punishment to punishment awarded in respect of
young males under the age of 18 years were similar to those of the latter, the
patterns of punishment still differed. It would appear that customary courts
made substitutions or additions without any regard to the seriousness of the
offence(s) concerned, resulting in unpredictable punishment. Nor it seemed
was equivalence (Tonry 2004, Marinos 2005) between corporal punishment
and the punishment it was supposed to replace considered in the case of
customary courts. This approach to substitution and enhancement of
punishment probably contributed to the inconsistencies in the punishment of
offences evident in the customary court.
Thus, it was not just the breadth of choice that was significant but also the
nature of substitution or additions. While substitutions could just as likely
be used to reduce as to enhance punishments, it was evident from the
patterns in the study that customary courts were more likely to make
additions than substitutions. Moreover, where they might be expected to a
make substitution such as the replacement of imprisonment with strokes,
they seemed to prefer to award the strokes together with some other
punishment including a suspended prison term. Magistrate courts generally
did exactly the opposite (MF8).
Internal and External Relativities
Amongst the possible reasons why customary courts punishments were
harsher than those awarded by magistrate courts was that the presiding
officers of the two courts appeared to have different starting and end points
as far as the internal relativities regarding scaling of offences were
concerned. The substantive jurisdiction of customary courts in relation to
ordinary criminal offences is limited to what the general courts would
regard as low to moderately serious offences (see Appendix B). However,
for the customary courts these 'moderate' offences are 'serious' offences
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since, if we exclude the two offences for which customary courts have been
granted extraordinary jurisdiction, namely stock-theft and drug-related
offences, 'moderate' offences sit at the top of the most serious offences that
come before these courts. It is, therefore, not surprising that customary courts
tended to punish such offences more severely than the general courts.
On the other hand, customary courts may well believe that they do not have
sufficient substantive powers to punish offenders as severely as they would
like using any particular penalty they would prefer (see appendix B). As
suggested in the preceding section, customary courts judges were unhappy
with restrictions pertaining to punishment of females and young persons. So
they could be making up for that by deploying a larger combination of
multiple punishments with the result that for most offence categories they
scored higher on severity than magistrate courts even though they
generally tried the lower band of offences within those general offence
categories than magistrate courts (see finding 5A2). However, when the
issue of multiple punishments is considered in the context of choice as
to discretion and the comparative substantive powers of the courts with
regard to all punishments, then it is easy to see why customary courts
would use multiple punishments to enhance punishment while magistrate
courts use them as a means to avoid imposing more severe sentences. The
fact that imprisonment is the basic punishment for all offences despite being
the most severe penalty may also explain why we get these divergent results.
8.5.2 Discretion and Underlying Value-Indicative Factors
The relatively unstructured discretion of customary court judges probably
allowed secondary factors associated with social change as it affects the
customary system, together with the inherent tendencies of customary courts
to come into play. Among the possible factors explaining the propensity of
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customary courts to deploy multiple penalties is that it's the product of the
combined effect of the hybridization of punishments in customary courts
resulting from changes in the law, and the retention of traditional elements of
the customary process which allows these courts to impose civil and penal
sanction all at once (Schapera 1938, Bouman 1984; Nserekol989). Other
researchers on the Botswana legal system have pointed to changes in both
the patterns of cases dealt with by customary court over time (Roberts 1972,
Love and Love 1996; Kuper 1969) and the growing use of penal sanctions
by customary courts (Bouman 1984). The resulting harsh penalties may, in
some cases be simply a result of these factors rather than a deliberate attempt
by customary courts to be punitive. However, as we argue below, the
possibility that in some cases harsh punishment was what was probably
intended cannot be excluded. Wide discretion simply provided greater scope
for that eventuality. For instance in terms of finding MF8 customary courts
appeared to be generally deploying multiple punishments to enhance
penalties probably as way of addressing the deficits in their substantive
powers (see Appendix B) while magistrate courts generally deployed
multiple punishments (at least in respect of triable-either-way offences) to
avoid imposing harsher punishment.
Discretion as to choice of punishment only partially explains the differences
in the way customary and magistrate courts deployed of multiple
punishments. There were still differences in the way the two types of
punished offences in that magistrate courts appeared to be more circumspect
than customary courts in their use of multiple penalties within the scope of
permissible substitutions and/or additions. Differences at a deeper level
regarding the attitude to and meaning of punishment as well as the
significance of certain offences/offenders for the two types of court probably
interacted with one another and a range of other variables to produce
differences in severity of punishments awarded by these courts that are
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manifest in the results of the present study. We consider some these factors
in the sections below:
Even though there was no systematic way of measuring directly the impact
of beliefs and postures adopted by the courts towards certain offences and
offenders on sentencing outcomes, there was a lot of indirect evidence
pointing to the possible influence of focal concerns on the behaviour of
customary courts, in relation to sentencing. Interview data (Chapter Seven)
indicates and statistical patterns on the distribution of triable-either way
offences (Chapter Five) would seem to confirm that customary courts wanted
and succeeded in getting certain offences (social disorder offences) that were
of special interest to those courts to be funnelled to them (see Finding 5A2).
It is therefore not surprising that these being offences they would like to
suppress, customary courts consequently tended to punish them more
severely than might otherwise have been reasonably expected. Social
disorder offences were of such a nature as to be seen to challenge the
authority of traditional leaders as leaders of their communities (Schapera
1970). A notable feature of these offences was that they involved young
persons whom the customary courts were eager to deal with in the
customary way through lashing (Tagart 1931, Schapera 1938, Leslie 1969).
The demographic situation in the country, the rapid pace of social change
and the high rate of unemployment amongst the youth make a clash between
the youth and traditional authorities almost inevitable. These factors,
together with many others, have probably helped to undermine the ability of
in-formal control mechanisms to curb social disorder so that traditional
authorities have to deal directly with it more and more.
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Legal Formalism
Changes in the law, especially the introduction of the written law
requirement (S10 (8) Constitution of Botswana and S20 Customary Court
Act), appears to have pushed customary courts in the direction of penal
sanctions and an inclination to accept what under customary law would be
regarded as premature formalization of disputes (see State v Bogatsu and
others). Legal formalism has also reduced considerably the flexibility of these
courts in many areas of the trial/dispute process (Bouman 1984, Roberts
1972).
(a) Specific Effects of Legal formalism
The relative inflexibility of the dispute process consequent upon the changes
introduced in the law since 1972, including certain restrictions regarding
sanctions applicable to female and young persons (see Finding 7C) appear to
have upset traditional leaders even as they have been happy to accept other
aspects of the changes. It is not inconceivable that finding certain options
regarding punishment of females and young persons closed to them,
traditional leaders may be making up for that by imposing multiple
punishments involving as many of the available options as possible. While
there was no direct evidence to support this supposition, the study found
evidence that traditional leaders were unhappy about restrictions on
punishments applicable to certain groups and that cases involving young
persons were being shunted to customary courts on their request.
One of the positive aspects of codification is that it has introduced an element
of certainty and consistency in the application of the law, including in
general terms the type and/or quantum of punishments that could be
awarded. However, for customary courts certainty has come at a cost.
Codified law has compromised flexibility which is regarded as a premium
value under customary law (Bennet and Vermeulen 1980, Comaroff and
Robertsl981). Loss of flexibility, and by extension, loss of ability to negotiate
281
elements of the dispute or the dispute process may, in some instances, result
in customary courts awarding harsher penalties than would otherwise have
been the case under customary law. For instance, a legal wrong such as
obscene abuse which would have been classified as delicts under customary
law have not only been re-classified as criminal offences but they also attract
serious penalties, including imprisonment.
Thus some penalties, have perhaps unintentionally, been rendered more
severe by the introduction of codified law. For instance under customary law
fines were not stringently enforced (Schapera 1942:39, Van Niekerk 1966:39-
40, Baillie 1969) but after codification, default on payment of a fine became
imprisonable. Moreover, the prison terms would seem to be disproportionate
to the fines. Currently, under the Customary Court Act, failure to pay a fine
of P10 (based on current exchange rate of $1 to 7 Botswana Pula which
roughly translates to $1.40 cents) will result in 1 month imprisonment.
However, it should not be assumed on the basis of the foregoing that all
the changes brought about by codification and universalization of the
criminal law have only served to make customary court sanctions harsher.
There are a number of instances, admittedly few, where penalties introduced
under codified law for certain offences are less harsh than they would have
been under customary law. For instance under customary law cattle theft
attracted very heavy penalties and the owner reserved the right, amongst
other things, to kill the thief if he caught the thief in the act (Schapera
1938:48). Killing a cattle thief is no longer permissible.
(b) General Effects of Legal Formalism
More widely, legal formalism has affected the ability of informal mechanisms
to work in concert with formal structures such as the chief's court to control
and punish misconduct in informal ways as was the practice under
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customary law (Schapera 1938, Comaroff and Roberts 1981). Customary
courts now find that they are constrained by the demarcation between formal
and non-formal processes that the law insists must be observed (see for
example S20 Customary Court Act). Even though some of these boundaries
existed previously between different levels of dispute resolution
mechanisms, they were much more fluid (Comaroff and Roberts 1981).
Different mechanisms of social control whose function was to deal with
social disorder in its various manifestations had some control over these
processes so that they could decide when particular conduct warranted
the attention of higher level structures. The latter function has been
appropriated by organs of the new nation state such as the police.
In the traditional Tswana set up there was a structural overlap and
continuity between the relatively formal senior courts and various less
formal mechanisms of social control (Schapera 1938 Comaroff and Roberts
1981, Roberts 1972; 1974). The latter encompassed a wide range of
mechanisms of varying degrees of formality and levels of organization
including descent group or family courts, women's courts, ward courts and
regimental courts. The most informal of these processes consisted in bilateral
attempts at dispute resolution (Fombad 2004:174). Informal mechanisms,
such the family and ad hoc regimental courts, not only exercised control over
individual members but also processed wrong-doers, and where necessary,
channelled them through to the higher structures (see Schapera 1938,
Comaroff and Roberts 1981). Thus structures of varying degrees of formality
and formal courts complemented and reinforced each other's roles as factors
of social cohesion (Roberts 1971(b); Malila 1993:49). The requirement of legal
formalism have disrupted this arrangement and caused the boundaries
between simple misconduct and criminal conduct to harden.
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Still, the present study found that the settlement oriented nature of the
Tswana dispute process has not been entirely erased. For example, in many
instances where cases were withdrawn to allow elders to mediate, there were
often strong hints in the language and normative referents used in the
discourse which appeared to suggest that the courts and the disputants often
believed that they were resolving matters according to the Setswana 'way'
when they engaged each other and the courts in that fashion. But it remains
the case that under the prevailing arrangements this process is marginal
rather than central to the dispute resolution process. Those litigants
concerned more with social relationships than the formalities of trial
probably find that it is more difficult than before to obtain the result(s) they
want from the customary courts though they are far better than magistrate
courts in that regard.
Observational data on reconciliation and other dispute processes as
exemplified by the case of Bogatsu and others suggests that between the two
systems, the customary system is generally more accommodating of the
needs the relational litigant while the received system is better suited to
those of the rule-oriented litigant. General literature confirms that on the
whole the Tswana customary system inclines towards settlement (Schapera
1938) and relational-orientation (Roberts 1972, Comaroff and Roberts 1981)
while the formalized western style systems leans more towards bureaucratic
or rule-oriented justice(Abel 1982, Holleman 1995, Conley and O'Bar
1990).These divergences appear to emanate from differences in philosophical
outlook about disputes and disputes process(Diamond 1973, Holleman 1995,
Comaroff and Roberts 1981, Roberts 1972;1974 ). Customary courts, like
informal courts, understand that disputes do not only serve an instrumental
function but an expressive function one as well (Abel 1982: 284, Marinos
2005, Diamond 1973, Roberts 1972: Comaroff and 1981)
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Bogatsu's case shows that requirements of legal formalism have reduced the
ability of customary courts to deal with cases in a manner they would have
preferred. Legal formalism has changed the Tswana dispute process such
that the nature and scope of the dispute is now subject to technical
determination rather than contestation from the point the case enters the
formal system. In Bogatsu's case we see an attempt by the family to frame the
dispute as being about the relationships. The customary courts saw it in
those terms as well but formal processes did not allow the case to be framed
in that way. The complainant saw the dispute in narrow terms as assault and
he found the general system was more receptive to that approach than the
customary system.
Formalism has, in essence, made the customary system more rule-oriented
and less flexible as evidenced by post trial attempts by presiding officers to
find out from litigants what the 'real problem' might be (Roberts 1972,
Comaroff and Roberts 1981). Litigants who are aware of the importance of
written rules such as the complainant in the Bogatsu's case are able to exploit
the rule-oriented nature of the formalized system to their advantage.
However, it was clear from the court observations that customary courts
judges were keenly aware that sometimes even if the requirements of formal
justice may have been satisfied in any given instance, the real problem may
have been misdiagnosed hence the often heard exhortation to disputants
after the official dispute process is closed: "Now tell me what the real
problem is" (A ko lo mpolele go re Iwa re mathata tota ke eng). Where the real
issue was the personal relationship between the parties rather the official
charge on court papers, formal justice may leave the disputing parties
dissatisfied with the trial process if that aspect is not addressed (Conley and
O'Barl990).
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Other researchers, especially those working in the area of family law in
Botswana have shown that litigants use the 'shadow of the law' to re¬
negotiate relationships (Griffiths. A 1997, Molokomme 1991, WLSA 1999) but
the system has probably become more rigid especially in the area of criminal
law, than earlier researchers found it to be (Roberts 1972, Schapera 1938) in
regard to the formulation of disputes. Still, observations from the present
study suggest that even despite these rigidities customary courts were more
likely to be used to resolve personal differences. Unlike customary courts
presidents, magistrates seemed to be more concerned about formal justice
than they were about satisfying the users of the system. Furthermore, by
comparison, they directed much less effort and energy towards repairing
social relationships than their counterparts in the customary courts. It may be
inferred from that that they were generally less concerned about the personal
relations between the parties than were customary court judges.
This is perhaps attributable on some level to differences in the seriousness of
cases coming before these two courts as well as differences in the degree of
procedural formality/informality between them.
In one unregistered case I observed at Mochudi involving an alleged
assault and theft that was brought before the court for mediation, the
presiding officers was able to determine very quickly that the two parties
were related by marriage: one was married to the sister of the other. When
asked to explain what the ' real problem' was, they told the court that the
dispute was really about a marriage that was breaking down and the
alleged ill-treatment of the woman who was married to one of the parties
and who was a sister to the other party. The presiding officer suggested a
meeting between the families of the two parties to resolve the issue and the
disputants agreed to explore that avenue for the time being. Litigants who
use the courts as way of restoring the balance in a relationship want
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official authority on their side, but at the same time want to retain control of
the dispute to ensure that it does not escalate beyond a certain point. But at
the same time, formalization means that they must cede control which may
in its turn, bring about the result they do not want (Conley and O'Bar 1990).
In the current set up, informal mechanisms and the formal courts have lost
some of the freedom of action that they used to have under customary law.
Officially recognized customary courts may not punish anyone unless a trial
has been held in accordance with prescribed procedures (S20 Customary
Courts Act). In other words, they cannot purport to punish anyone,
(including young persons over whom they appear generally to be anxious to
exercise control) outside the formal processes as they would have done
under customary law.
Nevertheless, Customary Court Act (S3) contemplates the possibility of
bodies other than formal courts conducting 'informal proceedings of an
arbitral nature.' What is interesting is that such bodies as are contemplated
under the Act would be bodies 'constituted under customary law.' Thus,
while courts of arbitration certainly fall within such a bracket, the term
'body' is sufficiently wide to cover a range of other informal bodies. To that
extent, it is reasonable to assume that the law allows informal bodies space
employ traditional modes of dispute resolution outside the boundaries of
officially recognized courts. However, the powers of any such a body are
limited in that it cannot purport to enforce its decisions or compel attendance
before it.
There is nothing in the Act to suggest that decisions taken by such a body
may not include the decision to punish the person whose conduct is
complained of if she/he 'loses' the argument. Theoretically, if the decision
reached by the body is that one of the parties must suffer corporal
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punishment, for example, the party concerned would have to agree to submit
to such punishment. According to the law if she/he does not agree, then the
body cannot compel her/him to do so. In practice, however, such bodies
often try to impose their decisions on the parties, even in situations where
one of the parties might not want to have a decision she/he finds
unacceptable imposed on her/him. The case of State v Bogatsu and another
clearly demonstrates that even adults may find themselves forced by their
families to submit to punishment even if they disagree with the decision.
Even though traditional authorities cannot participate in informal
proceedings in their judicial capacity, such matters can nevertheless be dealt
with at the court compound in their presence. The High Court confirmed in
the case of Kgalaeng v Attorney General (1988 BLR 21) that where custom
allows it, as is purportedly the case under Bakwena law, 'boys are from
time to time punished at the kgotla by their parents for misbehaviour by
infliction of lashes, but errant girls are planished at home'(own emphasis).
Because legal formalism has restricted the extent to which punishment may
be used as a means of curbing social order in the broad sense of the term,
traditional leaders have found creative ways of dealing with the problem.
Some have, like in the case of State v Bogatsu and others, attempted to push
such matters into the private domain where the family tends to be the arbiter.
Others have openly defied the state and employed traditional methods of
dealing with low-level social disorder as was exemplified by a clash between
a Member of Parliament for Molepolole and the Bakwena regent over the
latter's decision to resort to traditional policing (use of regiments) and crime
control (flogging, particularly of young persons found in the streets after
dark without due process) methods in 2001 when it appeared as if the police
were failing in their efforts to curb youth gang crime in Molepolole (The
Mid-week Sun 15/08/2001). As is evident from the distribution of triable-
either-way offences and sentiments expressed by Chiefs during interviews, it
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would appear that traditional leaders have also decided to use the blunt
instrument of criminal law to deal with minor social disorders. But the
unfortunate result of this approach is that a lot of people who should not
really have a criminal record end up acquiring one.
Hybridization
The interaction between the legal cultures of the two systems and the
social context in which these processes unfold, has the potential to change
the meaning of punishments that are traditionally part of the repertoire of
these legal systems (Findlay 1997, Cain 2001). This is particularly so in the
case of customary systems which have, in the area of criminal law, been
subordinated to the received law. This would be consistent with observations
made by others regarding the changing nature of punishments in customary
courts which are sometimes state-initiated, sometimes not (Schapera 1938:46-
50, Roberts 1972, Bouman 1984). On the other hand, in the present context,
the common law system may be less affected in that it forms the basis for the
basic offence and punishment framework for the whole system, flexibility
clauses pertaining to punishment in the customary courts notwithstanding.
What appears to be happening at least in the case of offences that were
previously regarded as civil wrongs under customary law, and therefore,
generally or mostly subject to civil sanctions, is that customary courts now
tend to apply a mixture of traditional sanctions and penal sanctions in
those cases where they decide that multiple punishments would be the
appropriate penalty. Where preference for a certain penalty in respect of
certain offences has been combined with the basic, general or standard
punishment prescribed in the law, namely imprisonment, the effect has been
to make punishment of that particular offence harsher in comparison to
previously existing approaches.
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Overall the patterns of the study show that the general use by customary
courts of particular penalties relative to others was different to those found
by earlier researchers, though in some respects it remained fairly consistent
for specific offences. However, general patterns were closer to those found
by Schapera (1943) and Roberts (1972) than those found by Bouman (1984).
The former found that overall the leading penalties were
restitution/compensation, fine, jail and corporal in that order while the latter
reported a complete reversal of that pattern. The latter's study was limited
both in terms of the number of years covered and the depth of the study
regarding sentencing outcomes. The present study shows that the fine has
overtaken compensation as the leading disposal in customary courts.
However, in A Handbook on Tswana Law and Custom (1938:48), Schapera
indicated that the fine and strokes were the most common punishments in
customary courts though he did not indicate which was the more common of
the two. If we look at how customary courts punished nuisance-related
offences which includes use of insulting language, we can see that the fine
and strokes remain the predominant punishments but the picture changes
somewhat when multiple punishments are considered.
What is important in the context of this thesis is that when the deployment of
multiple punishments is considered, the picture changes considerably,
showing both consistency and departure from traditional ways of punishing
thus suggesting hybridization of punishments.
More generally, the type of hybridization associated with absorption or
borrowing of different ways of doing things in the context of a dual legal
order in Botswana has been observed in other areas of law (see Griffiths. A
1983; 1986; 1996; Molokomme 1991). This is not unusual in systems that
attempt to integrate customary systems with the common law (Cain 2001,
Findlay 1997). Griffiths. A(1983; 1986;1996; 1997) has correctly observed that
both the general and the customary legal systems do not represent pure
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species of their genre but rather mixed systems (after their own fashion).
Moreover, as social change transforms the structure of social organization
and traditional obligations and rights associated with them (Roberts 1971(b),
Griffiths. A 1987, Molokomme 1991) so it is to be expected that the meaning
of and social sensibilities relating to punishment will change (Garland 1990:
Chapter 10). But contestation over the latter between the liberal segments of
society and the more conservative elements will continue (State v Seepapitso
IV (1972) BLR43) and the product of a compromise between them may, to a
greater or lesser extent, reflect the values of both hence hybridization.
Frames of Reference of day7 and Professional Adjudicators
One of the possible sources of difference in the way customary and
magistrate courts punished may have been differences in the philosophical
disposition of customary and magistrate judges owing to their lay or
professional ideologies respectively. Lay and professional adjudicators are
known to rely on different frames of reference (Schutz 1970) in their decision¬
making (Asquith 1983), which implies in turn that the outcomes of their
decisions may be different (see Diamond 1990).
In the context of the present study magistrates may be seen as possessing a
professional stock of knowledge that they acquire as a necessary qualification
for their position/job. Because they are drawn from the ranks of
professionally trained lawyers, the magistrates would therefore be expected
to make their decisions based on the professional stock of knowledge,
ideology or norms (see Asquith 1983, Diamond 1990).
A lay person, (which customary court judges are in this context because they
are not trained to a professional level in law) would rely on what Schutz
(1970) has termed 'socially approved system of typifications and relevances'
(pagel21). They rely in their decision-making on the general stock of
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knowledge even though they would generally be expected to be more
knowledgeable than an ordinary person whose contact with the courts or the
law is limited. As regards customary law, a chief may or may not be well
versed in customary law (Roberts 1971(b)), but the system within which s/he
operates is theoretically expected to provide guidance as to the correct
application of the laws, rules and principles under the customary system.
But in relation to the general law, the customary court judge expresses
lay/customary ideologies through the use of procedures and application of
rules and other devices. Being untrained, the 'relevances' of customary court
judges not only include the general stock of knowledge and typifications
but they are also mediated by and intersect with a variety of variables
including biographies of the individual judges in ways and to a degree that
is different from that of their professional counterparts in magistrate courts
(see Damaska 1986).
It has been suggested that when lay judges operate in an environment
where the rules allow them scope for independent thinking and action,
the idiosyncrasies of individual judges are likely to assert themselves
(Damaska 1986:24 ). Such is arguably the case in relation to customary courts
judges' choice as regards punishment and punishment combinations. This in
theory makes for inconsistencies in punishments (see Ashworthl992(b),
Tonry 1988).
The results of the present study would seem to confirm the view that lay and
professional attitudes/ideologies are consequential for punishment (see
Findings 5C1, 5C2 and 5C3). Not only did penalties awarded by customary
courts show a wider array of punishments combinations than those awarded
by magistrate courts but they also had a wider intra-system range in severity
scores for any given offence group(MF9). The range of variation between the
lowest and highest severity scores for punishments awarded for by
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customary courts for any given offence was so much wider than that of
magistrate courts for corresponding offences. Thus, there was much less
predictability regarding punishments a customary court might award in any
given instance, especially in relation to both the nature and severity of
punishment an offender was likely to suffer. Inconsistency and the varied
range of punishment suggest predominance of idiosyncratic tendencies in
the decision-making patterns of customary court judges (Damaska 1986
Ashworth 1992(b)).
8.6 The Wider Context of Punishment
In the section immediately preceding the present one we considered how
a diverse conjunction of fairly specific factors might possibly be interacting
to produce divergent outcomes in the use of multiple punishments by
customary and magistrate courts. However, those processes can only be
properly understood within the broader context of social and historical
changes that have shaped the nature of punishment in contemporary
Botswana. More specifically, we are referring here to changes in the dynamic
between the values relating to punishment, the social structure and state
organization. It will be recalled that we discussed historical-normative
factors that have shaped the legal system since the founding of Botswana as a
British protectorate in 1885 in Chapter Three. The normative sketch of the
legal system drawn in that part of the thesis was of a general nature and as
such did not concern itself specifically with punishment. This section focuses
on punishment as the main theme as a part of an attempt to provide some
background to explanations of sentencing patterns proffered in the preceding
section.
8.6.1 Colonial Legacy and Post-Independence Instrumentalism
Botswana's punishment regime is relatively harsh compared with those of
countries in the southern African region that became democratic or attained
independence recently such as Namibia and South Africa (Isaacs 2004,
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Hatchard 1991;1992). It is, however, not atypical when considered in the
broad context of Anglophonic Africa (Tanner 1972, Coldham 2000). A
number of explanations have been put forward to explain why punishment
in Africa tends to be harsh. These explanations apply with equal force to
Botswana.
It has been suggested that African countries inherited generally harsh
punishment regimes from the colonial period (Tanner 1972:451, Coldham
2000:220). For example Tanner (1972:451) has observed that before
independence the rate of imprisonment in Africa was higher than Europe
and this trend did not alter after independence. Custodial penalties have
remained the dominant mode of punishment in African countries (Hatchard
1985:503). Others have observed that punishment in African countries tends
be directed towards retribution and deterrence (Coldham 2000:220)
The harsh punishment regimes in African countries have been associated
with attempts by these countries to cope with rapidly expanding populations
(Tanner 1972:458) and more generally, rapid socio-economic change which
has, according to Hatchard (1985:483), increased levels of criminality in
developing countries as a whole (see Shelley 1981, Sumner 1982). Some
scholars have gone further to suggest that after independence there was a
recognizable tendency towards instrumentalism on the part of the state in
Africa (Ghai 1991). The state generally showed disdain for the technicism of
law (Ghai 1991:8, see also Ng'ong'ola 1988) thereby encouraging the use of
punishment as a tool for fighting crime.
It has also been suggested that reluctance of African countries to liberalize
punishment coupled with lack of organizational capability and resources to
implement alternatives to custody has meant that Africa has not seen a
shift in punishment regimes that has occurred in other parts of the world,
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especially the developed world (see Tanner 1972, Hatchard 1985, Clodham
2000). At the same time it has also been argued that fiscal crisis might cause
countries to abandon imprisonment in favour of cheaper alternatives (Tanner
1972:458). It was only as recently as 2004 that there was, in Botswana, the
shift towards non-custodial options, even then as Tanner had predicted, it
was prompted by overcrowding in prisons and fiscal constraints rather than
a paradigm shift. The punitive aspect was maintained because the
alternatives to custody were enhanced considerably in order to avoid them
from being seen as soft options.
Like other African countries, Botswana has since independence, been
reinforcing what was already a harsh punishment regime by passing ever
harsher legislation (see Ramokhua 1985, Malila 1993, Nsereko 1999). By the
end of 1990s Botswana had at least nine separate mandatory minimum
pieces of legislation on the statute books, most of which were enacted within
a very short span (Nsereko 1999). We have observed that the punishment
regime in Botswana has traditionally tended to use imprisonment as the
standard punishment for almost all offences, even those offences of the most
a trivial nature. Moreover, the public regards prisons as 'recreational centres'
(Botswana Daily News 14/05/08) which may well encourage the courts to
combine imprisonment with other punishments. The refrain that prisons are
too comfortable is not peculiar to Botswana or Africa for that matter (see e.g
Sparks et al 1996). While it may be true that in Africa unlike in the
developed world the deprivations of those outside prison sometimes exceed
those of inmates even in relatively affluent countries like Botswana, overall
conditions in African prisons remain very harsh(Coldham 2000:235).
Instrumentalism appears to be influencing the government's attitude to the
criminal justice system as a whole. Even the introduction of the penal code in
1964 was tainted by instrumentalism in that the process had to be rushed so
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that the code could be used to deal with rioters in Francistown, a town in the
northern part of the country (Republic of Botswana2002). The customary
legal system has perhaps been a more pliable instrument in the hands of the
government in its fight against crime than the general legal system. For
instance customary courts have been given extra-ordinary jurisdiction in
order to allow them to try stock-theft and dagga (marijuana) cases in an
effort to curb growing incidence of these crimes. The inclination to use
customary courts as instruments of crime control is encouraged by weak
protections for defendants in customary procedure rules and the well known
disdain of customary courts for technicism (Kirby 1985). On a more general
level customary courts have been encouraged by both politicians and the
wider public to use corporal punishment generally as an instrument for
curbing social disorder and deviancy (see Frimpong 2000:224-229).
Yet despite the general shift towards an ever more punitive punishment
regime, there has been some movement in the other direction in some areas
in Botswana. For instance, while the higher courts in Botswana would not go
as far as other higher courts in the region have done to declare certain
punishments such as corporal punishment and capital punishment
inherently inhuman and degrading; they have enjoined the government to
consider reviewing the use of such punishments (see e.g Clover Petrus).
similarly the Children's Act was may be seen as an attempt to shift the focus
away from punitive measures in cases involving children and juveniles
towards reform of character (see S28 of Children's Act, Molaudi and other v
State, Maripe 2001). The higher courts have tried to ameliorate the harshness
of some of the mandatory minimum sentences where compelling reasons for
doing so are believed to exist by allowing down-ward departures in
appropriate cases (Moatshe). The pressure to allow downward departures in
cases involving mandatory minimum penalties (Moatshe), has also received
legislative endorsement (see Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2004).
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However, many of these developments would be expected to have little
effect on the normative practices of customary courts. As a general rule
customary courts are not well attuned to changes in the principles and
practices of the general courts. I have suggested in Chapter Four that while
some of the revisory and appeal mechanisms may be generally
instrumentally effective as corrective mechanisms, they have little impact on
a broader systemic level in the customary court system. We noted in Chapter
Four that judges in Botswana enjoy wide discretion and that generally the
appeal review system is more suited to dealing with extreme cases than
ordinary inconsistencies. In the case of the customary system effectiveness of
appeal reviews is blunted by a variety of factors, including low skills levels
of key customary court personnel, lack of a framework in the customary legal
system for ensuring that learning of rules and principles relating to
sentencing is done in a systematic fashion, and lack of a mechanism for
ensuring the transmission and assimilation of jurisprudence from the higher
courts. Limited guidance provided by the Customary Courts Commissioner's
office through memoranda would be unlikely to have been enough to
produce a lasting change in the sentencing practices of customary courts.
8.6.2 Socio-Economic Transformation and its Significance
Botswana has by most accounts undergone tremendous structural
transformation since independence in 1966 (Harvey and Lewis 1990, Hope
1996). When Botswana became independent from Britain, she was regarded
as one of the poorest countries in the world. For much of the colonial period
the country was neglected because it was seen as little more than a labour
reserve for South Africa (Parsons 1984). An estimated 40% of the male
population aged 20-40 were working in South Africa at independence
(NDP8:7).
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Despite a poor start, Botswana has enjoyed steady but sometimes-rapid
economic growth for about three decades. Earnings from diamonds
accounted for much of the growth having outstripped beef as the country's
major export in the 1970s. However, increasing diversification has seen the
contribution of the mineral sector to the GDP shrink from 50% in the mid
1980s to 34% in 1995/95 (NDP8). Unlike other mineral-exporting countries
elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, the country has ensured that steady
economic growth is maintained through good macro-economic policies
(Harvey and Lewis 1990, Hope 1996), sustainable human development
(UNDP 1990) and good governance (Harvey and Lewis 1990). But the
country is susceptible to periodic droughts and over the years they have had
a devastating effect on the rural economy. They have made arable agriculture
a rather unrewarding activity. Consequently the arable sub-sector has shrunk
considerably in size since independence. Cattle farmers generally have
suffered massive losses as a result of recurrent drought, but farmers with
small herds usually suffer far heavier losses than big farmers because, unlike
the latter, they do not own boreholes. This tends to exacerbate existing
income inequalities among rural households particularly during the
prolonged droughts such as those Botswana experienced in the 1980s. For
poor households loss of cattle can adversely affect returns from arable
farming because they rely rather heavily on their animals for ploughing
purposes.
Rapid economic growth has had a dramatic impact on the lives of Batswana.
Massive injection of resources by government into the development of social
and physical infrastructure has put Botswana at the top of the league table in
Africa in terms of access to social services for citizens (UNDP 1990). Flowing
from this has been the enormous expansion of job and income earning
opportunities in the cash economy, particularly for the educated. An
expanding economy has provided unprecedented opportunities for social
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mobility for many Batswana. It has also produced rural-urban migration on a
scale not seen before in the country's history.
Growing economic activity in major centres has not only altered patterns of
settlement but also resulted in rapid urbanisation. There are five areas of
population concentration (including the capital city) and almost all of these
are situated in the eastern sector of the country along the railway line. It is
estimated that about 50% of the country's population is concentrated in
urban villages and towns within a 100km radius of the capital city
(NDP8:11). The capital has experienced phenomenal growth over the past
three decades. In 1971 it had a population of about 18000 (Republic of
Botswana 1991) but by 1991 it had reached 133 468 (Republic of Botswana
1996) far outstripping the projected figure for that year. The urban
population in Botswana was put at 46 % (NDP8:24) of the total population
for the year 1991. The best facilities tend to be concentrated in urban centres.
Similarly the mean income of households varies according to size and type of
settlement with households in towns earning the highest incomes, followed
by those in urban villages and then those based in the rural areas or small
settlements.
Access to cash income has had a huge impact on social structure. While other
factors have played an important role in the transformation of the country,
the economy has been the dominant factor (Molokomme 1991:52-55). The
cash economy has replaced subsistence agriculture as the main focus of
economic activity for the majority of the population. Cash earnings are the
main source of income for most households. Figures show that in towns cash
earnings make up 75% of household income, whilst in urban villages and
rural areas it accounts for 63% and 41% respectively (NDP8:24). Other
sources include income in kind and, for the rural areas, own produce.
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Subsistence agriculture was the dominant sector in the economy at
independence accounting for 42.7% of the GDP but by 1994/95 the overall
contribution of the sector had shrunk to 4.1 %( NDP8: 19). Agriculture
accounts for approximately 2% of formal employment even though informal
employment in the sector is quite substantial (NDP8:227). The arable sub-
sector has contracted significantly. In contrast cattle remain an important
part of life in Botswana. It is probably the symbolic value attached to cattle
and the fact that they are perceived as a platform for asset formation that has
ensured that many Batswana continue to take an interest in them.
Despite increasing commercialisation, the cattle industry is heavily
dominated by the traditional cattle-farming sector. However the ownership
of cattle is highly skewed. In 1974/75, 5% of rural households owned 50% of
the cattle herd while 45 % owned no cattle at all (Republic of Botswana,
1976). The number of non-cattle owning households has actually increased
since the mid-1970s. A UNDP/UNICEF report (UNDP 1990) indicates that
the proportion of rural households without cattle in 1991 was between 49%
and 50 % (NDP8:77). The significance of cattle ownership should not be
underestimated. Several surveys have shown that there is apparently a
positive correlation between cattle ownership and access to other sources of
income such as wages and transfers in the rural areas (Republic of Botswana
1976; 1988).
Surveys also show that the proportion of rural households living below the
poverty datum line increased from 45% in 1974/5 (Republic of Botswana
1976) to over 50% in 1985/86 (Republic of Botswana 1988). However between
the latter period and 1993/94 (NDP8:91) the overall proportion of very poor
households declined from 49% to 38%. The distribution of wealth in
Botswana is clearly very skewed. To illustrate further, the Household
Income and Expenditure Survey of 1985/86 (Republic of Botswana: 1988)
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showed that the top 20% of the population had a cash income 24 times
greater than that of the bottom 20%. Between 1980-1991, Botswana was
regarded as the most unequal society in the world amongst countries for
which statistics were available (Datta 1994 see also Curry 1987).
Because of rapid economic growth over the last three decades the social
organisation of communities at village level especially in the large villages
that served as capitals of pre-colonial polities has changed dramatically over
the last three decades. One of the unique features of Tswana society is that
communities are organised according to a hierarchy of co-residential
administrative units (Schapera 1938, Roberts 1971(b), Comaroff and Roberts
1981). The foundational unit is made up of a household consisting of a
husband and his wife or wives as the case may be. Next to such a household
would be other male-headed households of kinsmen or family group. A
genealogically senior member would head the group in its turn. Together
with another or other groups of related family groups they constitute a ward,
which is the basic administrative unit in Tswana communities.
Traditionally, a headman was the political, administrative and judicial head
of the unit. Headmen were answerable to the village chief or paramount
chief. The chief was the overall political, judicial and administrative head of
the chiefdom. Subject communities had their own headmen who sometimes
were from the dominant community or were under the overall supervision of
the chief's representative. Thus members of subject groups had much less
influence if any over the affairs of the chiefdom than members of the
dominant community. Political and administrative activity in traditional
communities centred on the Kgotla, which also served as the community
court. The Kgotla is basically the place where the community meets to
discuss its affairs.
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Under the customary system the family plays a key role in the dispute
process. Families may deal first with disputes on an informal basis but senior
members are expected to take a leading role if the matter goes to formal
adjudication. There is evidence to suggest that the breakdown of the
traditional family is undermining the customary legal system. A study
conducted in the mid-1980s found that some women pursuing child support
claims experienced some difficulties because of lack of support and co¬
operation from their families (Griffiths. A 1987, see also Roberts 1972(b)).
Dispersal of families all over the country and away from their customary
wards also makes the participation of members of kinship groups in
dispute processes difficult, however willing they may be to do so. Inability
to bring together family members dispersed all over the country emerged in
the study already cited above as a significant factor influencing women's
decision not to use customary courts to pursue their claims (Griffiths. A
1987).
8.6.3 The Changing Architecture of the State: Meaning of Punishment in
the Context of the Modern State
The suppression of customary criminal law and the adoption of a penal code
based on the English common law (Chapter One and Chapter Three), not
only pushed the philosophy of punishment associated with (the specifically
western variant of) the modern state into a position of unassailable
dominance, but also seemingly purposely privileged it over indigenous ones
(Otlhogilel993, Himsworthl969). Based on general social science literature
(Maine 1965, Sack and Aleck 1992, Nader 1992, Lukes and Scull 1983), we can
safely assume that the transformation of the law/society relationship, will
necessarily translate into the transformation of the hitherto existing
meaning(s) of punishment, though to what extent remains a point for debate.
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Conceived in relation to the modern state as referred to above, punishment
assumes a legal-formal bias that excludes other possible dimensions of this
otherwise complex phenomenon (Garland 1990, Garland and Young 1992) in
that it is taken to mean state-administered sanctions. This is consistent with
the notion that law is state-generated which represents the overwhelmingly
dominant view of law in western contexts and in non-western societies that
are highly centralized (see Diamond 1973, Kuper and Kuper 1965, Hooker
1975, Griffiths.J 1986). The Flew-Benn-Hart definition (McPherson 1967,
Hudson 2003), named after the three individuals who contributed to its
development, is thought to capture better than other definitions
punishment in the legal-formal sense associated with modern state.
According to the Flew-Benn-Hart definition, five elements must be present
for an act to qualify as punishment: it must (a) involve pain or other
consequences normally considered unpleasant (b) be for an offence against
legal rules (c) be of an actual or supposed offender for his offence (d) be
intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender (e) be
imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system
against which the offence is committed (McPherson 1967:21). Others have
sought to extend the model but have not tampered with these five elements
(see Hudson 2003:2). While this definition has been criticized for a number of
short comings, which we will not concern ourselves with here, it has endured
(see Garland 1990:17, Hudson 2003) and remains the baseline definition of
punishment in state-dominated societies.
The major problem with the definition lies in its deployment as a generic
model of punishment in state-dominated societies without regard for the
manner in which states in widely different social formations are constructed.
It is suggested here that the meaning of punishment would vary with the
architecture of the state so that the Flew-Benn-Hart model may fall short
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because it is a peculiarly western invention (see Malila 1993). By the same
token absorption of pre-existing states by the modern state would change the
texture and meaning of punishment. This is what would appear to be
happening in Botswana.
8.6.4 Context: Punishment, Proportionality and Human Rights in Botswana
In many jurisdictions protection against punishment that violates the
principle of proportionality is expressed as a prohibition against certain
punishments which are considered inhuman, degrading or disproportionate
or grossly disproportionate. Many countries, including Botswana, have
elevated the principle of proportionality from a mere common law or
statutory principle to a constitutionally protected one. In some constitutions
the principle has been adopted in the exact form it is expressed in
international instruments such as International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and African Charter on Human and People's Rights
(ACHPR).
Interpretation of the principle may be made in relation to one or both of two
dimensions of punishment namely, the type and quantum of punishment
(van Zyl Smit and Ashworth2004, von Hirshl990;1992). In terms of the
former, certain types of punishments should be proscribed because they are
inherently inhuman, cruel, degrading or unusual, while in terms of the latter
the severity of punishment must be consonant with the seriousness of the
offence.
Botswana's constitution, protects against 'torture or to inhuman and
degrading punishment or other treatment' (S7 (1) Constitution Botswana) a
formulation that is similar to that contained in article 7 and 5 of the ICCPR
and the ACHPR respectively. As there is no international legal definition of
a cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ('torture' which often forms part of
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the list of prohibited conducts under various instruments, is the exception in
this regard) each country has tended to develop its own interpretation,
though reference is often made to international human rights
norm/jurisprudence (see Tshosa 2001). As a result of differences in
approach, the scope of protection against torture, inhuman and degrading
punishment varies between countries. It is therefore not surprising that
Botswana has carved its own approach in relation to the interpretation of
these terms.
It would seem that as part of its strategy to ensure that it retains control
over the definition or interpretation of torture, inhuman or degrading
punishment, the government of Botswana entered reservation upon
ratification of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The reservation restricts the
meaning of 'torture 'to 'torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or
other treatment prohibited by Section 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Botswana'
(http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4_l.htm2008).
However, Section 7 of the Constitution does not provide a substantive
definition of torture and inhuman or degrading punishment or other
treatment. The interpretation has been left to the courts which have
generally been rather circumspect in their interpretation, largely to avoid
being seen to be usurping the role of parliament (see e.g Clover Petrus ).
This does not, however suggest that the courts do not recognize that some
punishments may be inherently inhuman in nature. In Moatshe, the court (per
Tebbutt at p25) quoted with approval the observation by Gubbay J.A in the
Zimbabwean case of Ncube vs. S (1988)LRC 442 where he said punishments
such as the rack, the thumbs screw and other punishments of a similar nature
are inherently inhuman and degrading. The court also observed that
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excessive imprisonment is by its nature also inherently inhuman and
degrading.
Nevertheless, Botswana is one of the few countries that have retained two
forms of punishment that have been abolished in many jurisdictions, namely
corporal punishment and capital punishment. In Botswana, the use of
corporal punishment in both judicial and non-judicial contexts is lawful. As
indicated earlier, corporal punishment is widely used as a device for social
control. Like corporal punishment, capital punishment is a lawful sanction
but its use is extremely restricted. It may only be deployed by the higher
courts in appropriate cases.
Both corporal punishment and capital punishment have proved to be very
controversial sanctions (Shumba and Moorad 2000, Tafa 2002,). For example
the controversial nature of corporal punishment was brought into sharp
focus by a diplomatic row that erupted between Botswana and Zimbabwe
over the punishment of illegal immigrants from the latter in a customary
court at Mahalapye towards the end of 2004 (Midweek-Sun 07/01/ 2004, The
Mid-Sun 28/01/2004. The Herald 03/02/2004). The problem at the heart of
this diplomatic row was initially as much about the standard of justice
observed in customary courts as it was about the appropriateness of the
punishment imposed by the court but punishment became the dominant
theme as the debate evolved and developed. The controversy led to the
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) sending a
mission to Botswana in 2005 to query the use of corporal punishment on
Zimbabweans with the government of Botswana.
Similarly, the death penalty has in recent years been the subject of much
criticism from local and international human rights organizations. The
execution of Marietta Bosch, a South African citizen for murder in 2001
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attracted greater attention from international human rights organizations
than executions in Botswana usually do. The South African Human Rights
Centre tried to get the president of South Africa to intercede with the
president of Botswana on behalf of Bosch while the African Commission on
Human and Peoples' Rights met after the execution to consider contentious
issues around her execution
(http: / /www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/may017pres.html 2002).
In cases of where the constitutionality of the death penalty has been
raised before the Court of Appeal, the court has found itself constrained to
conclude that since the death penalty is legally provided for in the
constitution, the court has no power to proscribe it without appearing to be
legislating. Thus even if the court agreed with the sentiment expressed
elsewhere around the world that the death penalty amounted to torture,
inhuman or degrading punishment, it cannot do more than to merely exhort
parliament to consider banning it. The point was most forcefully made by
Aguda JA in Ntesang v State 1995 BLR 151. Speaking on behalf of the court in
that case, Aguda observed that,
"....despite that the death penalty may be considered, as
apparently has been elsewhere, to be torture, inhuman and
degrading punishment or treatment, that form of punishment is
preserved by subsection (2) of section 7 of the constitution. I
have no doubt in my mind that the court has no power to
rewrite the constitution to give effect to what the appellant has
described as progressive movements all over the world , and to
give effect to the resolution of the United Nations as to the
abolition of the death penalty. I however express the hope that
before long the matter will engage the attention of that arm of the
government which has the responsibility of effecting changes
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which it may consider necessary to further establish the claim of
this country as one of the great liberal democracies of the world".
The courts have taken a similar view regarding the question whether
corporal punishment is inhuman and degrading punishment. While
apparently deploring corporal punishment and hoping for a change of
attitude on the part of the legislature, in Clover Petrus the Court of Appeal
held that corporal punishment per se is not inhuman and degrading as
it is a lawful sanction. It seems clear that the courts are reluctant to tackle
the question whether certain types of punishments are inhuman and
degrading even if they may think so for fear of being seen to be assuming
legislative powers.
While the court did not declare corporal punishment as such to be inhuman
and degrading in Clover Petrus, it nevertheless held that the application of
strokes in instalments amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment. So
it was not so much the type of punishment as the method of administration
of the punishment that the court found to be unacceptable. In Desai the
court deleted corporal punishment when it was by law required to order its
use in combination with other prmishments to punish drug-related offences.
The court found that the deployment of such a combination of punishments
amounted to inhuman and degrading punishment.
In Botswana corporal punishment is used on children and young persons
both as a lawful sentence and a popular disciplinary measure (Leslie 1969,
Shumba and Moorad 2000). Under the Penal Code, the Customary Court Act,
and Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act (305), corporal punishment may
be applied on young persons below the age of 18 years as a lawful sanction
for crime. It is also used as a disciplinary measure in schools( Education
Act), the home, in penal settings and in institutions charged with the care
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of children and young persons (Prisons Act (S 108 andl09) and the
Children's Act (S 20).
On the other hand , there has been an attempt especially under the
Children's Act (1981) to protect children from indiscriminate and excessive
use of corporal punishment generally, and to shift emphasis away from
the use of corporal punishment on child offenders. This attitude was
confirmed and underlined by the Court of Appeal in State v Molaudi and
others (1989) BLR 24. In that case the court described the general spirit of the
Children's Act, especially Section 28, as being non-punitive.
However, since the Children's Act permits the use of corporal punishment
(S29), it does not make a complete break with traditional cultural patterns.
Furthermore, not only does the Customary Court Act and Penal Code,
appear to contradict the Children's Act but more importantly, they are
inconsistent with the Beijing Rules (Rule 17.3) which prohibits the use of
corporal punishment on children. Furthermore, it appears that the
enactment of the Children Act has not been marked by a decisive shift in
the way the courts handle cases involving children. A report on juvenile
delinquents (Hisayi 1995: 10) observed that cases involving juveniles were
not handled according to the Children's Act. The study found that the
most common punishments in cases involving juveniles were corporal
punishment, followed by fines while probation or other welfare oriented
approaches were hardly used.
The courts in Botswana appear to be taking inspiration ( Moatshe) from the
leading South African case of S v Dodo 2001(3) SA382 where the judge who
was speaking for the court, observed that, 'the concept of proportionality
goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is cruel, inhuman
and degrading' even though they have not seemingly gone as far as the
South African court did in so far as it declared any punishment which is
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not proportionate to be cruel, inhuman and degrading. Even though S7(l) of
the constitution of Botswana does not make an explicit link between
disproportionality and punishment that amounts to torture, inhuman or
degrading punishment, the challenges relating to disproportionate
punishment have relied on that clause, as have courts' interpretations of the
same. As we noted in Chapter Four of this thesis disproportionate
punishment is prohibited by both statute and the common law. It has only
been indirectly elevated to the level of a constitutional principle through
S7(l), if it is conceded that the provision is in some way concerned with
disproportionality as the courts would appear to assume.
In Moatshe, Tebbutt, speaking for the Court of Appeal observed that when
considering the question whether mandatory sentences were inhuman
or degrading, the court proceeded from the premises '(a) that although the
legislature is empowered to prescribe mandatory minimum sentences, it
cannot enact penalties that would amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading,
in conflict with the Constitution and (b) whether prescribed punishment is
in such conflict is a matter for decision by the judiciary.'
It is evident from Moatshe's case that in Botswana, for a punishment to be
held to be inhuman and degrading it must be 'grossly disproportionate'. It is
not enough for a sentence to be simply 'disproportionate' hence the court
cautioned that 'not every disproportionate sentence can be stigmatized as
being a constitutional violation. It will only be a violation where the sentence
is so unfit having regard to the offence and the offender as to be grossly
disproportionate.'
It is not clear to what extent this test is an improvement on Shoto in terms of
the protection it affords against harsh punishment. It will be recalled that the
test set out in Shoto was that punishment must not be so severe ' as to induce
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a feeling of shock'. Like was the case before, it is for the court to make a
determination, using its own value judgment whether a sentence is
grossly disproportionate. However the value judgment must be based on
objective factors, 'regard being had to the contemporary norms operating
in Botswana and the conspectus of values in civilized democracies of which
Botswana is one'.
8.6.5 Value Conflict and Institutional Discord within the Legal System
The introduction of the penal code and suppression of customary criminal
law was a radical step that did not allow for gradual assimilation of the
new values and principles as had been the case during the colonial era
(Schapera 1970, Gulbrandsen 1996). It involved the total replacement of one
type of law with another. As we have observed the concessions such as those
were in respect to some aspects of procedure and, to a limited extent with
respect to choice of punishment.
Furthermore, there was no attempt to determine what possible areas of
conflict there might be between customary law principles and those of the
English common law (penal code). Ironically before the introduction of the
penal code an attempt was made to reconcile English common law
principles with those of the Roman-Dutch law even though the latter was
going to be replaced by the former (Republic of Botswana 1965). To avoid
any conflict between the Code and Roman Dutch civil law, the government
engaged a consultant who was familiar with the Roman Dutch system and
English law to study the Nyasaland Penal Code with a view to eliminating or
keeping to a minimum the areas of conflict. It is apparent that while an
effort was made to reduce the possibility of conflict with Roman Dutch
law, there is nothing in the records to suggest that similar efforts were
invested to avoid conflict with customary law and the difficulties that
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might be presented by the general relation between customary civil and
customary criminal law.
Furthermore there was no attempt to determine to what extent the penal
code was consistent or relevant to the needs of a rapidly changing society.
This was as true for Botswana as it was for other African countries. This
was/is a penal code based on 19th century English law which has not kept up
with developments in the English law. Botswana like other African countries
(Tanner 1972, Hatchard 1985, Coldham 2000) has not so far given priority to
reform of the criminal law or criminal justice since the universalization of the
penal code. There was bound to be tension between the two legal systems
since received law tends to emphasize retribution and deterrence
(Coldham 2000:230 ) even where customary courts would prefer to deal
with certain offences in their own peculiar ways. The shift towards
alternative to custody and liberalization of punishment in general that has
been taking place around the world has not yet happened in Africa on an
appreciable scale (Tanner 1972, Hatchard 1985 ). Botswana is no exception in
this regard. It was only in 2004 that Botswana amended the penal code to
allow substitution of custodial sentences with non-custodial penalties in
relation to certain offences. This happened not as result of a change in
philosophical outlook regarding punishing, but rather as an attempt to ease
overcrowding in prison. The substitutes were ramped up so that they would
not be seen as softer options.
Some of the problems relating to conflict between the customary legal system
and the received legal system are caused by failure to properly reconcile the
two systems (see generally World Bankl996). For example, there was no
proper tidying up of the constitution to remove any doubts that might exist
regarding the subsistence of customary criminal law following the
universalization of the penal code (Brewer 1974, Otlhogile 1993, Frimpong
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and McCall-Smith 1992), even though it would appear that as far as the
higher courts are concerned the case of Bimbo v State settled any lingering
doubts on the matter. It will be recalled that in that case the High Court
overturned a conviction by a customary court of the defendant who had been
charged with adultery under customary criminal law on this particular
ground. The High Court held that adultery was neither an offence created by
the Penal Code or other written law and as such the conviction could not be
allowed to stand. As far as some scholars are concerned, the continued
existence of customary criminal law remains, at least theoretically, both
uncertain and contentious not least because of the ambiguous nature of the
written law test (Brewer 1972; 1974, Otlhogilel993).
The written law requirement is expressed in the constitution as follows: 'no
person shall be convicted of a criminal offence unless that offence is defined
and the penalty therefore is prescribed in a written law' (Section 10(8) of the
Constitution of Botswana). However, Otlhogile (1993) has suggested that the
written law rule applies to common law rather than customary criminal law.
It would seem that section 10 (12) of the Constitution is consistent with this
proposition. It reads (i.e. section 10 (12)) thus in part:
'Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law
shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of:(e)
Subsection (8) of this section to the extent that the law authorises a
court to convict a person of criminal offence under customary law
to which such a person may be subject'.
It is clear that the constitutions does not on its own, provide a conclusive
view on whether and/or to what degree customary criminal law is exempted
from the written law test. The written law requirement in Customary Courts
(Amendment) Act (1972) is just as ambiguous as the one in the constitution
on the question of the subsistence of customary criminal law. Brewer (1974)
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has suggested that the requirement could be interpreted in two ways. It
could mean that customary courts are allowed to charge a person with a
criminal offence as long as all elements of such an offence in the relevant
written law are not different from those in the customary law. Alternatively
customary courts could invoke customary criminal law as long as the offence
is of the type created by the penal code or written law. Brewer seems to
argue more strongly in an earlier article that the first interpretation is
probably the correct one : 'it seems certain that the theoretical effect of
section 4 of the Act is to eliminate any customary offence of a nature not
included in the Penal Code or other written law'(Brewer 1972: 285). S 11(3) of
the CCA seems to strengthen the view that the customary courts are/were
at the very least not expected to adhere strictly to written law in that it
provides that 'in the exercise of the jurisdiction under the provisions of this
section customary courts may be guided by the provisions of the Penal
Code.' It not clear what is meant by the phrase "guided by". Roberts
(1971(a):206) has speculated that it was probably meant to exempt
Customary Courts from strict adherence to the Penal Code to allow them to
familiarise themselves with the Code in years following its introduction in
these courts.
The words 'may be guided' seems to leave open the possibility that they
may not be so guided. It has an open texture about it. The notion of
guidance has caused confusion as to what it was intended to mean. It is
possible that the use of the phrase 'may be guided' was inspired by a
pattern suggested by a colonial administrator at a conference on ' The
Future of law in Africa' in 1959 (BNA 1965) where it was proposed that
'guidance' did not mean that an indigenous court could convict an
individual under customary law or with reference to specific provisions
to the Penal Code. He explained it thus:
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"Our conception of guidance is really procedural. I would like to read the
relevant passage in the White Paper on this subject. It says that in matters of
procedure a native court cannot be expected to observe all the details of a
new code of criminal procedure for some years to come. The Panel has
therefore recommended that it should be regarded as sufficient if a court has
informed the accused of the offence of which he is alleged to be guilty
without framing any formal charge under any specified section of the Penal
Code. That is to say the native courts need not frame a formal charge
provided that they acquaint the accused with the offence with which he is
charged".
In general terms, as far as punishment is concerned, there was no attempt to
examine the use of various penalties or interventions in the customary and
general courts. More importantly there was no attempt to determine the
normative meanings of different punishments for the two legal systems. No
attempts were made to re-conceptualize punishment to ensure that it
embraces dimensions of the phenomenon that are 'customary', or to make
it sufficiently elastic to allow varying interpretations of what constitutes
customary values and principles that might be proffered by those
interpretive communities that may have a stake in the customary criminal
process.
8.7 Effects of Sentencing Disparities on the legal System
Proportionality
Ideally and generally, sentencing standards and sentencing formulae are
expected, if they are not to produce unfair or unjust results, to restrain
judicial discretion sufficiently enough to ensure that 'like cases are treated
alike' while at the same time giving judges enough discretion to ' treat
different cases differently.' To violate any of these two limbs of what one
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writer has referred to as the 'equality injunction' (Tonry 1992:32) can only
produce iniquitous results which could bring the administration of justice
into disrepute.
As we noted in Chapter Four of this thesis disparities are not in themselves
unacceptable. In fact the basic model that Botswana follows allows judges
very wide discretion indeed. We observed in Chapter Four that judges in
Botswana have, on the whole, very substantial powers in relation to
sentencing matters. The restraints on their powers are few, and where they
exist, fairly loose. This in effect means that disparities are a normal feature of
the system. Furthermore, having customary and received courts operating
alongside one another suggests that framers of the Constitution and
legislation governing trials in both systems contemplated or expected that
value-based differences between the two legal systems would result in
different sentencing outcome patterns. To that extent both intra- system and
inter-system disparities are to be expected.
However, as even the equality injunction suggests, not all types or
magnitudes of disparities whether intra-system or inter-system are
acceptable. As a rule it is disparities that are regarded as capable of offending
the ordinary person's sense of justice (see Shoto ) or those that the court
would find offensive to justice normally which are referred to as 'unjustified'
or 'unwarranted'. Still there is no consensus regarding the kind of disparities
that ordinary people would regard as 'unwarranted'. In Chapter Four it was
correctly observed that the term disparity cannot be meaningfully employed
without reference to context (Galligan 1986: Tonry 1996:186).
Notwithstanding this observation, Tonry (1996) has proffered a generic
notion of 'unwarranted' disparities. He observed that, "... 'Unwarranted'
disparities exist when sentences in general are disproportionate to the
relative severities of offences for which they are imposed" (Tonry 1996:187).
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This definition seems wide enough to capture the various forms of disparity
that are the subject of this thesis.
Customary and general courts would appear to have different tests for
determining whether or not a sentence is unwarranted. As stated in Chapter
Four and Section 8.8.4 of the present chapter, in terms of Section 17 of the
Customary Court Act, all customary courts are prohibited from passing a
sentence that is 'disproportionate' while the higher courts will strike down
any sentence which is 'grossly disproportionate^ Moatshe) and therefore
offensive to S7(l) of the Constitution of Botswana).
The existence of different disparity tests for each type of court raises the
question as to how inter-system disparity may be measured. We observed in
Chapter One of this thesis that the question whether the values and
standards of justice in the customary and general courts are or should be
comparable has not only divided public opinion in Botswana sharply, but
it has also become a recurrent theme in public debates about the criminal
justice system as a whole. But in fact, as far as criminal matters are
concerned the legal system as a whole is premised on comparability of justice
in the customary and general courts so that the question is more about the
degree of comparability rather than whether comparability is desirable.
A number of factors would appear to argue strongly in favour of the notion
that comparative justice was intended to be the goal of the dual legal system
in Botswana, especially after independence. First, it is implausible that
comparable justice was not the desired end when it was the lack of
comparability between the two legal systems during the colonial era that
triggered the shift towards universalization of criminal law in Botswana and
elsewhere in Anglophone Africa (Barton et al 1983, Allott 1965; 1971;1984 ).
During the colonial period, it was accepted on an official level that no
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presumption could be made that the type of justice dispensed by the
customary courts was or ought to be similar or comparable to that dispensed
by the general courts. In contrast, post-colonial justice, especially in the area
of criminal law was based on a radically different premise: trials must be
conducted by separate courts applying one basic law according to roughly
comparable standards (see for instance Barton et al 1983).
Second, the direction of reforms in the area of criminal law since the colonial
period, including reforms, appear to have been intended to ensure that the
use of corporal punishment in triable-either-way offences in customary and
magistrate courts was for similar offences. Third, the desire for convergence
is evident from the steps that were taken when criminal law was
universalized in 1972 to ensure that, broadly speaking, important rights
enshrined in the Constitution were observed in the system as a whole, thus
ensuring the constitution served as the grund norm for both legal systems.
Fourth, the dominance of and priority accorded to the common law system
together with notions of justice based on the principles associated with that
system over those associated with the customary legal system suggest it was
expected that over time the latter would assimilate the values and principles
of the former or that it would eventually be phased out as some scholars
have suggested (Brewer 1974) (a) the implied continuing evolution of the
customary principles presumably in the direction of and in accordance with
modern principles of justice (b) that the received system being the dominant
system where the customary system appears to fall short of the ideals of
justice the presumption is that it should follow the lead of the former if
possible. Thus the structural arrangement of the courts and the statutory and
constitutional framework allow for and presume differences in the way
received and indigenous courts approach criminal cases while ensuring
comparability. Thus it can be inferred from this that the differences in
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outcomes in criminal cases were not really intended to exceed tolerable
limits.
Two factors made it imperative to find a test that could adequately
capture relative and non-relative aspects of proportionality without
completely ignoring the tests that each type of court is required by the law
to apply. The first problem is the gap between the proportionality tests
employed in the two systems. As noted above customary courts may not
pass sentences that are /disproportionate'(S7(l)) but the higher courts
(general courts) will interfere only when a sentence is 'grossly
disproportionate^ Moatshe).
If we take the disproportionate test employed by customary courts we find
that it is far from satisfactory if employed without regard to what happens in
the general courts. Such an approach produces iniquitous results such that
we find that punishments imposed by customary courts for a particular
offence are not comparable in severity/leniency to those imposed by
magistrate courts or where sentences imposed for lower level offences in one
court rival those of higher level offences in the other court as findings of
this study indicate.
Even if we assume that quanta of the punishments awarded by customary
courts make sense in context of the 'internal relativities' of the customary
system, perceived sentencing powers deficit or if we were to concede that
the customary system should be considered on its own for reasons of
'culture' or public approval, a number of objections relating to the
principle of proportionality still remain. For a start, the severity score ranges,
and the degree of variability in combinations of multiple punishments
imposed by customary courts in relation to any given offence category
means that there were wide disparities in the punishment of the same type
of offence or offences from the same band of offences by the same court at
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different times (intra-system disparity). Both of these factors undermine
comparative proportionality of offences within bands of offences.
If we rely on the test of 'gross disproportionality' preferred by the general
courts, we will find that sentences are in themselves or in comparison to
those awarded by the general courts for similar offences are disproportionate
and will most likely never get the attention of the higher courts. It is
evident that the threshold required for intervention, namely that the
sentence should be 'grossly disproportionate'(Moafs/?e) or of such severity
'as to induce a feeling of shock'(Shoto), is too high. The result is that what
such policing of sentencing as the higher courts might be able to do would
only be concerned with outliers or extreme cases. There is considerable scope
for the courts, especially customary courts, to pass sentences that in and of
themselves or in comparison with those awarded by magistrate courts, may
induce a sense of injustice without necessarily failing the gross
disproportionality or shock test.
It may be argued that there is no need for the general courts to concern
themselves with disparities of a general nature since there already exist
lower levels appeal and review mechanisms that could identify and deal
with such disparities. But the existing mechanisms are not equipped to
address this type of disparity for a number of reasons. As we saw in
Chapter seven customary courts judges were generally hostile to reviews
by the Customary Courts Commissioner and the District Commissioner as
they felt that the latter's interference with sentences undermined their
authority and power. General sentencing patterns, therefore, tended to go
unchallenged. The Customary Court Commissioner and the District
Commissioner might also be dissuaded by practical considerations from
trying to interfere with sentences to an extent that would alter the general
patterns. It would be impractical to alter too many of the cases as it would
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result in the two offices being overwhelmed by the caseload. Furthermore,
these two mechanisms (even the customary court of appeal) lacked the
comparative perspective of the higher courts to be able to anchor sentences
properly in relation to those awarded by general courts. In any case very few
cases tried in customary courts actually go to appeal (Boko 2000).
It is reasonable to conclude that a more universal disparity test that takes
into account the standards internal and external to each systems is
required. The notion of 'unwarranted' disparity put forward by Tonry
(1996) overcomes many of the limitations evident in the two tests
discussed above and would appear to be suited to the task in that it allows
us to evaluate disparities within and between systems.
Were Disparities in the Punishment Awarded by the Courts Unwarranted?
If we consider the severity score ranges, and the degree of variability in
combinations of multiple punishments imposed by customary courts in
relation to any given offence category we can see that there were wide
disparities in the punishment of the same type of offence or offences from
the same band by the same court at different times. This suggests a high
degree of inconsistency in the sentences passed by customary courts. By
contrast the score ranges for punishments awarded by magistrate courts for
corresponding offences were very narrow and the variability of punishments
very limited, implying relatively high levels of consistency in the sentences.
The degree of inconsistency in customary court punishments as well as that
between them and those awarded by magistrate courts cannot be justified.
Multiple punishments awarded by customary courts may be regarded as
unjustified by reason of their severity. There does not appear to be any
clear relationship between seriousness of offence and punishment severity so
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that score values pertaining to what should ordinarily be regarded as low
level offences often compete with those of somewhat higher offences.
It may be argued that different levels of discretion give the courts the
opportunity to punish in accordance with their ethos, but this is doubtful
since the multiple punishments meted out by customary courts neither
represent the customary system nor do they reflect ways of the introduced
system.
Instead the punishments awarded were harsher than those that would have
been imposed by customary courts in the past and those imposed by
magistrate courts currently. The question that must asked is why even minor
offences would be regarded as representing what would appear to be such a
threat to the public that they must be punished in the way that they are by
customary courts? If punishment is based blameworthiness on the offender,
what are the implications of having a system that is inconsistent in the way it
lays blame and punishes offenders?
The seemingly haphazard way of punishing offender violates the presumed
parameters and logic of offence ranking. It cannot be acceptable that
similarly situated offenders should suffer or be at risk of suffering
significantly different punishments for similar offences simply because their
cases have been sent to different types of courts for trial. If a punishment
imposed by one type of court for a minor offence like common nuisance
exceeds that of fairly serious offences like Assault Occasioning Actual
Bodily Harm, then that offends the ordinary person's sense of justice and
would also tend to undermine the offence ranking system that underpins the
Penal Code. It therefore, stands to reason that the legislature never intended
to authorize such a degree of difference in sentencing outcomes nor would it
have contemplated that any part of the system could in the normal course of
events, punish beyond what is necessary to curb unwanted behaviour.
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This study has shown that differences in the structure of discretion of
customary and magistrate court judges, together with other factors,
introduce a disparity of a qualitatively different nature from ordinary
disparities that might be expected in the generic discretionary model
operating in the general courts as discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.
In particular this study found that differences in the structure of discretion as
to combination of punishments together with attitudes, orientation and
normative practices combine to produce unjustifiable disparities in the
punishment of offences.
Sentencing Discretion, Fairness and Equality
Apart from objections pertaining to proportionality, disparities raise a
number of other issues that have a bearing on the public confidence in the
criminal justice system as a whole such as human rights, fairness, and
equality of treatment. Some of these issues have dominated the public
discourse on inequities of the criminal justice system in Botswana in the past
forty years or so (Baillie 1969, Kirby 1985, Boko 2000, Tshosa 2001).
Amongst the general objections against unnecessarily severe punishment is
that it raises questions about the value the customary courts impliedly attach
to the rights of those tried in such courts if such severe intrusions on rights
and other deprivations are going to be visited individually for relatively
minor transgressions (see von Flirsch 1992). This is particularly serious given
the limited protections afforded those tried before such courts (Chapter Four)
and the propensity of customary courts to convict (Chapter Five).
One of the problems raised by excessive punishment is that whatever the
intended objective of punishment may be, human beings, should not,
according to Kant, be used as a means to an end( von Hirschl990:280-1).
Others have suggested punishment by its very nature diminishes 'positive
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freedom' (Cavadino and Dignan 2003:55). Therefore, on that basis it should
be kept to a minimum or even avoided where it is possible to do so.
Excessive punishment adds to a generally corrosive atmosphere in which the
value of human rights is denigrated.
Flexibility clauses in the Penal Code (S28 (4)) and the Customary Court Act
(SI7 (3)) relating to punishment of young persons as well as differences in
the discretion of the courts regarding choice as to combination of
punishments causes some defendants to suffer unnecessary prejudice and to
that extent, therefore, undermines the principle of equality before the law, or
at least non-discrimination. This issue in turn raises questions regarding
fairness and non-discrimination within the legal system. The principle of
equality before the law finds expression in Botswana's Constitution through
Section 15, which forbids discrimination on the basis of race, tribe, and place
of origin, political opinions, colour or creed. It will be noted that Section 15
does not mention certain groups thus effectively leaving them open to
discriminatory practices.
The people most likely to suffer prejudice would be those appearing before
customary courts generally and young persons specifically. The latter would
be likely to suffer disproportionately harsh punishment not only because
of the insistence by customary courts presidents that cases involving young
persons be channelled to them but also because such courts would already
have implicitly assumed a hostile posture towards young persons. Amongst
youthful offenders as a group, young males are at the greatest risk of
suffering unfair treatment. Unlike other groups, they are subject to corporal
punishment because of the flexibility clauses in Section S28 (4) and Section
17(3)) of the Penal Code and the Customary Courts Act respectively. In these
circumstances it cannot be argued that citizens have an equal chance or
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choice of being tried in either forum. By extension they do not have any
equal chance of being convicted or suffering certain kinds of punishment.
8.8 Dualism and Social Change
Just as the nature of dualism has been changing constantly since the advent
of the dual legal system (Chapter Three), so it has been changing in the area
of criminal law since the reforms of 1972 due to a myriad of factors, not the
least of which include changes in social structure, expansion in
opportunities for education, a growing culture of human rights( Boko2000)
Molatlhegil997), adoption of international protocols on criminal justice
standards(Tshosa2001), shifting cultural and life style patterns(Robertsl971
(b), Griffiths.A1983) and the changing dynamics in the relationship between
the two legal systems (Griffiths.A1983; 1997). This may explain, to a certain
extent, the persistent and growing concerns about differences in the
standards of justice rendered by the received and customary courts. The
results of the present study underscore the need for reform.
Implications: Reconciling Legal Institutions -General
One of the challenges currently facing post-colonial societies across the world
in the area of criminal law is that of finding ways to incorporate indigenous
practices and principles in the criminal process, including sentencing, in
ways that are consistent with the national constitution and human right
practices (see Findlay 1997, Cain 2001). The second problem is to find ways
of doing so that reflect a dynamic rather than a static notion of culture in
order to remain in tune with changing life styles and social complexities of
developing societies (McLachlan 1988).
Traditional institutional pluralism is not only based on a static approach of
the law/culture relationship but also stresses cultural identity at the level of
nation/group at the expense of internal group and individual lifestyle
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diversity (Greenhouse 1998, McLachlan 1988). Thus it takes a rather narrow
view of what group identity means in respect of the law/culture matrix.
Even when taken on its own terms this approach has the effect of
suppressing diversity within identified 'cultural groups' in that it ignores
differences among the constituent elements of traditional societies. In that
way it may, for instance reflect only traditionalist or lawyer's interpretations
of customary law rather than the living law (see Molokomme 1995).
In Africa attempts at reconciliation of legal systems that followed in the
wake of all Africa conferences on the future of customary law (Allott
1965;1971;1984) were in the mould of official pluralism which emphasised
the law/culture opposition based on the interpretation of culture in the
strong sense (see Greenhouse 1998,Dembour 1996). It also reflected the
rigidities infused into the system through harmonization of criminal law and
legal institutions in that it did not appear to recognize import of the
continuing dynamic between legal systems.
The static view of the relationship between legal systems is being
increasingly challenged (Merry 1988, Griffiths. A 1997). The Australian Law
Reform Commission has suggested that the way forward may lie in what has
been termed the 'functional recognition approach' to customary law
(McLachlan 1988). The approach represents a fundamental shift away from
the traditional approach to plural legal systems, primarily but not exclusively
because it suggests that the relationship between state law and indigenous
law should be regarded as both a dynamic and an 'indefinitely continuing
phenomenon.' It recognizes and acknowledges the diversity of the aboriginal
life styles and does not limit their choice as to which system they can use in
pursuit of justice. There is increasing recognition of this important dynamic
even in jurisdictions that traditionally did not even recognize relevance or
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importance of indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms in the lives of
ordinary people or at least certain section of their populations.
Some countries like Canada, Australia and some Pacific Islands whose legal
systems traditionally did not provide for the recognition or accommodation
of indigenous legal institutions and/or their ways of resolving disputes
have become more open to the latter's ideas and principles. It has been
suggested that in Africa where the set up is dominated by western style
courts and ideas about punishment, African perspectives on justice remain
excluded largely from the criminal justice system (Tannerl972, Coldham
2000), while the integration of indigenous and received systems in Africa was
expected to take a long time (Read 1963, Allott 1965; 1971), it has not been
systematic and focused.
In the area of criminal law, there is an increasing push internationally, for
countries to re-design their legal systems in such a way that they
accommodate and tap into indigenous legal systems' methods of dealing
with disputes even if those systems are not formally integrated into the
recognised legal system.. For instance, Canada has been exploring and
experimenting with the aboriginal concept of the Sentencing Circle in
criminal process for sometime (see Green 1998). A variety of international
instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990)
(article 40(1), Declaration of Basic Principles for Victims of Crime and Abuse
of Power (1985) (Principle 7) and United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for Non-Custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules 1990) encourage the
incorporation and use of methods, principles and measures beyond those
traditionally associated with state sanctions to deal with accused and
convicted persons.
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Reconciling Legal institutions: Specific Lessons for Botswana
It has been suggested that contact between the customary and received
system in Botswana has engendered conflict (Otlhogile 1993), concord or
mutual adaptation (Griffiths. A 1983), and domination (Otlhogile 1993) of
one by the other. No one interpretation holds true for all dimensions of the
entire relationship all of the time or across all branches of law. Different
things might happen at different contact or nodal points so that the
relationship generates tensions, contradictions, connections, divergences,
disjunctions and shifts as dynamics change (Merry 1988).
The present study shows, however, that as far as matters relating to
punishment are concerned, the dominant feature of the relationship between
the two systems is conflict. Some of the conflict emanates from issues which
it is generally officially thought were settled in 1972 or through precedents
such as the case of Bimbo v State, which was thought to have resolved once
and for all the question whether any court in Botswana could try and punish
someone for a customary criminal offence that is not found in the statute
books. However, it appears that for customary courts the question of
suppression of customary criminal law and the triumph of legal formalism is
not yet settled. As data from interviews with customary court judges in the
present study shows, and as the case of State v Bogatsu and others clearly
illustrates, there is continuing resistance to legal formalism by the customary
system. Thus, conflicts regarding the appropriate approach to disputes, more
precisely, their nature and substance, and how they ought to be resolved
seem set to continue for sometime into the future.
Thus the criminal process, including sentencing, requires a systematic
process of reconciliation at value, process and institutional level in order for
confidence in the criminal justice system as a whole to be restored. More
specifically, it needs to adjust sufficiently to such changes as may have
occurred in the customary and general system and the wider society, to
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ensure that the ethos of comparable standards, implicit in the original
quest for comparable justice that animated early reforms, is not lost.
In Botswana there is no explicit provision in the law that indicates an
objective or intention to promote customary approaches to punishment.
However, indigenous approaches to the dispute are given limited
recognition but not necessarily specific recognition. In the case of
punishment it appears that it is expected that through choice of punishment
the 'customary attitude' would manifest itself. Other ways in which
customary approaches have been implicitly recognized is in the non-
separation of civil and criminal elements in criminal cases attracting
compensation. But it must be recognized that even procedures around
compensation and fine appear to accommodate customary approaches, the
context of the use of these punishments may be changing their meaning and
symbolic value.
Perhaps the way forward is to create space for positive aspects of both
indigenous and received legal systems through systematization of principles
relating to punishment. In the case of customary law this could be through
an exercise similar to the Customary Law Restatement Project which was
taken by the University of London in the areas of personal law in the period
immediately following independence. The tricky question is how these
processes are merged and/or recognized. For instance, while current rules
recognize reconciliation, the formal process does not allow reconciliation to
run concurrently with other processes: should this change? Through a
process of review suggested above, positive principles of the customary
dispute process such as reconciliation could be absorbed into the legal
process while at the same time recognizing that they may be appropriate
for certain types of disputes but not others.
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Similarly, there needs to be sensitivity to the fact that in a society that is
settlement-oriented like Botswana (Schapera 1938, Comaroff and Roberts
1981), western style courts' 'winner-take-all' or zero-sum game approach to
disputes (Seidman 1978:213) can ruin social relationships or leave the
disputants unsatisfied with the outcome on a psychological and social level.
In traditional communities, most cases involve individuals who are
neighbours and relatives/kinsman, therefore resolution of dispute must
involve removal of grievance. It must be recognized that flexibility about
mediation negotiation/dispute settlement satisfies a need that is deeply felt
while the winner-takes-all approach encourages hardening of feelings of
hostility between the disputants (Seidman 1978:214).
8.9 Methodology
The present study provides some useful insights into issues of methodology
in cross-systems research where the subject of research is the normative
practices in systems that are anchored in different legal and social cultures.
Studies concerned with norms pertaining to legal systems, especially
customary law, are notoriously difficult to execute (Moore 1997, Comaroff
and Roberts 1977, Naderl992) partly because customary systems range from
the relatively well differentiated to those that hardly recognize the boundary
between legal and non-legal orders (Eliasl956). Naturally the methods
employed in different studies as well as their objectives for concentrating on
norms are diverse. So it is to be expected that in addressing this question
most writers often talk past rather than to one another (Comaroff and
Roberts 1977).
In a study such as the present one, traditional problems of methodology,
philosophical and theoretical approaches that are generally associated with
'comparative law' are compounded by the fact that the researcher on
indigenous and received law in Africa must contend with legal systems
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marked by parallelism, partial or full integration at a general level or
characterised by these variations across different branches of law. To add to
this complexity the systems involved may differ on socio-cultural and legal-
cultural levels or both.
Consequently, a study such as the present one provides some useful lessons
regarding the use of quantitative and qualitative methods in a way that
serves the specific requirements of the project while avoiding the traditional
ideological entanglements associated with the choice of methodology. The
objective of the study was to consider variations in relation to norms of a
very specific nature (those relating to sentencing) in the context of two legal
systems on one level and those of a very general and vague nature on
another (process/process values)(see Henham2000). In relation to the former,
the starting point was provided by a common offence framework. This
meant that the problem of equivalence of concepts was avoided (see Makoba
1992), at least at a superficial level, by the use of common reference points
(offences/ punishments). However, I was conscious of the fact that the
meaning of these concepts at a descriptive level might not necessarily be
consistent with their meaning at a normative level as far as the different
courts were concerned, a factor which could very well be the source of
differences in sentencing patterns. Thus, it became necessary to understand
the meanings attached to these concepts at a deeper level and these were
uncovered through interviews, court observations, general literature and
case law. The study sought to make meaningful comparisons regarding
outcomes of cases and punishments in two types of courts without ignoring
the significance of rules or processes (see Comaroff and Roberts 1977; 1981,
Summers 1974).
Yet it was necessary to prioritise different aspects of the investigation
according to the primary objective of the study and I found that the Mixed
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Method Strategy (MMR) provided me with a framework that transcends the
rigidities of traditional methods.
8.10 Call for Further Research
I observed in the opening sections of this thesis that remarkably little
empirical research has been done on the comparative aspects of the criminal
process in ordinary and customary courts in Botswana despite the topicality
of the subject. This thesis has attempted in its own modest way, to close that
gap in the area of sentencing. One of the ambitions that this study set for
itself was to find out whether the differences in the structure of discretion
of judges of customary and magistrate courts as regards the punishments
they may impose not just in cases involving similar offences but also those
involving similarly situated offenders, produces significantly different
outcomes. Accordingly, we tried to measure the effects (outcomes) of
variations in the discretion as to choice or substitution of punishments taking
into account what we have termed legal and non-legal variables.
Unfortunately thinness of data prevented that part of the exercise from
being executed fully or to yield more conclusive results than those
presented in this thesis. This is a question which future research could
address using a larger data set spanning a longer period than that covered by
supplementary data used in this study, which was four years for this
particular data set, could answer.
8.11 Recommendations: Policy
The major findings discussed in this section of the concluding chapter take
us back to issues and concerns that triggered the need for a study of this
nature in the first place. We observed in Chapter One of this thesis that the
question whether the values and standards of justice in the customary and
general courts are/or should be comparable has not only divided public
opinion in Botswana sharply, but it has also become a recurrent theme in
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public debates about the criminal justice system, as a whole. The disparities
relating to the deployment of multiple punishments underscore the
importance of this issue.
It is, therefore, imperative that adjustments should be made that would make
sentencing outcomes in the customary and general courts more comparable.
One of the more radical solutions that have been proposed is that criminal
jurisdiction of customary courts should be removed completely (see Boko
2000 for example). However, it may not be practical to remove the
jurisdiction of customary courts over criminal matters as has happened in
some neighbouring states. As we noted elsewhere in this thesis, customary
courts handle the majority of criminal cases processed by the courts in
this country so much that some have argued, perhaps, justifiably, that the
criminal justice system could not possibly function without them (Bouman
1984). More crucially, customary courts have a far greater reach into the rural
areas than the general courts. If the government were to attempt to replace
all the customary courts with general courts it would have to be prepared
to incur heavy financial costs which it almost certainly cannot afford given
budgetary constraints that have emerged in recent years.
Having said that, policy makers may want to consider whether it is desirable
or whether it serves the interests of justice that cases tried before customary
courts should be imprisonable. In some jurisdictions lay judges may not try
imprisonable offences if they are not sitting with a trained lawyer on the
bench or do not have a clerk who is a trained lawyer to advise them. This
study found that one of the factors that had the effect of making punishments
harsh was that the courts are allowed to combine imprisonment with any
number of other penalties. In order to reduce unjustified differences in
outcomes, customary courts' discretion as to combination of punishments
should be restricted or reviewed such that they cannot combine punishments
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in ways that would make them seem iniquitous. To that extent, the use of
different combinations of punishments should be specified and the allowable
number of punishments in respect of the offence stated. This should be done
with the object of ensuring that punishments available to customary
courts are comparable even if different from those that magistrate courts
would impose for similar offences. More radically, lawmakers could
formulate guidelines for customary courts along the lines of the Minnesota
model (see Tonry 1988).
From another perspective it seems that the overall menu of available
punishments was rather limited in that it did not include disposals that
would obviate the need to resort to unnecessarily harsh punishments to
punish lower-level offences. It is recommended in that regard, that the menu
be extended to include punishments not currently available to adult courts
such as probation and supervision orders. In addition substitutability of
punishments should be reviewed to ensure that alternate punishments are
generally of roughly equal severity.
More generally, it seems that customary courts are unlikely to relinquish
their traditional role as mechanisms of social control whose mandate has
always been wider than that contemplated by the law (eg Customary
Court Act) in the near future. To allow them to continue to exercise these
wider functions without offending the written law requirement or resorting
to the criminal process in order to deal with minor misconduct, the
government could introduce legislation that gives them flexible power
along the lines of United Kingdom's Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. It
would allow intervention outside the framework of criminal law with the
possibility of entry into the criminal justice system in cases where such




Lower customary courts are presided over by headmen, who also serve as
ward heads in large villages or village heads in smaller settlements. Lower
customary courts may not sentence any person to a period in excess of six
months. There is growing evidence from research which suggests that
customary courts generally, and lower courts in particular, continue to deal
with certain types of disputes informally before they proceed with formal
adjudication as they would have done in the past .Magistrate courts are
known to refer cases of domestic violence to Customary Courts for
reconciliation and mediation.
Chiefs Court
Before they were brought together under the state system different chiefs'
courts served as the courts of last instance for various tribal communities.
Despite the emergence of new overarching structures like the Customary
Court of Appeal Chief's Courts continue, to a large extent, to perform this
function at district level. Today they also serve, to a greater extent than
before, as courts of first instance (Schapera: 1970: 5) In terms of the relevant
enabling statute this grade of court may not sentence any person to a term of
imprisonment exceeding one year.
Urban Courts
Urban courts perform the same functions as other customary court except
that they do so in urban context. There is one crucial difference between
urban courts and other customary courts: they do not have the same links
with the communities they serve that the latter have. It is consequently not
clear whose customary law is applicable in such courts.
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The Customary Courts Commissioner (abolished 2001)
The Customary Courts Commissioner advises the Minister of Local
Government and Lands, on matters pertaining to customary law. S/he is also
charged with supervising and guiding all customary courts.
Customary Court of Appeal
The Customary Courts of Appeal is the highest court in the customary courts
structure. The jurisdiction of the Customary Court of Appeal is mostly
appellate though it must be pointed out that it has original jurisdiction in
certain areas that are out of the reach of lower customary courts. The
decisions of this court are appellable to the High Court. This is the point at
which the customary court system and general system converge. The
Customary Court of Appeal was set up as recently as 1986 even though it has
apparently been provided for since shortly after independence.
Ordinary/General Courts
Magistrate Courts
Magistrate courts in Botswana can trace their lineage to (colonial) courts like
those in England so named were presided over by laypersons. During the
colonial period the magistracy comprised of a class of administrative officers
with no legal training who had powers to carry out judicial functions. The
District Commissioner and District Officer (Administration) continued even
after independence to perform quasi-judicial functions.
Today only professionally trained lawyers preside over cases that come
before magistrate courts. Magistrates (The Magistrate Courts Act the Laws of
Botswana Voll Chapter 04:03) fall into four Grades: chief magistrate,
principal magistrate senior magistrates, magistrate grade Magistrate Grade II
and I' all of whose jurisdiction varies according to seniority. The Magistrate
Act 60(1) (The Magistrate Courts Act 60(1)) gives the Chief and Senior
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Magistrates 'jurisdiction to try any offence, except an offence, which is
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 21 years.' Magistrates'
courts probably rank second after customary courts in terms of the volume of
criminal cases they handle per a year.
The High Court
The High Court has unlimited original jurisdiction. Apart from being a court
of first instance it entertains appeals from both Magistrates Courts and the
Customary Court of Appeal. It also has the power to supervise proceedings
in the lower courts if it considers that it is in the interest of justice to do so.
Recently the High Court started sitting in circuit around the country.
The Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal is the ultimate court in Botswana. Its main function is to
hear appeals from the High Court. It became the court of final appeal in 1973.
(Otlhogile 1994:37). Prior to that, decisions of the Court of Appeal in the
Botswana, were, like those of similar courts in a number of other
independent Common Wealth Countries, appellable to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in the United Kingdom.
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APPENDIX B: Sentencing Powers ofMagistrate and Customary Courts
The jurisdiction of chiefs and magistrates as regards punishment is subject to
certain limitations. This section gives an overview of the sentencing powers
of the judges of the courts under discussion and the menu of punishments
generally available to them. Sentencing powers of all judicial officers are
shaped first and foremost by the Constitution which is the primary
normative framework for the legal system as a whole. The Constitution
provides not only that no person may be convicted of an offence unless it is
defined by written law but also that the penalty for such an offence must be
prescribed by written law (section 10(8) Constitution of Botswana). Offence-
creating sections of the Penal Code generally prescribe the appropriate
penalty for each offence and where they do not; section 33 of the Penal Code,
which provides for a general punishment, is applicable (Section 33 of the
Penal Code). In such cases a prison term of not more than two years, a fine
or both of these, may be imposed. In every other instance therefore the court
must inflict the penalty prescribed or its substitute, unless otherwise
provided or exercise its discretion to suspend the sentence caution the
offender or discharge him/her without proceeding to conviction.
A court of competent jurisdiction may impose any of the following
punishments where such are prescribed in relevant provisions of the offence-






f) Finding security to keep the peace and be of good behaviour or come up
for judgement
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g) Any other punishment provided by the Penal Code or by any other law
The last category (g) presumably includes extramural labour and a
discharge without punishment. Lower courts, including magistrate courts
do not have the jurisdiction to try offences that attract the death penalty
such as murder.
(i) Substantive Jurisdiction: Magistrate
Magistrates do not have a blank cheque regarding other offences either. The
sentencing powers of magistrates differ according to rank or grade. (Section
61 Magistrate Court (Amendment) 1999). Magistrates may not inflict
punishment which exceeds that which the law prescribes for a particular
offence except where they have been authorised by the Chief Justice through
a statutory instrument to do so.
Chief Magistrates: 15 years' imprisonment or P45 000 or both. Where
corporal punishment is applicable they may impose a maximum of 12
strokes. A Principal Magistrates is allowed a maximum of 12 years
imprisonment or P30 000 or both. S/he is also allowed to impose a
maximum of 10 strokes. Senior Magistrates: 10 years' imprisonment or P20
000 fine or both. They are allowed a maximum of nine strokes where
corporal punishment is specifically sanctioned by the law. Magistrates
Grade I: 7 years' imprisonment or P15000 fine or both. Magistrates Grade II:
5 years imprisonment or P10 000 fine or both. Where applicable Magistrates
Grade I and Magistrate Grade II, may impose a maximum of 7 strokes and 5
strokes respectively.




The courts have been given considerably greater discretionary powers in this
area than in others. Judges are allowed to impose a prison term of any length
they deem fit for offences punishable with life imprisonment or any other
period as long as they do not exceed the specified maximum. Furthermore,
they may in the case of an offence punishable with imprisonment impose a
fine in addition to or instead of imprisonment. Custodial sentences are
applicable to all categories of offenders with the exception of young
offenders under the age of 14 years (Section 27(1) Penal Code).
Corporal Punishment
Use of corporal punishment is restricted to those offences for which it is
specifically authorised by the law (Section 28(1) of the Penal Code). The court
is obliged in law to specify the number of strokes to be administered and
may in any case not impose a sentence of more than a dozen strokes or more
than half a dozen if the convicted person is under the age of 18 years (Section
28(2) PC).
As a form of punishment corporal punishment is not universally applicable
to all categories of offenders. Females and males who have been sentenced
to death and males who in the opinion of the court are more than 40 years of
age are not subject to corporal punishment. The court has the discretion to
impose corporal punishment instead of or in addition to imprisonment in the
case of any male under the age of 18 found guilty of an offence punishable
with imprisonment.
Fines
Fines are usually specified under the offence-creating statutes. Where the law
does not state the amount of the fine to be imposed the court may impose
any amount it deems fit though it should not be disproportionate to the
offence committed. With regard to those offences where a fine is imposed the
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court will direct that if the convicted person fails to pay he or she will serve a
prison term of some specified length. Otherwise the term of imprisonment
which a defaulter may suffer is determined according to the scale below;
Amount
P10 or less
More than P10 but less than P20
More than P 20 but less than P100









The court may discharge the offender without punishment where it believes
the case has been proved but feels it would not be sensible for a specified
reason not to punish the offender.
(i) Substantive Jurisdiction: Chiefs
Sentencing powers of chiefs differ according to the rank of the officer
concerned and tribal territory in which he is operating (Establishment
and Jurisdiction of Customary Courts Order). These powers are set out in
the warrant of each officer.
The Minister of Local Government may vary the warrants from time to
time (Customary Court (Amendment) Act, 2001). Most criminal matters
that are handled by customary courts fall within the category designated
'criminal matters' in the warrants. These offences are punished in
conventional ways described in this chapter. Customary courts have been
given enhanced sentencing powers in respect of Stock Theft and Drug
and Drug-related offences. I have outlined below the sentencing powers
of judges at Mochudi court. The warrants were last revised in 1999.
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Paramount chief and deputy chief: (Court Warrant)
Months Compensation Bovines/Equines Goats Strokes
Criminal matters 36 P2000.00 20 80 6
Stock Theft 120 P5000.00 6
Drugs and Related 96 P8 500.00 6
Senior Chief's Representative (Court Warrant)
Months Compensation Bovines/Equines Goats Strokes
Criminal Matters 18 P1000.00 13 50 5
Stock Theft 108 P4000.00 5
Drugs and Related 84 P8000.00 5
Chief's Representative:
Months Compensation Bovines/Equines Goats Strokes
Criminal Matters 12 P600.00 8 40 5
Stock Theft 96 P3000.00 5
Drugs and Related 72 P7 500.00 5
Sentencing: Sentencing in Customary Courts
Introduction
A customary court may sentence a person who has been convicted to a fine,
imprisonment, corporal punishment or a combination of these providing it
does not, amongst other things exceed its jurisdiction (Section 17(1)
Customary Courts (Amendment) Act). Courts may also bind a convicted to
keep the peace (Section 18(1)CCA). The court may, where a charge has been
proved, and having regard to certain factors, discharge the accused without
proceeding to conviction if s/he thinks that it is 'inexpedient to inflict any
punishment.' (Customary Court procedure Rule 19(1)).
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Customary courts are not bound to impose sentences that are prescribed in
the offence-creating sections of the Penal Code and other laws except where
they are otherwise required to do so (Section 49, CCA). So the punishment or
mix of punishments that a court imposes in any particular instance is a
matter entirely at the discretion of the court.
By extension, the maximum penalty that a customary court may impose for a
particular offence is entirely independent of the maximum prescribed by the
penal code and other statutes for that offence. The upper limit in each
instance is a function of the sentencing powers of the judge presiding over
the case (Sll (2) CCA). Before the latest amendment to the Customary Court
Act became effective in January 2002, there was some restriction of a general
nature limiting the period of imprisonment which any higher customary
court could impose to 12 months (Section 11(2) Customary Court
(Amendment) Act 1997). That restriction has been removed.
However some fetters have been placed on the exercise of these discretionary
powers to the extent that the court is prohibited from inflicting punishment
which is 'not in proportion to the nature and circumstances of the offence
and the circumstances of the offender'(S 17(4) Customary Court
(Amendment) Act, 2002). However it is not clear how proportionality and
circumstances of the offender are to be determined.
Corporal Punishment
Until the latest amendments to Customary Court Act became effective in
2002, corporal punishment was, with the possible exception of cases
involving offenders under the age of 18 years, restricted to a limited category
of offences.
343
All ordinary offences triable in customary courts are now potentially
punishable with thrashing. Prior to the aforementioned amendment, offences
that could be punished with corporal punishment included a number of
offences which form much of the staple of customary trials: Assault
Occasioning Bodily Harm, Burglary, Stock Theft and Offences Contrary to
the Stock Theft Act (Schedule under Customary Court (Amendment) Act
1997).
Females or anyone who the court considers might be over the age 40 years
may not be sentenced to corporal punishment (S 17(2) Customary Courts
(Amendment Act). In respect of males under the 18 years, the court has
discretion to order that they receive punishment in addition to or in place of
other punishments (S17(3)CCA).
Fines
A customary court may punish any offence with a fine. A fine or any part of
a fine may be used to compensate the victim of a crime providing s/he
agrees not to pursue a suit for damage or injury suffered for the same offence
(Section 25 CCA). In practice courts prefer to keep fines and compensation
awards separate.
The scale for determining punishment in cases of default is as follows :(
section 24(1), Customary Courts (Procedure) Rules).
Amount
PI or less
More than PI but less than P2
More than P 2 but less than P10










Compensation awards do not require elaborate procedure to determine the
level of the award to be made nor is a special application necessary before a
compensation order can be made. Compensation awarded may be in money
or in kind (S 24(1) Customary Courts Act).
A customary court may order the attachment and sale of the offender's
property if s/he fails to pay the amount awarded or any instalments as
required(S 24(4) CCA). Where the court has decided that a default of
payment will be punished with imprisonment the term of imprisonment
should be such as would 'satisfy the justice of the case. (Rule 29(1)
Customary (Procedure) Rules). The scale for determining the period of
imprisonment is the same one used in the case of defaults on fines. However,
the offender is entitled to have the term of imprisonment imposed in default
of payment of a fine or compensation proportionately reduced on payment
of part of the fine or compensation ordered (Rule 29(3) Customary
(Procedure) Rules).
Suspended Sentences
There are two types of suspended sentences that a customary court can
impose. It may after convicting the offender postpone the passing of sentence
for a period of not more than three years on certain condition(s). If after
expiration of the period, the offender has not breached the conditions of
recognizance the court may discharge him without imposing any sentence.
If the court is minded to impose a different form of suspended sentence it
may pass a wholly or partially suspended sentence subject to certain
conditions for a period of not more than three years.
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Binding Over
If it so chooses a court may, instead of or in addition to any other
punishment, cause a convicted person to enter into a bond in amounts
determined by the courts itself, 'on condition that he shall keep the peace and
be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding three years' (S18,CA).
Discharge without Conviction
A court may under certain circumstances discharge an accused person
without proceeding to conviction (S 19(1) CCA). It may do so, if having
taken into account certain factors such as the age of the accused or the trivial
nature of the offence, it considers that it would not be prudent to inflict any
punishment. The court can only discharge the accused person without
proceeding to conviction if it believes that the charge has been proved.
However, for purposes of restoring any property that may be involved in the
case to its original owner or purposes of seizure of such property by the state
the case is regarded as being in no way different from any other where a
conviction has been made(S 19(2) CCA).
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APPENDIX C: Prescribed Punishments for Common Offences under
the Penal Code
Table 23 : Prescribed punishments - common offences
General Offence Offence Mandatory Maximum (more
Class of Creating discretion)
Offence Statute
Assault and AC S 246 Penal Imprisonment not exceeding 1
related Code (PC) year.
offences ABH S 247 PC Imprisonment not exceeding 5
years with or without corporal
UW S 233 PC punishment.
Imprisonment not exceeding 7
years
Property TC S 271 as read Imprisonment not exceeding 3
Offences with (ARW) years
264 PC
Stealing from S 275 PC Imprisonment not exceeding 10
dwelling years
SBS S277 Imprisonment not exceeding 7
years
SS(Stealing 274PC Imprisonment not exceeding 14
Stock) years.
HB 300 (la) Imprisonment not exceeding 10
years
Burglary 300 (2) Imprisonment not exceeding 14
years
Other UIL Fine not exceeding P50 or
Common imprisonment not exceeding 3
Offences months or to both.
CN Imprisonment not exceeding 1
year.
Keys: AC - Assault Common; ABH-Assault Occasioning Actually Bodily
Harm; UW-Unlawful Wounding; TC-Theft Common; SBS -Stealing By
Servant; HB-House Breaking; UIL- Use of Insulting Language; CN- Common
Nuisance
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APPENDIX D: Technical deficiencies in the presentation of cases: Police
Prosecutors and Police Investigating Officers
Illustrative examples of technical difficulties encountered by
untrained/poorly trained personnel
Case 1
Prosecutor (PR): At the police station were you issued with a medical report
form
Prosecution WitnessNol (PW1): yes
PR: How can you identify the same?
PW1: If the police showed it to me
Interpreter: if they showed it to you how would you be able to tell it is the
form in question?
PR: by the injuries I suffered
PR: what else?
Interpreter: how else can you identify it?
PW1:1 can tell by the injuries only
PR: Do you know where the injuries are written on the form?
I don't know whether the doctor wrote them down according to how I
described them to him or not
PR: But how do you know that it is the one filled in by the doctor?
PW1: He gave it to me after completing it and I took it to the police
PR: your worship I am making an application for the form to be admitted in
evidence
Magistrate: But there is no clear evidence how he will identify it. How will
he identify it? What else can you identify it with?
PW1: Because I gave it to the police
Magistrate: No-no .We is not in dispute that you gave the police the form we
want you to tell the court how can identify it




PR: It bears whose signature?
Interpreter: whose signature? Whose signature are you saying is on the
form?
PW1: How do you mean?
Interpreter: Supposing I lost my blouse and the police recover it I should be
able to tell them how I can identify it - may be it has burn marks or some
buttons are missing I would have to tell them about all that.
PW1:1 can tell by the injuries that it is the correct form if the doctor recorded
what I told.
Magistrate: But you said you don't know how to read or write and now you
want to tell this court through signature
PW1:1 said through injuries I showed him my injuries
Magistrate: What kind of form was it?
PW1: Its just form
Magistrate: Is that it
PW1: Its long time since I last saw it
Magistrate: We want to know the identity features of the form
You can't remember the form?
PW1: If I saw it again I could tell whether or not it was the one
Case2
Pw2: I traced the accused Lebang Mosweu and interrogated her. Her
explanation to me was that she burnt...
Magistrate: inadmissible
PW2: When I interrogated her she explained that... when I interrogated her
she appeared to make a confession statement and it also looked like there
were some elements of provocation. I therefore took her to the District
Commissioner who is empowered accept such explanations and she
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submitted her confession statement. Which I wish to produce before this
court as part of evidence
PR: How can you identify the confession statement?
PW2: that statement is typed and bears the District Commissioner's signature
PR: What is his name?
PW2: the District Commissioner is Mr Ongadile
PR: What else? I think that is all about the statement. Sorry it explains that
the accused burnt the....
PRO: What are the identity features of the statement?
PW2: That is all I can remember about the statement
PR: Your worship I wish to make an application for the statement to be
admitted
Magistrate: But there are many statements done by the District
Commissioner from time to time. What is particular about this one? Yes what
else do you remember about the statement?
PW2: It's dated 25th September 2000 and bears the names of the accused
person. I indexed the number A25 on the statement in my own hand
PR: I make application for the statement to be admitted
Acts intended to cause grievous harm
Case 3
PR: Did you get a report of acts intended to cause grievous harm from the
complainant on the 7th of July 2001?
PW2: Yes
PR: What did the complainant say the accused used to try to stab him?
PW2: The complaint said the accused had an Okapi knife. He drew an Okapi
knife.
PR: Did the complainant mention the colour of that knife to you? Did you
ask the complainant about the colour of the knife?
PW2: He said it was an Okapi knife
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PR: I am talking about the colour not the type. The colour..?
PW2: Yes .Did the complainant mention the colour of the knife to you?
PR: No. he said it was an Okapi knife, which I believe is brown in colour.
PW2: Did he say it was brown in colour?
PR: No - I believed it was brown
PW2: You believed it was brown - that is not what you were told by the
complainant? He just said it was an Okapi knife but..
PR: And you took it to be a brown knife?
PW2: He never mentioned the brown colour
PR: Who brought in the brown colour then?
PW2: No one brought it in. Myself I just believe it was brown. He never
mentioned the brown colour.
PR: Don't tell this court what you believe. Tell the court what the
complainant told you.
PW: The complainant said the accused tried to stab him with an Okapi knife
The complainant wanted to know how the court should believe there was a
knife used. Do you mean that if the exhibit is not available there is no offence
committed?
An act has been done though the knife is not here as part of the evidence.
Magistrate: Did you investigate the case?
PW2: Yes
Magistrate: Were you satisfied with the investigation?
PW2: My investigation.. .uhmm I am satisfied with it
Magistrate: Were you satisfied with the investigation?
PW2:1 am satisfied with it
Magistrate: Do you honestly believe that you have done enough
investigation in this case?
PW2: Yes
Magistrate: Why so? What makes you think you have done enough already?
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PW2: I tried to see what he had been trying to use to stab the complainant
but unfortunately the accused said he got the knife... the knife was not his he
just got it from a vehicle
Magistrate: When he told you that you thought that was enough for you as
the investigating officer
PW2: Yes your worship
Magistrate: Even though you felt he was misleading you still felt it enough?
PW2: Yes
Magistrate: Even though he had misled you still felt you investigation was
enough?
PW2: Yes. I thought it was enough
Magistrate: You still felt it was enough
PW2: Yes
Magistrate: You talked of the accused person using a knife... saying that the
owner of the vehicle they were using took the knife. Did you follow the same
vehicle to collect the knife?
PW2: No your worship it was already ... it was nowhere to be found as the
defendant said he just got a lift from the vehicle and vehicle was nowhere to
be found
Magistrate: Who was the owner of the vehicle?
PW2: He said he just got a lift from the vehicle so I didn't confirm that
Magistrate: Did you ask him about the owner of the vehicle?
PW2: No I didn't
Magistrate: Evidence of the hammer - there was an allegation about him
using a hammer?
PW2: I did interrogate the complainant about him using the hammer on the
defendant
Magistrate: So you didn't believe that the complainant also used a hammer?
PW2: No
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Magistrate: What made you not to believe?
PW2:1 couldn't believe because those we just allegations
Magistrate: Why didn't you ask him to produce the hammer that was
mentioned by the accused person?
PW2: (Silence)
Magistrate: The accused person told you the complainant had used a
hammer why didn't you ask the complainant about it?
PW2: To do what with it
Magistrate: As part of your evidence
PW2: No I didn't get it from the complaint as part of evidence... we are
talking about the knife which...
PR: That is all your worship.
Defendant: Do you want to tell the court that you didn't trace me because
you believed me
PW2:1 traced you and then you said the knife was not yours
Defendant: How should the court believe that a knife was used?
PW2: It cannot believe because it is not in front... because it has not been
produced here
Case 4
PR: Constable, can run this one past me, what offence is the accused
charged with?
PW2: Assault occasioning bodily harm
PR: I want you to explain something to this court. You charged the accused
charged the accused with assault occasioning bodily harm I want to know
whether when the complaint came to report the incident he appeared to be
injured or was the swollen wrist the only problem
PW2: The wrist was swollen and the doctor confirmed
PR: How did the doctor confirm - verbally or did he write anything down?
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PW2:1 gave the complainant a doctors' report form, which he later returned
to me.
PR: What is the procedure? Is it not the procedure that once you have
received such a report form from a complainant you file and when the time
comes for you to give evidence you produce the report before the court as
part of your evidence confirming that the complainant was in fact assaulted?
PW2: It is true that such a report must be produced in court
PR: I want to know who is supposed to produce the report.
PW2: The investigator




PW2: It wasn't careless I just forgot.
PR: I heard you say that the complainant told you he had been assaulted. Did
he indicate to you whether any instrument was used on him during the
assault?
PW2: His walking stick
PR: Is not procedure for the investigating procedure to take away such an
instrument so that it can be produced in court as part of evidence?
PW2: It is the procedure
PR: Now did you produce the stick as part of your evidence in this case?
PW2:No. Because the (Mr X) complainant uses it as his walking stick
PR: Are telling this court, if I may use your own words, you are saying you
did not take the stick away because Mr X the complainant uses it as a
walking stick, if I may ask, supposing someone has been murdered using a
knife, are you telling this court that you would not take away the knife
simply because it is used around the house/home to cut meat?
PW2: That is different
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PR: Do you consider the object's uses to the owner or whether it has been
used as weapon?
PW2: Well I do consider whether it has been used as weapon
PR: What was your primary concern here?
PW2: That it was his walking stick - he uses it to support himself
PR: And that was the cause you were going to follow regardless of what the
laws says? That all you were thinking about?
PW2: Yes.
PR: Why? Is that your idea of how things should be done?
PW2: He uses it to support himself.
PR: I see. That is your idea of how things should be done.
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APPENDIX E: Profile ofKgatleng District and Mochudi
DISTRICT PROFILE:
Population of Kgatleng District in 2001: 73 507
Males: 35 734; Females: 37 773
Household Heads: 51.3% households were headed by females
Economically Active Population (employed and unemployed) in the District:
27 550
Employed Persons: 22 032
Unemployed Persons: 5 518 (or 20%)
MOCHUDI VILLAGE PROFILE:
Settlement Type: Peri-Urban/Major Village
Functions: Headquarters of Kgatleng District; Traditional Capital of
Bakgatla-ba -Kgafela
Population of Mochudi in 2001: 39 349
Population Growthl991-2001: 25 525-39 349
SOURCE: Kgatleng District Development Plan6:2003-2009
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APPENDIX F: Interview Instrument








4) How long have you been Presiding Officer/Prosecutor/Court Clerk?
5) Did you receive any training related to your present job? If yes specify?
6) What kind of work did you do before you took up your current job (as a
magistrate/chief) ?
7)Do find that your previous experience helps in your work as a
presiding officer/prosecutor/court clerk? How?
8) Do you think specialist training is necessary for this job? Why
Section 2: Role Perception
9) What do you perceive your role in the court room as a presiding officer to
be?
10) What is your role in relation to a) Assessment of Evidence b)
Sentencing?
11) Does the having no prosecutor in some of the cases affect your role in
anyway? (Chiefs only)
12) Does your role change in cases where the defendant does not have a
legal representative? (Magistrates only)
Section3: Types ofCases Handled by the Interviewee
13) What types of criminal cases do you handle?
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14) Which are the most common?
15) When do these offences generally occur?
16) Where do they take place?
17)What do you think is/are the major cause(s) of the most common
offences (theft, assault, burglary ,whatever the case may be)?
18) Which of these cases do you find the most difficult to deal with and why?
19) Which of these cases do you find easiest to deal with? And why?
20)Do you think there have been any changes in the pattern of crime
since you started work as presiding officer in this jurisdiction?
21)If yes, explain what has changed ? Why?
Section 3 Range of Powers
22) What range of disposal of options do you have?
23) Which if any involve mandatory sentencing?
24) Which cases if any, involve any element of discretion in sentencing?
25) Do the available disposal options accord with the type of punishment
you would like to see imposed for assault/theft /burglary etc.?
26What level of evidence is required for a conviction in assault / theft cases?
27) What does the prosecution (complainant/court as the case maybe) need
to prove each case?
28) Is there any benefit for the defendant of pleading guilty?
29) What verdicts are possible on offences charged (theft, assault)?
30) What factors do you generally take into account when sentencing in
assault/theft etc cases?
a) aggravating b) mitigating




32) Have you ever invoked S 316 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence
Act (CP&E) ( i.e order the accused to pay compensation to the victim)?And
Why?
33)If you do, for what type of offences do you order the convicted person
to compensate the victim?
34) Can you remember any cases within the past 12months where you made
such an order?
35) Have you ever called for reconciliation in a criminal case in terms of S321
of the CP&E? If so how often?
36) In what sort cases have you done this? Why?
37) What sort of parties were involved in cases where you felt it necessary to
promote reconciliation?
38) Do you in such cases order proceedings to be stayed?
39) Have handled any such case over the past 12 months?
Chiefs'/Urban Courts Only
40) Are there any cases you have handled where there was no prosecutor?
41) How common are these?
42) What type cases generally tend not have prosecutors?
43) How do they compare with those led by the prosecutor?
44)Do complainants receive any assistance from the court in delineating the
relevant issues?
45) What offences are handled by each of the two police forces (Botswana
Police and Local Police)? Why?
Urban Courts Only
46) What/whose customary law applies in your jurisdiction?
47)Are there any guidelines as to which customary law to apply in
particular cases (e.g civil cases where tribal is expected to apply)?
359
48)Do you receive any complaints from defendants/complainants who
may be concerned about which customary law is going to apply in their
cases?
49) What do you do in such cases? If the case involves:
a) a criminal matter b) a civil matter
Section 4: Interface between Courts
50)How do you relate to the Magistrate/Chief's court in your district as
far as criminal cases are concerned?
51)What type of cases are transferred from the Magistrate to the Chief's
court and vice-versa courts? Why?
52)Are there any instances you can remember where you had to exercise
your revisory powers over customary courts in your area ? Why?
(Magistrates only)
53) Who initiated the motion for revision? (Magistrates only)
54) Have you ever had a case you have tried revised by a magistrate? Why?
(Chiefs only)
55) Who had initiated the motion for revision? (Chiefs only)
Section 5General Views on the Criminal Justice System
56) What do you see as the main objectives of the criminal justice system?
a)punishment b) rehabilitation c)mediation d) incapacitation etc
57How well do you think these objectives are met in practice?
58) How effective are the magistrate courts, the High Court and Customary
courts in meeting these objectives?
59) What are the advantages and /disadvantages of the approach to justice
and procedures that are adopted in each type of court?
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